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Specificity and vantage perspective of autobiographical memories in borderline pathology 
Kris Van den Broeck 
Prof. dr. Filip Raes (supervisor); Prof. dr. Laurence Claes, Prof. dr. Guido Pieters (co-supervisors) 
 
Autobiographical memory (AM), “the aspect of memory that is concerned with the recollection 
of personally experienced past events” (Williams et al., 2007, p. 122), is believed to play an important 
role in the construction and maintenance of one’s self-concept. Compared to controls, patients with 
major depressive disorder (MDD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have repeatedly found to 
show reduced memory specificity (‘overgeneral memory’, OGM). This is generally measured with a word 
cueing task, inviting participants to recall specific memories in response to cues, such as happy, or lazy. 
The aforementioned patients tend to retrieve categories of events, rather than memories that refer to a 
single episode. Furthermore, these patients tend to more often adopt a third-person (observer) 
perspective during voluntary recall. It has been suggested that OGM and observer memories dampen the 
emotional arousal evoked by painful memories, thereby preventing one’s self-concept to destabilise. 
However, in the longer term, in has been shown that both strategies increase one’s vulnerability for 
future complaints. Also, both strategies have found to be associated with rumination or comparison-
driven processes, and OGM is found to correlate with reduced executive functioning. 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a common mental illness with high clinical burden. 
Although BPD patients often have co-morbid PTSD and MDD, findings on OGM are not fully replicated in 
these patients. The first aim of this thesis, therefore, was to get a clearer view on the associations 
between OGM and (co-morbid MDD and PTSD in) BPD. The second aim was to broaden the current 
knowledge on vantage point during recall, which, to our knowledge, has never been studied in BPD 
patients. Recent findings suggest that cues that are highly discrepant towards one’s current self-concept 
increase the likelihood of retrieving OGMs. The third aim was to further investigate the association 
between self-discrepancy on the one hand, and OGM and vantage point during recall on the other hand, 
both in relation to BPD (features). 
After briefly situating our research aims (Chapter 1), we present an overview of the literature on 
OGM in BPD patients (Chapter 2). Our findings suggest that both depressed and traumatic state in BPD 
patients are unrelated to OGM (Chapters 3 and 4). Yet, OGM in BPD is predictive for depression 
symptom severity and trauma symptom severity at six-month follow-up (Chapter 6), and we found a 
negative correlation between OGM and the variety of non-suicidal self-injurious methods used (Chapter 
7). Therefore, we suggest that BPD patients, as depressed and traumatised patients, may benefit from 
therapeutic strategies aimed at increasing memory specificity. With respect to vantage perspective, we 
found that (a) depressed state in BPD is unrelated to the proportion of observer memories retrieved; and 
(b) that BPD patients with PTSD more often adopt an observer perspective, also when retrieving non-
traumatic memories (observer memory retrieval style; Chapter 4). In a non-clinical sample, we found 
that higher levels of observer memories (following high discrepant cues) were associated with more 
interpersonal and anxious-neurotic BPD complaints (Chapter 5). Finally, we developed two methods to 
study the impact of self-discrepancy on the AM characteristics of interest. Using novel indices, we found 
that self-discrepancy was negatively associated with memory specificity in depressed BPD patients 
(Chapter 3). However, using self-discrepant cues, we failed to replicate these findings. Also, prompting 
self-discrepancy had no effect on the vantage point used during recall (Chapter 4). 
We conclude that the current theories on AM organisation seem to apply insufficiently to BPD. 
We consider how the patterns observed in BPD patients with respect to OGM and vantage point during 
recall may be explained by emotional dysregulation and identity disturbance, both characteristic for BPD, 
and we reflect on the validity of the methods used to investigate the role of self-discrepancy. Finally, 
clinical implications and directions for future research are discussed (Chapter 8). 
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De specificiteit en het perspectief van autobiografische herinneringen in relatie tot borderline-klachten 
Kris Van den Broeck 
Prof. dr. Filip Raes (promotor); Prof. dr. Laurence Claes, Prof. dr. Guido Pieters (co-promotoren) 
 
Het autobiografisch geheugen (AG) beheert de herinneringen aan persoonlijke ervaringen. 
Vermoedelijk steunen we in belangrijke mate op het AG om ons zelfconcept te ontwikkelen en te 
handhaven. Patiënten met een majeure depressieve stoornis (MDS) of een post-traumatische 
stressstoornis (PTSS) kunnen minder goed specifieke herinneringen, verwijzend naar eenmalige 
gebeurtenissen, ophalen. Ze hebben een overalgemeen (autobiografisch) geheugen (OAG), en verwijzen 
vaker naar categorieën van gebeurtenissen. Meestal wordt geheugenspecificiteit gemeten door 
respondenten cues aan te bieden, zoals gelukkig of lui, waarna ze specifieke herinneringen moeten 
ophalen. In vergelijking met gezonde proefpersonen, ‘zien’ depressieve en getraumatiseerde patiënten 
hun herinneringen ook vaker vanuit een derde-persoonsperspectief (of observatorperspectief). Mogelijk 
leiden OAG en een meer afstandelijk observatorperspectief ertoe dat pijnlijke herinneringen minder 
intense emoties heractiveren. Zo wordt verhinderd dat iemands zelfconcept gedestabiliseerd raakt. 
Echter, op langere termijn, resulteren beide strategieën in meer klachten. OAG hangt verder samen met 
rumineren en verminderde executieve functies, terwijl het aandeel observatorherinneringen stijgt 
wanneer men zichzelf evalueert. 
De borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis (BPS) is een veelvoorkomende en ernstige psychische 
stoornis. BPS-patiënten hebben vaak PTSS en MDS, maar de bevindingen aangaande OAG worden niet 
altijd gerepliceerd in deze groep. Het eerste doel van dit proefschrift was dan ook een beter zicht te 
krijgen op de samenhang tussen OAG en BPS (en co-morbide MDS en PTSS). Het vergroten van de kennis 
betreffende perspectiefname tijdens het herinneren was ons tweede doel. Voor zover wij weten, is dit 
nooit onderzocht bij BPS-patiënten. Volgens recente bevindingen ontlokken cues die discrepant zijn ten 
aanzien van iemands actuele zelfconcept makkelijker categorische herinneringen. Als derde doel wilden 
we dan ook de relatie tussen zelf-discrepantie enerzijds en OAG en perspectiefname bij herinneringen 
anderzijds verder onderzoeken, steeds in relatie tot BPS(-klachten). 
Eerst situeren we onze onderzoeksvragen (Hoofdstuk 1). Daarna bespreken we alle beschikbare 
studies over OAG bij BPS-patiënten (Hoofdstuk 2). In onze patiëntensteekproeven waren depressie noch 
trauma gerelateerd aan OAG (Hoofdstukken 3 en 4). Anderzijds voorspelt OAG bij BPS-patiënten de 
ernst van depressie en trauma na zes maanden (Hoofdstuk 6), en is OAG negatief geassocieerd met het 
gebruik van meer diverse zelf-verwondende methoden (Hoofdstuk 7). BPS-patiënten hebben daarom 
wellicht baat bij therapeutische strategieën die erop gericht zijn om iemands geheugenspecificiteit te 
vergroten, net als patiënten met MDS en PTSS. Inzake perspectiefname vonden we dat (a) MDS bij BPS-
patiënten ongerelateerd is aan de proportie observatorherinneringen die worden opgehaald; en (b) dat 
BPS-patiënten met PTSS vaker gebruik maken van een observatorperspectief, ook bij het ophalen van 
niet-traumatische herinneringen (observatorstijl; Hoofdstuk 4). In een niet-klinische steekproef was het 
aantal observatorherinneringen (na hoog-discrepante cues) geassocieerd met meer interpersoonlijke en 
angstig-neurotische borderline-klachten (Hoofdstuk 5). Als we zelf-discrepantie onderzochten aan de 
hand van indices, vonden we een inverse relatie tussen de mate waarin de cues zelf-discrepant waren en 
geheugenspecificiteit bij depressieve BPS-patiënten (Hoofdstuk 3). Dit werd niet gerepliceerd als we zelf-
discrepante woorden gebruiken. Perspectiefname en zelf-discrepantie waren evenmin geassocieerd 
(Hoofdstuk 4). 
We concluderen dat de gangbare theorieën over de organisatie van het AG niet eenduidig 
toepasbaar zijn op BPS-patiënten, en reflecteren over de validiteit van de methoden die we gebruikten 
om zelf-discrepantie te onderzoeken. Emotionele disregulatie en een gestoorde identiteitsontwikkeling, 
beide typisch voor BPS, kunnen de geobserveerde patronen met betrekking tot OAG en perspectiefname 
bij BPS-patiënten mogelijk (mede) verklaren. Tenslotte bespreken we de klinische implicaties van onze 
bevindingen en mogelijk toekomstig onderzoek (Hoofdstuk 8). 
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INTRODUCTION OUTLINE 
This first chapter aims to situate our research topics. Therefore, we will first briefly1 
define the concepts that are central to our research. Subsequently, we will present our 
hypotheses, and describe how we investigated them. Finally, we will outline the 
structure of this thesis. 
 
CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 
Autobiographical memory is that part of memory that is concerned with the 
management of personally experienced past events. It involves the processing of 
experiences, and the storage and retrieval of memories. Autobiographical memories 
are believed to play an important role in the construction, maintenance and evolution 
of one’s self-concept (Conway, 2005; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Prebble, Addis, & 
Tippett, 2013). In addition, autobiographical memory is thought to facilitate daily 
functioning, because it supports the creation of scripts (Tomkins, 1979), and 
contributes to successful social problem solving (Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin, & 
Howells, 1992; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1992). Given the presumed importance of 
autobiographical memory, its functioning and characteristics are examined from 
diverse psychological angles. In this thesis, we are especially interested in the specificity 
of voluntary (deliberately retrieved) memories, and in the perspective that is adopted 
while recalling such events. 
                                                     
 
1  Each of the following chapters highlights the concepts relevant for that chapter in more 
detail. In this introductory section, therefore, we confine ourselves to a brief overview of the 
central concepts. 
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For theoretical considerations regarding autobiographical memory, we will often refer 
to the Self-Memory System (SMS), an influential model on autobiographical memory 
organisation and functioning, developed by Conway and colleagues (Conway, 2005; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004 – see also Figure 1). This model 
assumes that autobiographical memories are stored in the ‘autobiographical knowledge 
base’ (AKB). The AKB is a hierarchical structure of layers, with lower layers containing 
more event-specific knowledge, and higher-order layers clustering the episodic 
memories into life time periods (e.g., high school period), and general events (e.g., first-
time experiences). Specific autobiographical memories are thought to crystallise into 
semantic knowledge and into one’s self-concept, i.e., a consistent set of descriptions 
(‘schemas’) about who one actually is and how one actually functions. Additionally, the 
  
Figure 1 The Self-Memory System by Conway et al. (2004, p. 498) 
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self-concept also includes personal goals, i.e., ideas about how one ideally would like to 
be, or about how one thinks one should be according to one’s own or others’ 
standards. According to Conway et al. (2004), people use autobiographical memories to 
consolidate their current self-concept (‘self-coherence’) and to keep track on goal 
attainment processes (‘adaptive correspondence’). The ‘episodic memory system’ 
(EMS), a structure that precedes the AKB, continuously takes snapshots of our 
whereabouts, also including all kinds of perceptual features. Most of these snapshots 
are only available for a short period of time, just long enough to serve adaptive 
correspondence. For instance, when the goal is to pay your groceries, you should have 
access to the memory referring to the moment you handed the money to the cashier. 
However, some episodic memories (e.g., struggling in front of my computer, trying to 
create a concise text) should be available for a longer period of time, because they 
serve higher-order goals (e.g., writing a doctoral thesis). These memories get the 
chance to become integrated in the layers of the AKB, and may become relevant for 
self-coherence (e.g., they contribute to the belief that, although writing is a difficult 
process, persistence will result in success). Eventually, gradual changes in one’s self-
concept may occur. 
The processes of self-coherence and adaptive correspondence usually run 
unconsciously, without one being aware of the relevant memories. However, we are 
able to retrieve some memories voluntary, e.g., in response to questions as “What did 
you have for lunch yesterday?”, or “Can you remember the last time you were sad?” 
Such guided search processes usually begin with a broader description of the given 
cues (“What do I usually have for lunch? What did I do yesterday?”, or “Sad reminds me 
of tears, a pillow, my teddy bear…”). These explorations tap into the AKB at the level of 
general events. By further elaborative and matching processes, the search is refined 
over and over again. A temporal and goal-sensitive framework gets activated, and the 
lower layers of the AKB and the episodic clues of the EMS are reached, yielding in a 
specific, detailed autobiographical memory. 
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BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental illness, associated with high 
mortality rates (e.g., Paris & Zweig-Frank, 2001) and frequent use of mental health 
resources (e.g., Bender et al., 2001; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Khera, & Bleichmar, 2001). 
DSM-IV2 criteria of BPD are listed in Table 1, showing that BPD is characterised by 
disturbed relatedness, and affective and behavioural dysregulation (Sanislow et al., 
2002). Point prevalence is rather high – prevalence rates are estimated at 0.4% to 5.9% 
in the general population, and about 15% to 25% in residential psychiatric health care 
(Grant et al., 2008; Gunderson, in Gunderson, 2009; Torgersen, Kringlen, & Cramer, 
2001). In addition, co-morbid Axis I and Axis II disorders are very common amongst BPD 
patients (e.g., Grant et al., 2008; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich, & Silk, 2004; 
Zanarini, Frankenburg, Vujanovic, et al., 2004). For instance, one-year prevalence of 
major depressive disorder (MDD; APA, 1994) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; 
APA, 1994) is 19.3%, and 31.6%, respectively (Grant et al., 2008). 
Many BPD patients suffer from an unstable sense of self (‘identity disturbance’; DSM-IV, 
APA, 1994) and regularly experience difficulties in problem solving (e.g., Kremers, 
Spinhoven, van der Does, & van Dyck, 2006b; Maurex et al., 2010). Thus, studying 
autobiographical memory in BPD patients is particularly relevant, because it may 
contribute to a better understanding of both BPD and autobiographical memory 
functioning. We have focussed on two autobiographical memory deficits that have 
consistently been found in depressed and traumatised patients: reduced memory 
specificity and the relatively more frequent occurrence of observer memories. 
                                                     
 
2  Because this Ph.D. project started before the publication of the DSM 5, we will consistently 
refer to DSM-IV (APA, 1994). 
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MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
Following a study of Williams and Broadbent (1986) almost 30 years ago, numerous 
studies have shown that depressed, remitted depressed, and traumatised patients 
show reduced memory specificity (RMS), also known as overgeneral memory (OGM; 
for an overview, see Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). Williams and 
Broadbent (1986) asked their participants to fill out a set of questionnaires and tests, 
including the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The 
AMT consists of a list of cue words, and respondents are instructed to retrieve a 
specific memory (see Table 2 for definition and example) in response to each cue. The 
Table 1 DSM-IV criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD; APA, 1994, p. 664) 
BPD is manifested by a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-
image, and affects, and marked impulsivity beginning in early adulthood and present in a 
variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following: 
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. Note: Do not include suicidal 
or self-injuring behaviour covered in (5). 
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterised by 
alternating between extremes of idealisation and devaluation. 
3. Identity disturbance: Markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self. 
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., substance 
abuse, binge eating, and reckless driving). Note: Do not include suicidal or self-
injuring behaviour covered in (5). 
5. Recurrent suicidal behaviour, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behaviour. 
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic 
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more 
than a few days). 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness. 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of 
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights). 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms. 
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authors discovered that recent suicide attempters, compared to both hospitalised and 
non-hospitalised controls, retrieved less specific memories. These levels of non-
specificity were especially due to higher levels of categoric memories (Williams & 
Dritschel, 1992). OGM was further found to be associated with poor problem solving 
abilities (e.g., Goddard et al., 1996), higher levels of rumination (e.g., Raes et al., 2005), 
and an avoidant coping style (e.g., Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005).  
Early theoretical considerations state that OGM was merely a symptom of MDD and 
PTSD, perhaps due to reduced executive functioning, inhibiting adequate search 
processes (Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000). However, OGM is found in 
remitted depressed patients as well (e.g., Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder, & 
Table 2 Possible outcomes on the Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) 
Specific memory A memory that refers to a single, personally experienced 
event that did not take longer than one day. 
E.g., Lonely – Last Saturday. My partner was out for work, 
and my friends were not able to come over. I phoned my 
parents, but could not reach them. 
General memory 
 Categoric memory 
 
A memory that refers to a category of events. 
E.g., Lonely – Every Wednesday afternoon at work. All my 
colleagues have outdoor meetings then. 
 Extended memory A memory that refers to an event that took longer than one 
day. 
E.g., Lonely – Those months after we broke up. 
No memory The answer is not an autobiographical memory, e.g., a 
semantic associate. 
E.g., Lonely – “Only the Lonely” is a classic song from Roy 
Orbinson. 
Same event The answer refers to an answer given to a previous cue. 
Omission No answer is given within the time limit.  
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Fartacek, 2000; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale., 2002), and is predictive for the course of 
depressive symptoms (for a meta-analysis, see Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010) and 
post-traumatic symptoms (e.g., Bryant, Sutherland, & Guthrie, 2007; Kleim & Ehlers, 
2008). These findings suggest that OGM is a trait, and that one’s position on this trait 
indicates one’s vulnerability for MDD and PTSD. Therefore, relevant theoretical models, 
such as the SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway et al., 2004), and the CaR-FA-X model 
(Williams et al., 2007) attempt to explain the persistence of OGM apart from the 
presence of acute depressive and trauma symptoms. 
Both frameworks describe the concept of functional avoidance (FA), conceptualising 
OGM as a generalised avoidant coping strategy. Imagine a driving instructor who causes 
a car accident. This event probably does not fit his personal goals (e.g., ‘I would never 
want to be involved in a car accident’). Being less specific during the retrieval of such a 
painful (traumatic, highly self-discrepant) memory may be beneficial in the short term, 
because it prevents the activation of the associated negative emotions, and, therefore, 
the destabilisation of one’s self-concept (which could lead to depressed feelings). Yet, 
in the longer term, and when generalised towards other memories as well, OGM is 
believed to hinder adequate processing of self-discrepant/traumatic information (e.g., 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Hearst-Ikeda, 1996), resulting in the maintenance of 
depressive and post-traumatic symptoms. The CaR-FA-X model identifies two additional 
mechanisms that alone or in combination with FA may be responsible for OGM and 
associated complaints: capture and rumination (CaR), and impaired executive 
resources (X). Executive resources are necessary to adequately fulfil a search process, 
but have been shown to be impaired in depressed (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990) and 
traumatised patients (e.g., Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). CaR 
then, refers to problems that may arise during the first orienting stages of a search 
process. Ruminators or people who have highly elaborated networks concerning the 
self may get entangled (‘captured’) in their thoughts and self-descriptions, which then 
impedes a more thorough search for specific memories. 
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Although BPD patients often have co-morbid PTSD and MDD (Grant et al., 2008), OGM 
in BPD patients is only inconsistently found (see Chapter 2 for a review). The first aim of 
this thesis was to gain more insight into the association between OGM and (a co-
morbid diagnosis of MDD and/or PTSD in) BPD. 
 
VANTAGE POINT DURING RECALL 
Another line of research demonstrated that depressed (e.g., Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), 
remitted depressed (e.g., Bergouignan et al., 2008) and traumatised patients (e.g., 
Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003), compared to controls, also more often retrieve 
memories while using an observer perspective, as set against a field perspective. 
Although people can be forced to view their memories from one perspective or the 
other (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Libby, Eibach, & 
Gilovich, 2005; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), most (recent) recollections are spontaneously 
remembered from one’s original point of view, as if one again ‘sees’ the situation 
through one’s own eyes (‘first person perspective’, or ‘field perspective’; Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2006; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). When recalling other 
memories, one might remember the situation as an observer might see it, seeing 
oneself act in the situation (‘observer perspective’, ‘third person perspective’, or ‘fly 
on the wall perspective’). The first kind of memories are generally experienced as more 
emotional and detailed, whereas in observer mode one is more likely to focus on the 
objective circumstances than on the affective elements (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 
McIsaac & Eich, 2002; 2004; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; 
Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014). 
Why do depressed and traumatised patients recall greater proportions of observer 
memories? First, similar to OGM, it has been suggested that observer memories could 
serve functional avoidance (FA). Indeed, the use of an observer perspective is found to 
be positively associated with avoidant coping strategies (Kenny & Bryant, 2007; Kuyken 
& Moulds, 2009; Lemogne et al., 2009; McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Williams & Moulds, 2007), 
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and, as mentioned above, observer memories generally evoke less emotional arousal. 
Second, observer memories are found to become more likely when one evaluates 
oneself, or when one needs to compare one’s actual self with a former or future self 
(Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005). 
Remember the driving instructor who caused an accident. Such an abrupt distressing 
event may threaten to disorganise one’s self-concept. Focussing on the consistencies 
between one’s current self and former selves, may add to self-coherence. Third, Libby 
and Eibach (2011) argue that the perspective one adopts during retrieval is rather 
motivated by how one conceptualises the retrieved life event in relation to the facets 
of one’s self. The adoption of a field perspective is assumed to address the experiential 
self, because this perspective evokes concrete features of a situation. Observer 
memories on the other hand, would lead people to frame that event in a broader 
context, e.g., one’s self-beliefs, or in relation to other significant events. According to 
this theory, and opposed to the concept of perspective taking as a FA strategy, observer 
memories may even intensify emotional responses. 
An overarching theoretical framework about the functions of and mechanisms behind 
vantage perspective during autobiographical recall is missing. However, parallels with 
OGM seem obvious. The second aim of this thesis was to broaden the current 
knowledge on vantage perspective during memory retrieval. To our knowledge, 
vantage perspective has never been studied in BPD patients. We therefore aimed to 
shed some light on the occurrence and relations of observer memories in BPD patients. 
 
SELF-DISCREPANCY 
As described above, FA is especially relevant when the retrieval of memories highlights 
the discrepancies between one’s current self and one’s personal goals. This implies that 
the likelihood of retrieving OGMs differs from one person to another and depends on 
the AMT cues that are used. Indeed, some support has been found that the meaning of 
a cue at least in part determines memory specificity in (remitted) depressed (e.g., 
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Barnhofer, Crane, Spinhoven, & Williams, 2007; Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; 
Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 2007) and borderline patients 
(Spinhoven et al., 2007, study 2). As far as we know, the association between vantage 
point during retrieval and self-discrepancy has never been examined before. However, 
if vantage point serves FA, it would be reasonable to expect higher proportions of 
observer memories when respondents are asked to retrieve self-discrepant memories. 
The third aim of this thesis was to further investigate the association between self-
discrepancy and memory specificity, and to explore the association between self-
discrepancy  and vantage point during recall.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical and clinical relevance of autobiographical memory and the clinical 
burden of MDD, PTSD, and BPD justify a thorough study of autobiographical memory 
characteristics in these patients. The general aim of this thesis was to clarify the 
associations between OGM and vantage point during recall on the one hand, and (a co-
morbid diagnosis of MDD and PTSD in) BPD on the other hand. Following a critical 
analysis of all relevant studies (with respect to OGM, see Chapter 2), we formulated six 
hypotheses: 
1. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY DISTURBANCES (IN BPD, BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY) DEPEND ON 
THE AMT CUES USED. 
Usually, the AMT consists of a standard set of cues. Personal connotations 
respondents make in response to cues are neglected this way. However, it is only 
reasonable to assume that different cues evoke different memories in different 
people. 
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2. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY DISTURBANCES IN BPD ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A CO-MORBID 
DEPRESSED STATE AND/OR DEPRESSION SYMPTOM SEVERITY 
Despite the strong associations between OGM and MDD, current and previous 
depressed states have not been systematically assessed in studies questioning 
OGM in BPD. If depressed state was administered, inconsistent outcomes have 
been found. We thus cannot exclude that autobiographical memory disturbances 
may be solely associated to (previous) depressed state(s). Furthermore, given 
previous findings in non-BPD patients suggesting that (remitted) depressed 
patients report higher proportions of observer memories, we hypothesised that 
vantage perspective during recall may be mainly associated with depressed state 
in BPD patients as well. 
3. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY DISTURBANCES IN BPD ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A CO-MORBID 
DIAGNOSIS OF PTSD AND/OR TRAUMA SYMPTOM SEVERITY. 
Likewise, despite the association between OGM and trauma symptoms and a co-
morbid diagnosis of PTSD (Moore & Zoellner, 2007), and although many BPD 
patients have been exposed to trauma, the association between the presence of 
PTSD or trauma symptoms and autobiographical memory disturbances in BPD 
has only gained little attention. Indeed, autobiographical memory disturbances 
in BPD may be mainly associated with PTSD/ trauma symptoms. 
4. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY DISTURBANCES IN BPD ARE ASSOCIATED WITH PHENOTYPICAL 
BPD FEATURES. 
Because the diagnosis of BPD has many different phenotypes, autobiographical 
memory disturbances in BPD may be associated with one or more DSM criteria 
(APA, 1994) or BPD symptoms in particular. To our knowledge, this has never 
been tested before with respect to OGM. However, it might explain why 
previous findings on OGM in BPD have been mixed. Vantage perspective during 
autobiographical memory retrieval has never been studied in BPD patients at all. 
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5. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY DISTURBANCES IN BPD ARE RELATED TO A LESS FAVOURABLE 
OUTCOME ON BPD SYMPTOMS, DEPRESSIVE SYMPTOMS, AND/OR TRAUMA SYMPTOMS.  
According to the functional avoidance hypothesis, the autobiographical memory 
disturbances of interest predict a diminished reduction of complaints in the 
longer term, suggesting an increased vulnerability. In non-BPD patients, OGM 
has indeed been found to predict the course of depression (Sumner et al., 2010) 
and post-traumatic symptom severity at follow-up (e.g., Bryant et al., 2007; 
Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). Likewise, the adoption of an observer perspective during 
the retrieval of traumatic events shortly following trauma is found to predict 
PTSD status at 12-month follow-up (Kenny et al., 2009). As far as we know, the 
predictive value of vantage perspective during recall for the course of (MDD or 
PTSD in) BPD has never been examined. With respect to OGM, Kremers et al. 
(2006a) found that OGM was not predictive for future complaints in their sample 
of BPD patients. 
6. PREVIOUSLY FOUND ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY DISTURBANCES 
AND OTHER VARIABLES ARE REPLICATED IN BPD PATIENTS 
OGM in depressed and traumatised patients has been found to be associated 
with higher levels of rumination (e.g., Raes et al., 2005), cognitive avoidance 
(e.g., Hermans et al., 2005), and with reduced executive functioning (e.g., 
Dalgleish et al., 2007). In addition, we hypothesise that OGM in our sample of 
BPD patients will be associated with socio-demographic variables as age and 
education (see also Chapter 2), dissociation (Jones et al., 1999), and non-suicidal 
self-injury (Startup et al., 2001), as was found previously in other BPD samples. 
Finally, we will explore whether vantage point during recall is associated with 
these variables in our sample of BPD patients. 
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METHODS 
We have tested these hypotheses in a large sample of patients suffering from 
personality disorders (N = 74, with 55 diagnosed with BPD; Chapters 4, 6, and 7), in a 
smaller clinical sample (N = 34, all BPD patients; Chapter 3), and in two non-clinical 
samples (N = 148 and N = 120; Chapter 5, and 8), using different versions of the AMT to 
measure memory specificity and vantage perspective during recall. To test Hypothesis 1 
(the potential role of self-discrepancy), we developed a method to calculate indices 
expressing to what extent the standard AMT is discrepant towards one’s current self-
concept (Chapter 3). We further administered personalised AMTs (Chapter 4), and 
written ‘group-specific’ AMTs (non-clinical samples, e.g., Chapter 5). For the 
personalised AMTs, we used each respondent’s most self-discrepant self-guides they 
provided during the administration of the Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ; Higgins, 
Klein, & Strauman, 1985). The ‘group-specific’ AMTs were constructed using cues that 
were judged as high or low discrepant by clinicians for patients with MDD or BPD. 
To examine whether OGM and observer memories were particularly associated with 
MDD (severity), PTSD (symptom severity), or BPD (features), we included interviews 
(e.g., Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis I and II) and tests (e.g., 
Assessment of DSM-IV Personality Disorders; Beck Depression Inventory-II; Borderline 
Syndrome Index; Impact of Event Scale) for proper diagnosis of MDD, PTSD, and BPD, 
and to assess symptom severity. 
To examine Hypothesis 5 (on the predictive value of OGM and observer memories for 
future depressive, trauma-related, or BPD complaints), we have included a six-month 
follow-up phase in the large clinical BPD trial, which was completed by 61.11% of the 
BPD patients. 
Finally, in an attempt to replicate previous associations between OGM and other 
constructs found in depressed and traumatised patients (Hypothesis 6), we 
administered a large test battery in our large clinical BPD sample assessing, e.g., 
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rumination, experiential avoidance, and dissociation. This also allowed us to explore 
potential associations between observer memories on the one hand, and these 
constructs on the other hand. 
We always used standard data-analytic techniques (multivariate regression, analysis of 
variance, bootstrapping), and most of our measures had proven reliability and validity. 
 
DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature on OGM in BPD patients, published so 
far. We formulate some topics that should be taken into account when conducting 
future research, in order to control for methodological concerns and the complexity of 
the BPD diagnosis. 
In Chapter 3, we focus on Hypotheses 1 and 2. More precisely, we studied the impact of 
self-discrepant information on the specificity of autobiographical memory retrieval. As 
outlined above, we created indices expressing to what extent the AMT was relevant 
and discrepant for each respondent. We then examined the association between these 
indices and memory specificity in depressed and non-depressed BPD patients. 
In Chapter 4, we focus on Hypotheses 1 to 3. More precisely, in line with Hypothesis 2, 
we investigated in our large clinical BPD sample whether (current or remitted) 
depressed BPD patients show more OGM and retrieve more observer memories than 
never depressed BPD patients. Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 3, we examined 
whether BPD patients with a co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD more often adopt an 
observer perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval, and whether they are 
less specific than BPD patients without PTSD. Finally, extending our findings of Chapter 
3 on the role of the content of the cues (Hypothesis 1), we now used personalised 
AMTs to prompt self-discrepancy. We examined whether this resulted in more OGM 
and higher proportions of observer memories than standard AMT administration. 
Furthermore, we explored whether the impact of self-discrepancy on the specificity and 
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vantage perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval was associated with 
depressed or traumatic state. 
Chapter 5 then, reports on the findings of the larger non-clinical study, investigating the 
association between vantage perspective during recall and borderline symptom clusters 
(Hypothesis 4), and the potential impact of cue-discrepancy on this relationship 
(Hypothesis 1). 
In Chapter 6, we turn to Hypothesis 5, testing whether memory specificity added to the 
prediction of depression symptom severity and trauma symptom severity of BPD 
patients at six-month follow-up. 
Finally, Hypothesis 6 is partially investigated in Chapter 7. In fact, we attempted to 
replicate earlier findings on the (negative) association between OGM and the frequency 
of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) in BPD patients (Startup et al., 2001). 
In Chapter 8, we summarise our findings with respect to each of our research aims. 
Considering previous findings, and the strengths and shortcomings of our studies, we 
then discuss to what extent the current models on autobiographical memory 
organisation are applicable to BPD patients, and how emotional dysregulation and/or 
identity disturbance, two characteristics of BPD, could add to an explanation of the 
observed patterns of findings. Finally, we formulate repercussions for therapy and 
directions for future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
Overgeneral memory (OGM), the tendency to retrieve categories of memories rather 
than single events, is often observed in (previously) depressed and traumatised 
patients. This chapter reviews the findings on OGM in relation to borderline personality 
disorder (BPD). Although depression and trauma are very common in BPD patients, 
OGM has not been consistently found in this population. Methodological issues 
however, may impede researchers from unambiguously drawing conclusions about this 
finding. These limitations are listed. We further investigate to what extent the current 
findings on OGM in BPD are consistent with the prevailing theoretical models on 
autobiographical memory organisation. Finally, directions for model fine-tuning and 
future research are suggested. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
First described by Williams and Broadbent (1986), overgeneral memory (OGM) is a 
robust finding in depressed, previously depressed, and traumatised patients (for an 
overview, see Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). OGM refers to the 
difficulties these clinical groups experience in retrieving specific information from their 
autobiographical memory, typically assessed using the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). In this task, respondents are asked to recall specific 
memories in response to cue words (e.g., anxious). Instead of recalling, as instructed, 
detailed information on “personally experienced events that happened only once and 
did not last longer than one day”, the aforementioned patients tend to retrieve 
categories of events rather than specific recollections (e.g., “Whenever I visit my 
mother-in-law”, rather than “When my mother-in-law turned 60 and invited us over for 
coffee and cake”). OGM is also associated with poor problem solving abilities (e.g., 
Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996), higher levels of rumination (e.g., Raes et al., 2005), 
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and an avoidant coping style (e.g., Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005; 
Muenks, 2010). 
Initially, OGM was considered as a symptom of emotional disorders, e.g., following the 
premature abortion of guided search processes (Norman & Bobrow, 1979; Reiser, Black 
& Abelson, 1985). However, more recent frameworks, such as the Self-Memory System 
(SMS; Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) 
and the CaR-FA-X model (Williams et al., 2007) suggest that OGM also may play a more 
causal role in the onset and/or maintenance of a depressive state or post-traumatic 
symptoms. According to these models, specific retrieval of painful memories may 
reactivate related emotions, which may in turn be threatening for the stability of one’s 
self-concept. Therefore, in order to avoid reliving painful memories, patients are 
thought to have learned, by means of negative reinforcement and generalisation, to 
stay at a more general level. This is known as functional avoidance (FA). Although FA 
may prevent emotional turmoil in the short term, it is believed to lead to the enduring 
existence of traumatic intrusions in the longer term. 
The SMS more closely describes the mechanisms that may be underlying FA, suggesting 
the likelihood of retrieving OGMs may differ from one person to another and 
depending on the AMT cues that are used. In 2004, Conway et al. defined the Working 
Self (WS), which has two, potentially conflicting tasks. First, and foremost, the WS 
should construct and maintain an accurate, integrated and stable sense of self over 
time (‘self-coherence’). It therefore makes information that supports current self-
concepts highly available. Second, the WS should monitor progress in goal-directed 
activities (‘adaptive correspondence’). Problems may arise when discrepancies between 
one’s actual condition and one’s desired state (goal) are strongly emphasised. A 
business man who has always dreamt of being successful and rich probably finds it very 
difficult when he finds himself being dejected due to a missed promotion. In order to 
prevent destabilisation of one’s self-concept (and potentially a full-blown depression), 
resources are then shifted away from adaptive correspondence to self-coherence. In 
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case of guided search processes, this action will result in the inability to retrieve event-
specific knowledge. The SMS thus suggests that it would be more difficult (or unlikely) 
to recall specific information in response to cues that tap into domains that are highly 
discrepant from one’s actual self. Data from Crane, Barnhofer, and Williams (2007) 
support this idea. 
The CaR-FA-X model identifies two additional mechanisms that alone or in combination 
with FA may be responsible for OGM and associated complaints: capture and 
rumination (CaR), and impaired executive resources (X). Executive resources are 
necessary to adequately fulfil a search process, but have been shown to be impaired in 
depressed (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990) and traumatised patients (e.g., Moradi, Taghavi, 
Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). CaR then, refers to problems that may arise 
during the first orienting stages of a search process. Ruminators or people who have 
highly elaborated networks concerning the self may get entangled (‘captured’) in their 
thoughts and self-descriptions, which then impedes a more thorough search for specific 
memories. 
In this chapter we will focus on the findings on OGM in patients suffering from 
borderline personality disorder (BPD). DSM-IV criteria of BPD are listed in Table 1 
(Chapter 1, p. 7), showing that BPD is characterised by disturbed relatedness, affective 
and behavioural dysregulation (Sanislow et al., 2002). BPD is a severe mental illness, 
associated with high morbidity (e.g., Paris & Zweig-Frank, 2001) and frequent use of 
mental health resources (e.g., Bender et al., 2001; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Khera, & 
Bleichmar, 2001). In addition, co-morbid Axis I (e.g., Grant et al., 2008; Zanarini, 
Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich, & Silk, 2004) and Axis II (e.g., Grant et al., 2008; Zanarini, 
Frankenburg, Vujanovic, et al., 2004) disorders are very common amongst BPD patients. 
General prevalence is rather high – prevalence rates are estimated at 0.4% to 5.9% in 
the general population, and about 15% to 25% in residential psychiatric health care 
(Torgersen, Kringlen, & Cramer, 2001; Grant et al., 2008; Gunderson, in Gunderson, 
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2009) – with no differences between males and females (Leichsenring, Leibing, Kruse, 
New, & Leweke, 2011).  
Patients diagnosed with BPD often have co-morbid post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD; APA, 1994; up to 31.6% of BPD patients met criteria for PTSD during the last 12 
months, according to Grant et al., 2008) and major depressive disorder (MDD; APA, 
1994; up to 19.3% of BPD patients met criteria for MDD during the last 12 months), and 
they report mood-state independent rumination (e.g., Abela, Payne, & Moussaly, 2003; 
Smith, Grandin, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006) and disturbed executive resources (Maurex, 
2009). Furthermore, many BPD patients suffer from an unstable sense of self (‘identity 
disturbance’; DSM-IV, APA, 1994) and regularly experience difficulties in solving 
problems (e.g., Kremers, Spinhoven, van der Does, & van Dyck, 2006b; Maurex et al., 
2010). Therefore, and given the assumed role of OGM as an emotion regulation 
strategy during psychopathology, we would expect that BPD patients, too, would show 
problems retrieving specific memories. In any case, it could be useful to investigate 
OGM in BPD patients, given the current ideas and findings on the role of 
autobiographical memory in the construction of one’s self-concept (e.g., Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Jørgensen et al., 2012) and its involvement in problem solving 
(e.g., Sutherland & Bryant, 2008). 
In this chapter we will discuss in detail the findings on OGM in patients with BPD. 
Additionally, we will investigate to what extent these findings are consistent with the 
prevailing theoretical models on autobiographical memory organisation described 
above. Finally, directions for further research will be outlined. 
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STUDIES ON OGM IN RELATION TO BPD 
Reviewing the literature, we found 12 publications describing eight different samples3 
directly examining OGM in relation to BPD. In eight studies, consisting of seven 
different samples, control groups were included, consisting of either healthy individuals 
(Jones et al., 1999; Jørgensen et al., 2012; Kremers, Spinhoven, & van der Does, 2004; 
Kremers et al., 2006b; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & Startup, 2010; Renneberg, Theobald, 
Nobs, & Weisbrod, 2005) or clinical populations (Artnz, Meeren, & Wessel, 2002; 
Jørgensen et al., 2012; Kremers et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005). Some studies also 
investigated the relationships between OGM and borderline-related symptoms such as 
dissociation (Jones et al., 1999; Kremers et al., 2004; Kremers, Spinhoven, van der Does, 
& van Dyck, 2006a; Renneberg et al., 2005), self-harm (Maurex et al., 2010; Renneberg 
et al., 2005; Startup et al., 2001), problem solving abilities (Kremers et al., 2006b; 
Maurex et al., 2010), traumatic intrusions (Maurex et al., 2010; Kremers et al., 2004; 
2006a), and rumination (Van den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, & Raes, 2012 – see also 
Chapter 3 in this thesis) in BPD patients. 
Table 3 presents an overview of the studies of interest, describing the studied samples 
and the type of Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) that was used. 
                                                     
 
3  Jones et al. (1999) and Startup et al. (2001) reported on one sample. Also, Kremers et al. 
(2004; 2006a; 2006b), and Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, and Williams (2007) 
reported on one sample. 
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Table 3 Sample and AMT characteristics of the studies on OGM in relation to BPD (symptoms) 
   AMT characteristics 
  
Participants 
 
Controls 
Number and 
valence of cues 
Kind of 
cues 
Cue 
presentation 
Time 
limit 
Scoring 
system 
Variable of 
interest 
Jones et al. 
(1999) 
23 BPD 
outpatients (5 
males) 
23 healthy controls, 
matched for age, gender, 
and years of education 
6+ / 6- / 6° Nouns and 
adjectives 
Verbally 30s S / G / O #G 
Startup et 
al. (2001) 
Id Jones et al. 
(1999) 
No control group 6+ / 6- / 6° Nouns and 
adjectives 
Verbally 30s S / G / O #G 
Artnz et al. 
(2002) 
9 outpatients 
with BPD as first 
diagnosis (3 
males) 
9 patients with MDD as 
first diagnosis; 11 patients 
with primarily an AD; 10 
patients suffering 
primarily from a PD other 
than BPD 
Dutch translation 
of original AMT of 
Williams & 
Broadbent (1986): 
5+ / 5- 
Adjectives 
(traits) 
Not reported 60s S / NS #S 
Kremers et 
al. (2004) 
83 BPD 
outpatients (6 
males), of which 
47 also suffered 
from MDD and 
24 had PTSD 
30 healthy controls (0 
males) without childhood 
sexual or physical abuse 
nor Axis I pathology; 26 
MDD outpatients (no 
bipolar or psychotic 
disorder, no substance 
abuse) 
AMT version of 
McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin, & Pitman 
(1995): “a specific 
moment at witch 
you exhibited the 
trait presented”; 
5+ / 5- 
Adjectives 
(traits) 
Visually + 
Verbally 
60s S / C / E / No 
comply or 
missed / O 
%S 
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Renneberg 
et al. (2005) 
30 BPD 
inpatients (0 
males), of which 
19 also suffered 
from MDD, and 
11 had PTSD 
30 healthy controls (0 
males; BDI < 12; max 1 
BPD criterion of SCID), 
matched for age and 
years of education to BPD 
group; 27 MDD inpatients 
(no Axis II cluster B 
diagnosis) 
5+ / 5- / 5° Adjectives Visually 60s S / C #S / #C, but 
also latency to 
S, valence of 
memory 
content, and 
age of 
memory 
Kremers et 
al. (2006a) 
At T1: Id 
Kremers et al. 
(2004); at T3, 55 
participants (5 
males) 
remained, of 
which 37 
suffered initially 
from MDD, and 
18 did not. 
No control group AMT version of 
McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin, & Pitman 
(1995); see 
Kremers et al. 
(2004); 
5+ / 5- 
Adjectives 
(traits) 
Visually + 
Verbally 
60s S / C / E / No 
comply or 
missed / O 
%S 
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Kremers et 
al. (2006b) 
78 BPD patients 
from the 
Kremers et al. 
(2004) study, of 
which 44 also 
had MDD (3 
males), and 34 
(3 males) had a 
history of 
parasuicidal acts 
30 healthy controls from 
the Kremers et al. (2004) 
study 
AMT version of 
McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin, & Pitman 
(1995); see 
Kremers et al. 
(2004); 
5+ / 5- 
Adjectives 
(traits) 
Visually + 
Verbally 
60s S / C / E / No 
comply or 
missed / O 
%S 
Spinhoven 
et al. (2007) 
82 BPD patients 
from the 
Kremers et al. 
(2004) study 
No control group AMT version of 
McNally, Lasko, 
Macklin, & Pitman 
(1995); see 
Kremers et al. 
(2004); 
5+ / 5- 
Adjectives 
(traits) 
Visually + 
Verbally 
60s S / C / E / No 
comply or 
missed / O 
%S 
Maurex et 
al. (2010) 
47 BPD 
outpatients (0 
males), with at 
least 2 suicide 
attempts of 
which at least 1 
during the past 
6 months 
30 healthy controls (no 
BPD according to SCID, no 
trauma exposure), 
matched for educational 
level with the BPD 
patients 
12+ / 12- / 12° Adjectives 
(only?) 
Verbally 30s S / C / E / SA / O #S / #C / #E / 
#SA / #O 
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Reid and 
Startup 
(2010) 
31 BPD 
outpatients (7 
males), of which 
22 also had 
MDD (5 males), 
who were all 
engaged in at 
least 3 episodes 
of self-harming 
behaviour 
during the last 
12 months 
29 healthy controls (6 
males), matched for age 
and gender with the BPD 
patients, and without BPD 
and MDD 
6+ / 6- Nouns and 
adjectives 
Verbally 60s S / C / E / O %S / %C / %E / 
%O 
Jørgensen 
et al. (2012) 
17 BPD 
inpatients (all 
female), and 
without co-
morbid OCD 
diagnosis. 16 of 
them met the 
identity 
disturbance 
criterion as 
measured by 
the SCID. 
23 psychology students 
(‘nonclinical controls’; all 
female); 14 OCD 
inpatients (7 males), of 
which 3 had a co-morbid 
no-BPD Axis II diagnosis as 
measured by the SCID 
No AMT, but a modified version of the Life Story Event Task (Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson, 
2009) was used. 
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Van den 
Broeck et 
al. (2012) 
34 BPD 
inpatients (7 
males), of which 
11 were 
considered 
currently 
depressed (4 
MDD, 1 
Depressive 
disorder NOS, 8 
Adjustment 
disorder) 
No control group 9+ / 9- Adjectives Written 
version 
No 
time 
limit 
S / C / E / NM-
SA / SE / O 
Participant-
rated / 
corrected by 
researcher 
pS / pC 
#[C/E/G/O/S/SA] = Number of …; %[C/E/O/S] = percentage of …; +/-/° = positive/negative/neutral valence; AD = Anxiety Disorder; AMT = Autobiographical 
Memory Test; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; BPD = Borderline Personality Disorder; C = general categoric memories; E = general extended memories; G = 
general memories; MDD = Major Depressive Disorder; NM = no memory; NOS = Not Otherwise Specified; NS = non-specific memories; O = omissions; OCD = 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; p[C/S] = proportion of …; PD = Personality Disorder; PTSD = Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; S = specific memories; SA = 
semantic associates; SCID = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders; SE = Same Event 
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OGM IN BPD PATIENTS 
OGM IN RELATION TO DIAGNOSTIC STATUS, SEVERITY OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND BPD-RELATED 
SYMPTOMS 
This section consecutively summarises findings on whether or not OGM is associated 
with (1) diagnostic status of BPD, MDD, PTSD or other anxiety disorders; (2) severity of 
BPD, depression or anxiety; and (3) symptoms often associated with BPD, such as 
dissociation, self-harm, deficient problem solving skills, and rumination. 
In three studies, BPD patients were found to be more overgeneral (Jones et al., 1999; 
Maurex et al., 2010) and less specific than healthy controls (Maurex et al., 2010, Reid & 
Startup, 2010). In other studies, in contrast, BPD patients were found to produce just as 
many categorical (Reid & Startup, 2010) or specific (Renneberg et al., 2005) memories 
as healthy and depressed controls. Also, Arntz et al. (2002) found that a diagnosis of 
BPD was unrelated to the number of specific memories retrieved, r = .004. One study by 
Jørgensen et al. (2012) found a trend for lower proportions of specific memories in BPD 
patients as compared to patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder and healthy 
controls. Thus, when co-morbid disorders during BPD are not controlled for, evidence 
for OGM in BPD is divided: some data support the hypothesis of OGM being present in 
BPD patients (Jones et al., 1999; Maurex et al., 2010), whereas others refute it (Arntz et 
al., 2002; Jørgensen et al., 2012; Renneberg et al., 2005), or are inconclusive (Reid & 
Startup, 2010). 
Arntz et al. (2002) discovered that MDD (and personality disorders other than BPD) 
rather than BPD, or any form of anxiety disorder, predicted AMT outcome with regard 
to specificity. The data of Kremers et al. (2004) also suggested that OGM was more 
related to MDD than to BPD. They found that only the currently depressed BPD patients 
retrieved less specific memories than controls, as did their control group of MDD 
patients. When studying the role of cue discrepancy, Spinhoven et al. (2007) and Van 
den Broeck et al. (2012) found that highly relevant or discrepant cues led to reduced 
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memory specificity, especially in currently depressed BPD patients. These findings 
suggest that, in addition to the meaning of the cue, and in line with the results of Arntz 
et al. (2002) and Kremers et al. (2004), a co-morbid diagnosis of MDD is more important 
in predicting OGM than the diagnosis of BPD. However, other studies (Maurex et al., 
2010; Reid & Startup, 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005) found no differences between 
(currently/previously) depressed BPD patients and non-(never-)depressed BPD patients 
in memory specificity, yet Renneberg et al. (2005) found that MDD patients retrieved 
more categorical memories than BPD patients (with and without MDD). Somewhat 
surprisingly, Reid and Startup (2010) found that difficulties retrieving specific memories 
especially emerged in their non-depressed BPD sample. 
Memory specificity was also found to be unrelated to a co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD in 
BPD patients (Kremers et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005). Maurex et al. (2010) found 
that memory specificity was negatively associated with lifetime exposure to violence4, 
however Kremers et al. (2004) were not able to replicate such an association between 
trauma exposure and OGM in BPD patients. According to Artnz et al. (2002), neither 
trauma exposure nor the presence of an anxiety disorder is related to reduced memory 
specificity (in a sample that at least in part consisted of patients suffering from BPD). 
With regard to the association between OGM and the severity of psychopathology 
reported, the data indicate a more coherent picture. Memory specificity seems to be 
unrelated to BPD severity (Kremers et al., 2006a; Maurex et al., 2010). Also, no relation 
was found between anxiety severity and OGM in BPD patients (Jones et al., 1999; 
Maurex et al., 2010). Depression severity was mostly found to be unrelated to reduced 
memory specificity in BPD patients (Jones et al., 1999; Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a; 
Maurex et al., 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005), except in the study by Van den Broeck et 
                                                     
 
4 This association was not remained after Bonferroni correction. 
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al. (2012) who observed a negative association between the proportion of specific 
memories retrieved and scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). 
OGM, considered an emotion regulation strategy since the beginning of theorising, has 
also been studied in relation to other symptoms that have been thought to have similar 
functions and that regularly occur in BPD patients, e.g., dissociation and parasuicidal 
acts. In addition, because of the robust associations in depressed samples between 
OGM on the one hand and problem solving abilities and rumination on the other, 
analogous relationships were hypothesised in BPD patients, whom are known to have 
poor problem solving capabilities (e.g., Kremers et al., 2006b; Maurex et al., 2010) and 
high levels of rumination (e.g., Smith et al., 2006). In general, with regard to these 
borderline-related symptoms, few associations have been found, and none of them 
have been replicated by other studies. Jones et al. (1999) found that more dissociation 
was reported when respondents retrieved more general memories, but memory 
specificity was not found to be associated with scores on the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES) in BPD patients (Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a; Renneberg et al., 2005). In the 
Jones’ et al. (1999) BPD sample, Startup et al. (2001) discovered that the more general 
memories were retrieved, the less parasuicidal acts were reported during the four 
months prior to testing, however neither Renneberg et al. (2005), nor Maurex et al. 
(2010) were able to replicate these findings. The latter, however, found that reduced 
memory specificity was associated with poor problem solving abilities in BPD patients, 
thereby contradicting earlier findings of Kremers et al. (2006b). These authors found 
that problem solving abilities did not correlate significantly different with memory 
specificity in (depressed and non-depressed) BPD patients than in controls. 
Furthermore, only Van den Broeck et al. (2012) have so far found a negative association 
between memory specificity and rumination, but the correlation disappeared when 
depression severity was controlled for. No associations were found between memory 
specificity and trait anger (Jones et al., 1999), the prevalence of intrusions (Maurex et 
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al., 2010; Kremers et al., 2004), or avoidance towards intrusions (Maurex et al., 2010; 
Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a). 
In sum, it can be concluded that neither PTSD nor the severity of other symptoms of 
psychopathology (depression, anxiety, or BPD) relate to OGM in BPD patients. With 
respect to BPD associated symptoms, the low number of available studies does not 
allow us to draw clear conclusions. Results regarding the role of MDD suggest that 
memory specificity in BPD is at least in part associated with MDD (Artnz et al., 2002; 
Kremers et al., 2004; Spinhoven et al., 2007; Van den Broeck, 2012), although there are 
contradicting findings (Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & Startup, 2010; Renneberg et al., 
2005). Finally, given the current studies, a relationship between memory specificity and 
a diagnosis of BPD cannot be ruled out either. Data of Jones et al. (1999), Maurex et al. 
(2010), and Reid and Startup (2010) suggest that OGM and a diagnosis of BPD are 
associated, whereas data of Arntz et al. (2002), Kremers et al. (2004), and Renneberg et 
al. (2005) found no association. 
 
OGM IN RELATION TO SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS AND AMT CHARACTERISTICS IN BPD PATIENTS 
This section first overviews findings on whether or not OGM is associated with socio-
demographic variables, such as gender, marital status, age, and education (in terms of 
years or level of education). We then describe the associations between memory 
specificity on the one hand, and cue valence, retrieval latency, and the extent to which 
cues are meaningful for the respondent (‘cue discrepancy’) on the other hand. 
OGM has not been found to be associated with gender (Arntz et al., 2002; Kremers et 
al., 2004) or marital status (Arntz et al., 2002). Age was sometimes found to be 
negatively correlated with memory specificity (Artnz et al., 2002; Maurex et al., 2010; 
and Spinhoven et al., 2007, when cue discrepancy was taken into account), but not 
always (Kremers et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005; Spinhoven et al., 2007). Education 
(in terms of years or level of education) was found to correlate positively with memory 
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specificity (Arntz et al., 2002; Maurex et al., 2010), or negatively with OGM (Spinhoven 
et al., 2007). This is in line with previous findings in traumatised (e.g., Schönfeld & 
Ehlers, 2006), depressed, anxious and healthy participants (e.g., Wessel, Meeren, 
Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach, 2000). Nevertheless, after controlling for educational 
level, group differences generally remain (Williams et al., 2007), suggesting that 
education only explains part of the variance. 
Kremers et al. (2004) found no main effect of cue valence on memory specificity in BPD 
patients. However, according to Jones et al. (1999), BPD patients retrieved more 
generic memories following negative cues than after positive or neutral cues. 
Renneberg et al. (2005) found that healthy controls, depressed controls as well as BPD 
patients retrieved more specific memories following negative cues than after neutral or 
positive cues. Kremers et al. (2006a) found the opposite in a BPD sample that had 
followed long-term psychotherapy. Regardless of BPD, samples of depressed and 
traumatised patients also show mixed evidence with regard to whether memory 
specificity varies with the valence of the cue (Williams et al., 2007). Meta-analyses by 
van Vreeswijk and de Wilde (2004) and by Williams et al. (2007) suggest that OGM 
generally emerges following both positive and negative cues. 
Renneberg et al. (2005) were the only researchers to investigate latency when 
retrieving specific memories. In general, BPD patients do not differ in retrieval latency 
for specific memories from depressed or healthy controls, although they tend to 
retrieve memories faster than MDD patients. Specific memories following negative cues 
were found to be retrieved the fastest. 
As described above, according to the Self-Memory System, cues that tap into domains 
that are highly discrepant from one’s actual self would be more likely to evoke OGMs. 
Van den Broeck et al. (2012) computed an index expressing the degree to which the 
AMT as a whole was discrepant towards a respondent’s actual self-concept. This index 
was negatively and highly correlated with memory specificity in their depressed BPD 
patients, r = -.89, p < .01 (but not in the non-depressed BPD subsample). These findings 
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are in line with what has previously been found in remitted depressed patients (Crane 
et al., 2007). Also suggesting that memory specificity in (depressed) BPD patients 
depends, at least in part, on the meaning the cues have for the respondents, Spinhoven 
et al. (2007, study 2) discovered that BPD patients retrieved less specific memories in 
response to cues that were thematically related to a participant’s relevant set of 
dysfunctional attitudes5. These findings match earlier findings in (remitted) depressed 
participants (Barnhofer et al., 2007; Spinhoven et al., 2007, study 1). 
In sum, we can conclude that results regarding the association between memory 
specificity and cue valence are varied. Regarding the impact of the meaning of the cues, 
findings are limited, but they seem to suggest that highly sailliant cues are more likely 
to evoke general memories, whether they tap into a domain that is highly discrepant 
towards one’s self-concept, or whether they closely match one’s dysfunctional self-
beliefs. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
The present findings consistently suggest that OGM in BPD is reliably associated with 
educational level, and that illness severity or PTSD are unrelated to memory specificity 
in this group of patients. However, the studies presented above are inconclusive on 
whether or not OGM is directly associated with a diagnosis of BPD and/or MDD in BPD. 
Several reasons prevent us from drawing unambiguous conclusions in this regard. 
First, contrasting results regarding a possible association between OGM and diagnosis 
of BPD may result from methodological and sample differences between the studies. 
                                                     
 
5  Dysfunctional attitudes, such as “If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure” (item 
14 from the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978)), are thought to be 
indicatory for maladaptive schemas that may trigger self-referent thinking. 
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Table 3 shows that studies differed in samples (outpatients, inpatients, different 
exclusion criteria, e.g., participants with substance abuse were sometimes excluded and 
in other studies included, or special demands, e.g., a certain amount of suicide 
attempts) and control groups (clinical groups, healthy controls, no control group). In 
fact, the hypothesis that BPD patients show OGM seems to hold in BPD outpatients 
when compared to healthy controls (Jones et al., 1999; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & 
Startup, 2010), but not in BPD inpatients (Jørgensen et al., 2012; Renneberg et al., 
2005), or when compared to other clinical samples (Arntz et al., 2002; Jørgensen et al., 
2012). Furthermore, except for Jørgensen et al. (2012), all the studies presented above 
used the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT). These AMTs varied in number of stimuli 
(10 to 36), kind of stimuli (nouns, adjectives, or both, or traits), stimulus presentation 
(verbally, visually, or both), response time (30s or 60s), response requirements (verbally 
or written), and scoring procedure (AMTs were mostly scored by researchers only, 
however, using a written AMT, Van den Broeck et al., 2012, asked their respondents to 
score each of their memories as specific, categorical, or extended. Afterwards, the 
memories were systematically scored by the researchers in order to correct incorrect 
judgements. Supplementary scoring categories were also added in this phase). Most 
authors were interested in the number or percentage of general (Jones et al., 1999; 
Startup et al., 2001), general categorical (Maurex et al., 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005; 
Reid & Startup, 2010), or specific memories (Arntz et al., 2002; Kremers et al., 2004; 
2006a; 2006b; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & Startup, 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005; 
Spinhoven et al., 2007), however Van den Broeck et al. (2012) used the proportion (this 
is, percentage corrected for the presence of omissions) of specific memories. Griffith et 
al. (2012) describe in more detail how these variables may influence AMT outcome and 
complicate comparability. Jørgensen et al. (2012) used a completely different 
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methodology to collect memories by asking respondents “to write down three 
memories that are most central to one’s life story”6. No explicit instruction to recall 
specific memories was included. Therefore, comparability of the specificity scores 
obtained from this procedure with those obtained from the traditionally used AMT may 
be questioned. 
Second, over the past 25 years, OGM has mainly been studied in relation to MDD and 
trauma. Axis II disorders were often not diagnosed, nor were they explicitly excluded. It 
is only reasonable to expect that many samples will definitely have included BPD 
patients, given that lifetime prevalence of BPD in patients diagnosed with MDD or PTSD 
is estimated at 11.5% and 24.3%, respectively (Grant et al., 2008). Moreover, some 
authors (e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986) only included patients who had reported 
suicidal gestures just before test admission. It is of relevance to note that surprisingly 
few publications are available that specifically focussed on BPD patients alone. 
Third, except for Kremers et al. (2004) and Maurex et al. (2010), none of the studied 
samples exceeded 35 BPD patients. According to DSM-IV (APA, 1994), a BPD diagnosis 
requires the presence of at least five out of nine distinguished criteria, leading to a wide 
variety of BPD phenotypes. Theoretically, 256 different BPD phenotypes are possible. 
Studying a limited sample size of 30 BPD patients, as is often the case in the studies of 
interest, may not cover the heterogeneity and complexity of BPD diagnoses. Therefore, 
inconsistent findings may be an artefact of sample selection, or, alternatively, when 
samples consist of many different BPD phenotypes, unique associations, for instance 
between OGM and suicidal gestures, may not be revealed. 
                                                     
 
6  Jørgensen et al. (2012) used a modified version of the Life Story Event Task (Rubin, Berntsen, 
& Hutson, 2009). Two independent raters agreed in 87% of the cases in judging memory 
specificity. 
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Finally, potentially important factors are often neglected in the studies that have been 
conducted until now. For example, none of the studies controlled for medication or 
substance use, and only some studies took education or trauma (exposure) into 
account. Nevertheless, Kremers et al. (2006a) suggested that the complexity or the 
severity of the trauma may co-determine OGM. Furthermore, Van den Broeck et al. 
(2012) argued that depressive status in BPD patients could be considered in terms of 
affective instability following traumatic experiences, thereby differing from MDD in 
non-BPD patients. 
Overall, up to now, conclusions on the association between OGM and BPD are 
confounded by differences in samples and instruments, and by the heterogeneity of the 
BPD diagnosis which is not reflected in the small sample sizes that have been studied so 
far. The robustness with which OGM has been found in traumatised or depressed 
patients strongly contrasts with the minority of available publications that specifically 
focussed on OGM in BPD, although it is possible that BPD patients make up part of the 
traumatised and depressed samples in which OGM has been identified. Finally, current 
studies may have neglected meaningful variables that may contribute to OGM in 
general or in BPD in particular, such as medication or substance (ab)use, affective 
instability, or characteristics of trauma exposure. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
According to the CaR-FA-X model (Williams et al., 2007), OGM results from ruminative 
and self-focused processes (CaR), functional avoidance (FA), limited executive resources 
(X), or from an interplay between these variables. Because these processes have been 
repeatedly demonstrated in depressed and traumatised patients, the applicability of 
the framework is justified in these clinical groups (Williams et al., 2007). 
In BPD patients, visual (Maurex et al., 2010) and verbal (Reid & Startup, 2010) working 
memory and education, which may also to some extent reflect executive functioning (X; 
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Reid & Startup, 2010), have been found to be associated with memory specificity (Arntz 
et al., 2002; Maurex et al., 2010; Spinhoven et al., 2007).  
Rumination (CaR), on the other hand, has not been found to be associated with OGM in 
BPD patients, at least not after controlling for depression severity (Van den Broeck et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, avoidance of intrusions (Maurex et al., 2010; Kremers et al., 
2004; 2006a), and dissociation, which can be considered as the ultimate avoidance 
strategy (FA; Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a; Renneberg et al., 2005), have systematically 
been shown to be unrelated to memory specificity in BPD patients – although Jones et 
al. (1999) found that dissociation scores were positively associated with more general 
memories. These findings question the applicability of the CaR-FA-X model and its 
predecessors for explaining potential OGM in BPD patients. 
Although many BPD patients report dissociative episodes, BPD patients are often 
clinically described as easily getting overwhelmed by their emotions. Linehan (1993) 
additionally mentions relatively low thresholds for emotional reaction and highly 
intense feelings in BPD patients, meaning that just minor stressors (or memories) can 
make them seriously upset. Non-BPD subjects, who can tolerate more stress before an 
emotional reaction is evoked, might have the opportunity to apply other strategies on 
stressors before threshold values are exceeded. They might, for instance, increase the 
psychological distance towards emotional events by not exploring all the details of an 
event (or by not recalling all the details of a memory; OGM). OGM could thus be 
considered as a (unconscious, passive, pre-emptive) mechanism by which one alters a 
memory, in a way that one’s threshold will be less likely to be exceeded by it. 
Linehan (1993) further assumes that stress reduction is slower in BPD patients 
compared to people without BPD (‘slow return to baseline’). It is hypothesised that, by 
the time the emotional reaction to a stressor has faded, a new experience starts 
another series of intense feelings, preventing adequate emotion regulation. In fact, BPD 
patients risk moving further away from the baseline instead of approaching it. At 
extreme levels, the only way to return to baseline quickly may seem to be to perform 
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extreme acts. Indeed, the clinical presentation of BPD suggests that BPD patients apply 
more stringent methods of emotion regulation such as self-injurious behaviours or 
dissociation in an attempt to control difficult emotions. However, findings on cue 
discrepancy suggest that OGM is used in BPD patients when specific prompts are used 
(Spinhoven et al., 2007; Van den Broeck et al., 2012). 
This idea closely relates to the inflexibility concept proposed by Debeer, Raes, Williams, 
and Hermans (2012), stating that healthy respondents would be more flexible in 
manipulating the specificity of their own memories during retrieval in response to 
situational demands when compared to clinical populations. This is considered an 
adequate reaction during daily life: one will be able to retrieve specific solutions out of 
memory in response to problems one is confronted with, and one would recall at a 
more general level when it is inappropriate to get overwhelmed by emotions and the 
memory threatens to do so. Depressed and traumatised patients then, are thought to 
be inflexibly overgeneral, whereas BPD patients may be inflexibly specific, both leading 
to deficient emotion regulation and processes maintaining the disorder. The 
overgeneral memory style of depressed patients, for instance, prevents them from 
correcting their experiences and schemas about their selves, the world and the others 
by not incorporating contradicting specific information. In contrast, the specific style of 
BPD patients may impede the construction of a solid self-concept and trustworthy and 
predictable descriptions of others. According to the Self-Memory System (Conway, 
2005), information is hierarchically stored. Information selectively derived from event-
specific knowledge at the lower levels is integrated into higher-order (thematic or time) 
categories, that are conceived as being part of one’s conceptual self (Conway et al., 
2004). The SMS thus suggests that the creation of self- (and other?-) descriptions that 
are coherent over time and across experiences requires the ability to somehow 
reflectively zoom out, thereby selectively neglecting event specific knowledge (the 
concept of narrative identity as conceptualised by, e.g., McAdams & Pals, in Shiner, 
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2009, may also be of relevance here). Being inflexibly specific, BPD patients may be 
failing to chunk event specific knowledge into higher order categories. 
Further research is necessary to test the value of cognitive flexibility as a mediator 
between one’s personal reactivity (thresholds) and final affect. If so, studies should also 
investigate to what degree, and how (in)flexibility can be changed during therapy. 
Kremers et al. (2006a, p. 490) state that “the defensive function of an overgeneral 
memory style might not be adequate when traumatic events as complex and severe as 
often is the case in patients with BPD are involved”, suggesting that flexibility may turn 
into inflexibility following severe trauma. Can it be turned around? 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the available studies are rather limited in number, 
making it difficult to truly investigate the applicability of the CaR-FA-X model in BPD 
patients. Future studies should therefore study the associations between OGM and 
working memory, rumination, and avoidance measures in BPD patients. 
In addition, the current findings do not sufficiently exclude the possibility that OGM in 
BPD is mainly associated with co-morbid MDD7 or exposure to trauma. Therefore, 
future studies should carefully record respondents’ history and severity of MDD and 
trauma, as well as other potentially influential factors such as medication use and 
substance abuse. Furthermore, given the heterogeneity of the BPD diagnosis, future 
studies should also include large samples of BPD patients in order to study whether or 
not OGM in BPD is associated with one or more specific BPD criteria, and to assure 
whether the current findings are not due to selection effects. 
As outlined above, the clinical burden of BPD is large, for patients as well as for their 
social context. Patients and society would therefore benefit from a clear understanding 
                                                     
 
7  Although depression in BPD may differ from depression in MDD (see, e.g., Van den Broeck et 
al., 2012 – Chapter 3). 
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of information processes in these patients, being both a target for therapy as well as 
the medium by which therapy works. Studying autobiographical memory in BPD is 
particularly relevant, because of its role in the formation of one’s sense of self, which is 
by definition (APA, 1994) unstable in BPD patients. As for now, the current theories on 
autobiographical memory organisation seem to apply insufficiently to BPD, although 
the idea of cognitive flexibility may open up interesting perspectives. We formulated a 
number of issues that should be taken into account when conducting future research, 
in order to control for methodological concerns and the complexity of the BPD 
diagnosis. 
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ABSTRACT 
Reduced memory specificity (RMS) is a robust finding in (previously) depressed patients 
and patients suffering from post-traumatic symptoms. It has been associated with 
depression severity, rumination, and – more recently – with cue content (e.g., cues 
referring to highly discrepant self-guides are assumed to hinder specific memory 
retrieval more likely than cues that match one’s self-concept). In this study we have 
investigated the presence of these relationships in 34 patients diagnosed with 
borderline personality disorder (BPD). All participants completed the Self-Description 
Questionnaire (SDQ), the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT), the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II), and the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). First, it was observed that 
both rumination and depression severity were associated with RMS. However, when 
confounding between rumination and depression severity was considered using partial 
correlations, only depression severity was found to be significantly associated with 
RMS. Second, in the currently depressed BPD patients (n = 11), memory specificity was 
significantly related to cue content suggesting that, at least for depressed BPD patients, 
RMS is related to the extent to which cues activate highly discrepant personal domains. 
Although our data suggest that depression severity as well as current depression (in 
interaction with cue content) play an important role in the occurrence of RMS in BPD, 
we will discuss that these findings could be moderated by post-traumatic stress and/or 
executive functioning. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
First described by Williams and Broadbent (1986), reduced memory specificity (RMS) is 
often observed in depressed, previously depressed, and traumatised patients (for an 
overview, see Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). RMS refers to the 
difficulties these clinical groups experience in retrieving specific information from their 
autobiographical memory, typically assessed using the Autobiographical Memory Test 
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(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). In this task, respondents are asked to recall specific 
memories in response to cue words. Instead of recalling, as instructed, detailed 
information on ‘personally experienced events that happened only once and did not 
last longer than one day’, the aforementioned patients regularly respond with general 
(categorical) rather than specific recollections (e.g., “every time I play tennis”, rather 
than “that one time I broke my racquet in that thrilling tiebreak against my brother.”). 
In relation to mood, RMS is found to be associated with delayed recovery from 
depressive episodes or future mood disturbances (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & 
Ferrier, 1993; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Hermans et al., 2008; van Minnen, Wessel, Verhaak, 
& Smeenk, 2005). It has been suggested that RMS more strongly relates to diagnostic 
status of depression than to depression severity (Williams et al., 2007). In relation to 
trauma, Moore and Zoellner (2007) concluded in their review that “post-traumatic 
symptoms, rather than trauma exposure per se, are associated with overgenerality” (p. 
433). Furthermore, RMS is also found to be associated with poor problem solving 
abilities (e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008), higher 
levels of rumination (e.g., Raes et al., 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), and feelings of 
hopelessness (Williams et al., 1996). 
All above-mentioned associations taken into account, one would expect patients 
diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD), too, to have difficulties retrieving 
specific memories. First, depression and trauma are common phenomena in BPD 
patients. Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich, and Silk (2004) conclude that even after 
treatment 61% of the BPD patients meet criteria for major depression, and 35% meet 
criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. Second, BPD patients often ruminate (e.g., 
Smith, Grandin, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006), and they have difficulties to adequately 
solve problems (Kremers, Spinhoven, van der Does, & van Dyck, 2006b; Maurex et al., 
2010; Reid, 2008). 
The number of studies published so far that have focused on RMS in BPD, is still 
relatively small (n=9). Differences in RMS between patients with and patients without 
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BPD have found to be mediated by differences in IQ and education (Reid & Startup, 
2010), and RMS in BPD has found to be associated with poor social-problem solving 
capacity (Kremers et al., 2006b; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid, 2008) and with less para-
suicidal acts (Startup et al., 2001). But in relation to mood, most of these studies have 
shown that RMS in BPD is unrelated to depressive status (Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & 
Startup, 2010; Renneberg, Theobald, Nobs, & Weisbrod, 2005) or depression severity 
(Jones et al., 1999; Kremers, Spinhoven, & van der Does, 2004; Kremers et al., 2006a; 
Maurex et al., 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005). However, Kremers and co-workers 
(Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a) did find RMS in the clinically depressed subgroup of their 
borderline sample, independent of depression severity. Also Arntz, Meeren, and Wessel 
(2002) found RMS to be related with a diagnosis of MDD, independent of a diagnosis of 
BPD. Reid (2008) suggests that borderlines’ memory specificity is situated in between 
the specificity levels of depressed and normal controls, being closer to the latter. Given 
these inconsistent findings, the first aim of this study was to further elucidate the 
relationship between RMS and depression and depression severity in BPD. 
As theories and studies on RMS in depression evolved, rumination has been considered 
as an important mediating factor in the relation between depression and RMS (e.g., 
Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006), and, to a lesser 
extent, in the relation between post-trauma psychopathology and RMS (Kleim & Ehlers, 
2008). Rumination, defined as “repetitively thinking about one’s (depressed) feelings 
and about their causes, meanings, and consequences” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569), 
is known to be associated with increased vulnerability for depressive episodes or 
symptoms (for a review, see Watkins, 2008). In addition, a considerable body of 
correlational (e.g., Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al., 2006; Raes, Hermans, 
Williams, Demyttenaere, et al., 2006; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), as well as 
experimental (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 
2000) evidence has emerged during the last decade, showing that RMS in depression is 
significantly associated with rumination. Moreover, RMS and rumination appear 
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mutually reinforcing vulnerability factors for depression (Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 
2009). As far as we know, the relationship between rumination and RMS in BPD 
patients has not previously been studied, however. Hence, the second aim of this study 
was to investigate the relations between rumination, RMS, and depression in BPD 
patients. 
Recently, it has been suggested that autobiographical memory specificity in clinical 
groups also depends on the content of the information that has to be retrieved. Or, 
more precisely, on the meaning the information has for the respondent (Barnhofer, 
Crane, Spinhoven, & Williams, 2007; Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Dalgleish et 
al., 2003; Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 2007). These predictions 
are based on the Self-Memory System (SMS; Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004), an influential model on (autobiographical) 
memory organisation. Basically, this model assumes that a lot of personally experienced 
events lead us to draw coherent conclusions, named schemas or self-concept, about 
‘who’ we actually are and ‘how’ we function. Additionally, the self is supposed to 
contain ideas about how we ideally would like to be or how we ought to be according 
to our own or others’ standards. These ideas are referred to as self-guides (e.g., Higgins, 
Strauman, & Klein, 1986) or goals (Conway et al., 2004). Discrepancies between one’s 
self-concept and these goals will evoke a kind of discomfort, which will motivate one to 
change one’s behaviour, which in time will lead to adjusting the ideas about oneself. 
Discomfort evoked by discrepancies between one’s actual and one’s ideal self is 
assumed to give rise to feelings of dejection, whereas discomfort related on 
discrepancies between one’s actual and one’s ought self will rather elicit feelings of 
agitation. Indeed, in depressed patients actual-ideal discrepancies appear more 
prominently present, whereas in anxious subjects the actual-ought discrepancies are 
more important (e.g., Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986; Strauman, 1989). In 
2004, Conway et al. have defined the Working Self (WS), which is responsible for (1) 
maintaining an integrated sense of self-identity (i.e. self-coherence) and (2) monitoring 
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progress in goal-directed activities (i.e. adaptive correspondence). With the latter 
Conway et al. (2004) refer to the encoding and use of information related to here-and-
now experiences that are relevant in the light of the ongoing goal-attainment 
processes. In order to construct an accurate, integrated and stable sense of self, the WS 
operates to make information that supports current self-concepts highly available, but 
in order to change towards one’s goals the WS should also focus on episodic clues that 
give information on goal-attainment. Problems arise when challenges towards goal 
progress appear. If the discrepancies between the actual self and one’s personal goals 
are largely emphasised, e.g., in case of  traumatic experiences or in self-referent 
thinking by depressed patients, the stability of the self gets threatened. According to 
the SMS, resources are then shifted away from adaptive correspondence to self-
coherence in order to maintain or stabilise the self by trying to resolve the present 
discrepancies. In case of intentional search processes, no resources will be available to 
retrieve event-specific knowledge, therefore increasing the likelihood of retrieving 
general memories8. 
The SMS thus suggests that it would be more difficult (or unlikely) for a depressed 
respondent to recall specific information on a topic that relates to one of his ideals that 
significantly differs from the person’s actual view of the self. Indeed, Crane et al. (2007) 
found a negative correlation between the number of self-relevant AMT cues and total 
memory specificity in previously depressed individuals. Likewise, Spinhoven et al. 
(2007) and Barnhofer et al. (2007) found that less specific memories were retrieved in 
response to cues that were thematically related to a participant’s relevant set of 
                                                     
 
8  This more or less connects with the idea that an overgeneral memory style may function as a 
protective mechanism in order to avoid the reactivation of painful memories and the related 
discomfort evoking sensory and perceptual features (‘affect regulation hypothesis’, Williams, 
1996; ‘functional avoidance’, Williams et al., 2007). 
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dysfunctional attitudes9 concerning ‘need for approval’ in (remitted) depressed 
patients. In addition, Barnhofer et al. (2007) found that the association was moderated 
by executive capacity. Finally, Spinhoven et al. (2007) were able to replicate these 
findings in borderline patients. The third and final aim of this study, therefore, was to 
investigate the relationships between the meaning of the cues and memory specificity 
in BPD patients. 
In summary, the main aims of the present study are to get a clearer view on the 
relationships between (1) RMS and depression (severity); (2) RMS and rumination; and 
(3) RMS and cue content in BPD patients. First, given the fact that the current balance 
of evidence suggests that there is no association between memory specificity and 
depression (severity) in BPD (see Jones et al., 1999; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & Startup, 
2010; Renneberg et al., 2005, and to a lesser extent also Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a) 
we did not expect to find a relation either. Second, given the established relations 
between RMS on the one hand and depression and rumination on the other in 
(previously) depressed patients, and given the fact that many BPD patients are (or have 
previously been) diagnosed with MDD and PTSD as well, we hypothesise that there will 
be a negative correlation between memory specificity and rumination in BPD patients. 
Finally, focusing on the impact of cue content on overgeneral memory retrieval, we 
hypothesise that (1) less specific memories will be retrieved in response to AMT cues 
that closely approach highly relevant personal themes and (2) less specific memories 
will be retrieved in response to cues that relate to highly discrepant personal domains. 
 
                                                     
 
9  Dysfunctional attitudes, such as “If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure” (item 
14 from the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978)), are thought to be 
indicatory for maladaptive schemas that may trigger self-referent thinking. Two sets of 
Continues at the next page 
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METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Thirty-four participants (7 males) were recruited from the University Psychiatric Centre 
UPC KU Leuven, Campus Kortenberg (Belgium). All participants were diagnosed by an 
experienced psychiatrist. They all fulfilled DSM-IV criteria for BPD (APA, 1994). Except 
for 7 participants, all respondents had at least one co-morbid Axis I diagnosis. The most 
common Axis I diagnoses were Substance Abuse (n = 8), Adjustment Disorder (n = 7, of 
which 6 with depressive mood), Eating Disorder (n = 5), and Depressive Disorder (n = 5, 
of which 4 MDD and 1 Depressive Disorder NOS). Therefore, 11 participants were 
considered as currently depressed (5 patients with Depressive Disorder and 6 with 
Adjustment Disorder with depressive mood). All participants were hospitalised on a 
unit specialised in treating BPD using principles of Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT; 
Linehan, 1993). Participants were between 17 and 48 years of age (M = 27.21; SD = 
9.05). Most participants were single (73.5%) and unemployed (38.2%), and had had 
previous residential psychiatric treatment (M = 2.35; SD = 1.86; range: 0–8). 
 
INSTRUMENTS 
Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ, Crane et al., 2007; non-published Dutch 
adaptation by Van den Broeck, Claes, & Raes, 2008). Originally developed by Higgins, 
Klein, and Strauman (1985) to measure the actual, ideal and ought selves (see Appendix 
A, p. 235, for definition), the Selves-Questionnaire has often been adapted (e.g., Carver, 
Lawrence, & Scheier, 1999; Crane et al., 2007; Strauman, 1992). We translated the 
version  of  Crane  et  al.  (2007)  into  Dutch  and  replaced  the 8-point  Likert  scales  
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
attitudes in particular are related to depression: ‘need for approval by others’ and 
‘performance evaluation’. These can be assessed using the DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978). 
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by 100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS). First, participants were asked to describe their 
actual self by means of seven characteristics. For each of the actual self-descriptions 
participants reported, they had to fill out one VAS, measuring the extent to which 
respondents believe they actually possess the cited characteristic at the present 
moment. Afterwards, participants were asked to describe their ought, ideal and feared 
selves respectively, again each time by means of seven characteristics. For each of the 
self-guides cited by these discrepant selves, two VAS were presented. On the first VAS, 
respondents were asked to indicate to what degree they ought to have, ideally would 
like to have or feared to have the self-guides they had written down to describe their 
ought, ideal and feared self respectively. As for attributes formulated as characterising 
the actual self, participants were asked to indicate on the second VAS to what degree 
they actually possessed each of the cited self-guides at the present moment. This 
procedure allowed us to calculate discrepancy scores between ought self and actual 
self, between ideal self and actual self, and between feared self and actual self by 
subtracting the position on the second scale from the score on the first scale. 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT, Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Dutch written 
version, see e.g., Raes et al., 2008). In a first phase participants were presented with 18 
written cue words (9 positive and 9 negative): happy, sad, safe, angry, interested, 
clumsy, successful, emotionally hurt, surprised, lonely, relaxed, guilty, proud, afraid, 
pleasant, cowardly, carefree, and lazy. They were instructed to write down specific 
autobiographical memories in response to each of the cue words. The definition of a 
specific autobiographical memory was explained to them by using an example. In a 
second phase they were asked to go over their responses again and to score each of the 
retrieved memories as ‘1’ (being a specific memory); ‘M’ (being a categorical memory) 
or ‘>’ (being an extended memory). Afterwards the memories were systematically 
scored by the researchers in order to correct incorrect judgements by the participants. 
Scoring categories ‘No memory/Semantic association’, ‘Omission’ and ‘Same event’ 
were also added in this phase. Variables of interest are the proportion of specific 
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memories, and proportion of general categoric memories. This version of the AMT has 
been previously successfully used to assess autobiographical memory specificity (e.g., 
Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory, & Williams, 2002; Raes et al., 2008; Raes, Williams, & 
Hermans, 2009). We found a satisfactorily interrater reliability in our sample, r = .8210. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown 1996; authorised Dutch translation 
(BDI-II-NL) by van der Does, 2002). This self-report questionnaire measures depression 
severity. It consists of 21 items, each representing a specific depressive symptom (e.g., 
pessimism, guilt, suicidal ideations). An item consists of four statements indicating 
different levels of severity. Participants were asked to mark the statements that best 
describe how they felt during the last two weeks, the current day included. Item scores 
differ from 0 to 3; total score ranges from 0 to 63 with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of depressive symptoms. The internal consistency of the total BDI-II-NL in our 
sample was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .93).  
Ruminative Response Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; authorised 
Dutch translation (RRS-NL) by Raes & Hermans, 2007). The RRS-NL consists of 22 items 
and measures rumination during depressive state. Items have to be scored on a 4-point 
Likert scale (almost never to almost always), indicating how often a ruminative 
response is present when one is feeling down. Adequate reliability and good 
convergent and discriminant validity are reported (see Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 
2010). Internal consistency of the total RRS-NL in our sample was high (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .84). 
 
 
                                                     
 
10  We would like to thank Katleen Hoing for her contributions in order to determine interrater 
reliability. 
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PROCEDURE 
Following oral informed consent, participants were tested in groups of 2 to 8 people. 
They were asked to fill out the questionnaires in the order presented above. No time 
limits were set. 
 
ANALYSES 
In order to test our hypotheses concerning the relationships between cue content and 
RMS, we first calculated two indices, combining SDQ results and the content of AMT 
cues, and, secondly, computed correlations between these indices and the proportion 
of specific memories retrieved. 
The first index, IrT, expressed the degree to which the AMT as a whole was relevant for 
the respondent, based on all the self-guides given on the SDQ (hence ‘T’, for total). To 
create this index, we combined each AMT cue with each self-guide that was produced 
by the participants to describe their ideal, ought or feared self. In total, participants 
produced 268 different self-guides, leading to 18 x 268 = 4824 word pairs. These word 
pairs were randomly allocated to 72 lists, making 67 matches per list. These lists were 
put online, using the open source survey service Limesurvey.org. We asked a panel of 
volunteers to rate for each pair of words to which degree they felt these words were 
synonymous, using a visual analogue slider, ranging from -100 to 100. Two hundred and 
ninety six volunteers (95 males) filled out this online instrument. These respondents 
were between 18 and 73 years of age (M = 37.75, SD = 13.25). Most volunteers were 
married (53.0%) and worked (76.7%). Fifty-two percent of these respondents had 
completed university. For each word pair a mean synonymy score over the volunteers 
was calculated. Since we were interested in relevance, we used absolute values of (the 
means of) the synonymy scores. For practical reasons we simplified the scale to scores 
ranging from 0 through 10. We created the IrT by computing the mean over all 
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(adapted) synonymy scores between all AMT cues and all self-guides a participant 
reported. 
A second index, IdT, expresses the degree to which the AMT is discrepant in relation to 
the total of self-guides formulated by respondents on the SDQ sections on the ought, 
ideal and feared selves. To create this index, we multiplied the aforementioned 
discrepancy scores by the corresponding synonymy scores as defined above. Finally we 
computed the mean over all variables that were relevant for all ought, ideal and feared 
self-guides. 
 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE USED MEASURES 
Table 4 summarises the means, standard deviations and ranges on all included 
variables. Because we asked participants to rate for each self-guide their discrepant as 
well as their actual position, we were able to calculate the magnitudes of the 
discrepancies. Most participants had no trouble to formulate enough self-discrepancies 
and self-guides, but one participant did not complete the SDQ. His data were excluded 
from the analyses. 
In terms of depression severity, most participants were considered severely depressed 
(71.9% scored above the BDI-II cut-off score of 28 points). One out of eight participants 
(12.5%) reported minimal complaints (range 0-13), 9.4% had scores indicating mild 
depression (14-19) and 6.2% of our participants were moderately severely depressed. 
The currently depressed participants did not differ from the currently non-depressed 
participants on the variables mentioned in Table 4, except for the feared-actual 
discrepancy scores (magnitude), which is smaller for the currently depressed 
participants, F = 5.76, p = .023. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMORY SPECIFICITY, DEPRESSION (SEVERITY), AND RUMINATION 
As is shown in Table 5, no association was found between memory specificity and 
diagnosis of depression. In contrast, the proportion of specific memories and 
depression severity as measured with the BDI-II are negatively associated, r = -.52, p < 
.01. This association remains significant when we control for diagnosis of depression, r 
= -.49, p < .01, suggesting that, at least in this sample of BPD patients, the relationship 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the measures used 
 M SD Range 
Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ)    
 Number of actual self-guides 6.38 1.23 3 – 7 
 Number of ought self-guides 6.00 1.58 1 – 7 
 Number of ideal self-guides 6.15 1.25 3 – 7 
 Number of feared self-guides 5.88 1.49 2 – 7 
 Ought-Actual discrepancy (magnitude) 37.16 35.64 -69.20 – 92.57 
 Ideal-Actual discrepancy (magnitude) 47.70 34.40 -88.33 – 88.00 
 Feared-Actual discrepancy (magnitude) 71.21 26.27 14.67 – 115.50 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT)    
 N / % specific memories  11.50 / .69  4.31 / .23 0 – 18 
 N / % general categoric memories  2.32 / .15  1.97 / .13 0 – 7 
 N / % general extended memories  .65 / .04  1.07 / .06 0 – 4 
 N / % no memory retrievals  1.09 / .08  1.50 / .14 0 – 6 
 N / % same event retrievals  .12 / .01  .33 / .02 0 – 1 
 N no response retrievals 1.68 3.41 0 – 12 
Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) 33.31 12.97 7 – 61 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS)    
 Total score 59.68 8.37 42 – 77 
 Reflection scale 11.24 3.28 5 – 18 
 Brooding scale 14.53 2.18 11 – 19 
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between memory specificity and depression severity is independent of depressive 
state. Indeed, the proportion of specific memories retrieved does not differ between 
depressed and non-depressed participants, F(1, 32) = 2.50, p = .12 (nor does the 
proportion of categoric memories retrieved, F(1, 32) = .72, p = .40). Moreover, 
associations between RMS and depression severity are high, as well in the depressed as 
in the non-depressed participants, r = -.63, r = -.44, respectively, both ps < .05, and 
these correlations do not differ from one another, z = -.64, p = .52. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 5 show that the proportion of specific memories and 
rumination are negatively associated, r = -.38, p < .05. However, p-level drops beneath 
significance level once depression severity scores are partialled out , r = -.11, p = .58, 
suggesting that lack of specificity in our sample is associated with depression severity 
and that the zero-order relation with rumination is explained by its association with 
severity of depressive symptoms. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Correlations between the proportions specific and categoric memories, 
rumination, depression, and depression severity 
 % GC RRS-total Depressive status BDI-II-total 
% S -.66** -.38* .27 -.52** 
% GC - .24 -.15 .29 
RRS-total  - -.34 .58** 
Depressive status   - -.30 
BDI-II-total    - 
%S = proportion specific memories retrieved during AMT administration; %GC = proportion 
general categoric memories retrieved during AMT administration.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMORY SPECIFICITY AND CUE CONTENT 
As mentioned above, we hypothesised that (1) the more AMT cues tap into a domain 
that is highly relevant for the respondent, the lower the proportion of specific 
memories retrieved by the respondent will be, and (2) the more AMT cues are 
experienced as discrepant with one’s actual state, the lower the proportion of specific 
memories retrieved will be. To test these hypotheses, we investigated the correlations 
between the proportion of specific and categoric memories retrieved in response to the 
AMT cues and the SDQ indices computed as described in the Analyses section. At first 
sight, the indices are not associated with memory specificity; IrT nor IdT correlated 
significantly with the proportion of specific memories, r = -.11, r = .17, ps = ns, 
respectively. There were no associations with the proportion of categoric memories 
either, r = -.02, r = -.06, ps = ns, respectively. 
Table 6 Correlations between the proportion of specific and categoric memories and 
between the indices expressing the self-relevance (IrT) and self-discrepancy (IdT) 
of the AMT 
 % S % GC IrT IdT 
% S           - -.63** .03 .40 
% GC  -.76** - -.05 -.19 
IrT  -.58 .07 - .29 
IdT  -.89** .57 .78** - 
Data above the diagonal relate to the non-depressed patients (n = 22) or our sample; Data 
below the diagonal relate to our depressed subsample (n = 11). 
%S = proportion specific memories retrieved during AMT administration; %GC = proportion 
general categoric memories retrieved during AMT administration; IrT = index expressing 
relevance of AMT in relation to all participants’ self-guides produced during SDQ 
assessment; IdT = index expressing relevance of AMT in relation to all participants’ self-
guides produced during SDQ administration, also taken into account the discrepancies 
indicated by the participant. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Crane et al. (2007) found that cue content only related to memory specificity in 
remitted depressed patients, and Kremers et al. (2004; 2006a) found that a depressed 
subgroup of their borderline patients retrieved less specific memories compared to the 
non-depressed borderlines they examined. Inspired by these findings, we recalculated 
these correlations in the depressed and the non-depressed subgroups of our sample. 
These correlations are shown in Table 6. The correlations of the non-depressed 
subgroup are shown above the diagonal; under the diagonal the correlations of the 
depressed subgroup are displayed. In spite of the small selection – only 11 of our 
participants were currently depressed –, we now found that IdT was negatively and 
highly associated with memory specificity in the depressed subsample, r = -.89, p < .01, 
suggesting that depressed BPD patients have more difficulties retrieving specific 
memories as cues are more referring to self-discrepant domains. In marked contrast, 
this relation was reversed (but not significant) in the non-depressed participants, r = 
.40, p = .07. These correlations differed significantly, z = -4.38, p < .00111. 
Although not significant, we also found a positive association in the depressed 
subsample between IdT and the proportion of categoric memories, r = .57, p = .065, 
(significantly different from the corresponding r = -.19, p = .39 in the non-depressed 
participants, z = -1.99, p < .05). Furthermore, a negative association was found between 
                                                     
 
11  This result was corroborated by a multiple hierarchical regression analysis predicting the  
(standardised) proportion of specific memories. Independent variables were all 
standardised. We entered depression severity on the first step, IdT and depressive status 
(non-depressed vs depressed) on the second step, and the interaction of IdT and depressive 
status on the third step. The overall model was significant, R² = .46, F(4, 27) = 5.67, p < .005, 
with no significant effect of IdT and depressive status, t(27) = .34, p = .74, β = .06, and t(27) = 
.84, p = .41, β = .13 respectively. The interaction of IdT x depressive status, on the other 
hand, was held back as a significant predictor, t(27) = -2.46, p = .02, β = -.42, as was 
depression severity, t(27) = -2.20, p = .04, β = -.37, pointing out that the interaction between 
depressive status and IdT is the most important determinant in this regression analysis, even 
when controlled for depression severity scores. 
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IrT and the proportion of specific memories retrieved, r = -.58, p = .064. This final 
correlation does not differ from the corresponding r = -.03 in the non-depressed 
subsample, z = -1.62, p = .10. No association was found in either subsample between IrT 
and the proportion of categoric memories retrieved, r = -.05 for the non-depressed 
participants, and r = -.07 for the depressed participants respectively, both p = ns. 
IrT and IdT were found to be unrelated to depression severity in the overall sample, r = 
.05, r = .14, ps > .44 respectively, as well as in the non-depressed participants, r = -.17, r 
= -.02, ps > .45 respectively. In the currently depressed participants, IdT related to 
depression severity, r = .71, p < .02, but IrT did not, r = .53, p = .10. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The aims of this study were threefold. First, we were interested to see what 
relationships could be found between memory specificity and depression (severity) in 
BPD patients. Second, we examined the relationship between memory specificity and 
rumination in BPD. Finally, based on recent theorising and empirical findings on the role 
of cue content in the retrieval process, we investigated whether memory specificity is 
influenced by the personal relevancy of AMT cues. 
Regarding the associations between memory specificity and depression severity, and 
between memory specificity and rumination, we found that both depression severity 
and rumination were negatively associated with memory specificity in BPD patients, 
suggesting that the more severe one’s depressive symptoms are, and the more one 
ruminates, the less one is capable of retrieving specific autobiographical memories. 
However, it should be noted that rumination and memory specificity were no longer 
significantly related when depression severity scores were partialled out. Furthermore, 
memory specificity and its relation with depression severity were independent of 
depressive state, and no direct association between memory specificity and depressive 
diagnosis was found. These findings suggest that depression severity is a more 
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important determinant of memory specificity in our BPD sample than rumination or 
depressive state. 
Although our results do not deviate from what is generally found in depressed patients 
(e.g., Raes et al., 2005; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, et al. 2006; van Minnen et al., 
2005), they are inconsistent with previous work that focused on the relation between 
memory specificity and depression (severity) in BPD (Arntz et al., 2002; Jones et al., 
1999; Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & Startup, 2010;  
Renneberg et al., 2005). If any relation was found, memory specificity in BPD patients 
was related to depressive state (Arntz et al., 2002; Kremers et al., 2004; 2006a), but 
never to depression severity. Clear-cut explanations for our findings are lacking, though 
we would like to point out some considerations. First, the currently depressed and the 
non-depressed participants did not differ on any of the variables of interest (depression 
severity, memory specificity, rumination). Possibly, our research design may not have 
encountered important variables that either directly or indirectly (via depression 
severity) have influenced memory specificity. As mentioned before, differences in RMS 
between patients with and patients without BPD have found to be mediated by 
differences in IQ and education (Reid & Startup, 2010), and associations are reported 
with poor social-problem solving capacity (Kremers et al., 2006b; Maurex et al., 2010; 
Reid, 2008) and with less parasuicidal acts (Startup et al., 2001). Executive deficits or 
post-traumatic symptoms can therefore be considered as important missing variables. 
Second, but closely relating to the previous consideration, we should consider the 
possibility that depression in BPD differs in nature from depression in MDD. Possibly, 
depression in BPD should be considered in terms of affective instability following 
traumatic experiences. Finally, we should question why only a relatively small number 
of participants was acknowledged as currently depressed by the psychiatrist. Based on 
the cut-off scores mentioned in the BDI-II-NL Manual (van der Does, 2002) we can 
conclude that 78.1% of our respondents were considered (moderately) severely 
depressed, and that reported depression severity scores were high in the total sample 
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(M = 33.31; SD = 12.97). Measuring depression severity implicates measuring the 
absence or presence of symptoms, and vice versa. We could therefore wonder what 
exactly determines whether a psychiatrist judges someone as currently depressed or 
not. The use of a categorical diagnostic classification system as the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
may have some limitations on this behalf, since a diagnosis is made by judging the 
presence or absence of certain criteria, possibly without taking fully into account the 
severity of the total tableau of symptoms. 
Regarding the relations between cue content and memory specificity, we expected 
participants to report less specific memories when AMT cues more closely relate to 
highly discrepant personal domains (high discrepancy) or to highly personal themes 
(high relevance). As for ‘high discrepancy’, we did not find a relation with memory 
specificity for the total sample. However, the currently depressed BPD patients in our 
sample did show a significant negative association between memory specificity and the 
extent to which the AMT cues referred to discrepant domains about the self (IdT). 
Furthermore, a nearly significant positive correlation between IdT and the proportion of 
categoric memories was found in this subsample. These correlations differed 
significantly from the corresponding correlations in the non-depressed participants. In 
addition, these findings were unrelated to depression severity. This pattern of results 
suggests that the more AMT cues are experienced as discrepant with one’s actual self-
perceptions, the more difficult it is to retrieve specific memories on that AMT, at least 
when one is currently depressed. As for ‘high relevancy’, we only observed a marginally 
significant negative association with memory specificity for the currently depressed 
BPD-patients in our sample, and this correlation did not differ from the corresponding 
correlation in the non-depressed participants. No associations were found between cue 
relevance and the proportion of categoric memories retrieved. 
It has been proposed that the activation of schemas that are discrepant with actual self-
schemas would demand a reallocation of resources in an attempt to reduce the present 
discrepancies, thereby hindering the retrieval of specific autobiographical information 
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(Conway et al., 2004; Dalgleish et al., 2003). As mentioned before, BPD patients are 
prone to rumination (Smith et al., 2006), which could be considered as a discrepancy-
based thinking, directed at reducing the discrepancies (Crane et al., 2007). In addition, 
rumination has often been associated with RMS (e.g., see Debeer et al., 2009; Raes, 
Hermans, Williams, Beyers et al., 2006). Furthermore, BPD patients are typically 
characterised by an instable sense of self, suggesting that their WS processes are 
mostly involved in self-coherence rather than in adaptive correspondence (Parker, 
Boldero, & Bell, 2006). We therefore would expect RMS in (all) BPD patients. However, 
we only found significant associations between discrepancy and memory specificity in 
our depressed participants. Nevertheless, the non-depressed participants probably 
have some ideals or standards they try to attain as well. And given the high co-
morbidity rates with depression in BPD, it is unlikely that none of the non-depressed 
participants had never been depressed before, even though we do not have precise 
data on the number of previous episodes of depression of our participants. 
The SMS (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004), and the 
CaR-FA-X model (Williams et al., 2007), however, also take into account executive 
functioning and traumatic experiences. Depression and rumination are known to be 
associated with lower levels of executive functioning, which could explain why we only 
found a relation between discrepancy and memory specificity in our depressed 
participants. Furthermore, as mentioned before, depression in BPD patients could be 
different in nature since it can be considered in terms of affective instability following 
traumatic experiences, or as a post-traumatic symptom. Unfortunately no measures on 
(post-)trauma (symptoms) nor on executive functioning were administered. 
An alternative, though speculative, possible explanation is delivered by Parker et al. 
(2006), who suggested that BPD patients differed in self-complexity. They assume that 
high self-complex persons will abandon to focus on discrepant ideal-self content, 
thereby protecting them to develop depression. We could therefore (tentatively) 
hypothesise that our currently depressed participants would be low in self-complexity, 
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therefore focussing more on ideal-actual discrepancies, which would lead to less 
specific memories. However, since this hypothesis is speculative, further research is 
necessary to test it. 
Three topics need further discussion. First, we need to analyse the different findings 
concerning relevancy, which we found was unrelated to RMS, and discrepancy, that 
was highly associated with RMS in depressed participants. According to the SMS 
(Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004) an emphasis on 
discrepancies (= highly discrepant) regarding personal (= highly relevant) goals could 
lead to a reallocation of the resources in the disadvantage of autobiographical memory 
specificity, suggesting that relevancy as well as discrepancy are both necessary 
elements in influencing memory specificity, and none of them is sufficient as such. Our 
data do confirm that relevancy as such is not sufficient, since it does not lead to 
problems in retrieving specific memories. Since high discrepancy indices are related to 
difficulties in retrieving specific autobiographical memories, we can conclude that 
discrepancy as such is a necessary factor in the correlation. However, it is not clear 
whether discrepancy is a sufficient factor, since our discrepancy indices are constructed 
by multiplying previously determined relevancy scores (‘synonymy scores’) by the 
discrepancy scores, thereby taking into account relevancy as well. This was a necessary 
step, because we needed to determine to what degree AMT cues and self-reported 
self-guides were related. In order to clearly distinguish between relevancy and 
discrepancy, pure discrepancy scores should be obtained in future research. This can be 
done by constructing personal AMT’s, based on one’s self-reported self-guides, or, the 
other way around, by asking participants to what degree they think they ought to have, 
ideally would like to have, or fear to have the characteristics expressed by the AMT 
cues, and to what degree they actually believe they possess each of these 
characteristics at the moment. Tentatively, we do believe that relevancy as well as 
discrepancy are necessary factors, since we think that highly discrepant domains are 
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not necessary highly relevant for the respondent, thereby having less impact on one’s 
resources and thinking processes. 
Second, it would be interesting to see whether memory specificity in (depressed) BPD 
patients depends on the sort of discrepancies they mainly report, given the fact that 
BPD patients often complain about disturbed mood and anxiety. Following the ideas of 
Higgins and co-workers (e.g., Higgins et al., 1985; 1986), we would expect that 
depressed BPD patients experience more discomfort following the confrontation with 
ideal self-guides, which would lead to less specific retrieved memories. Despite our 
small sample size, we conducted some preliminary analyses, using indices that only 
took into account the ought, the ideal, and the feared self-guides respectively. Stressing 
that a larger sample size is recommended for these analyses, our data suggest that, 
contrary to the expectations, discrepant ideas about one’s ought self are more 
important in relation to RMS than discrepant or relevant ideas about any other kind of 
self, and only in the depressed subgroup of our sample. Further research has to be 
conducted, of course, but such data could also help pointing out whether rumination 
content (as stressed in the definition of rumination by Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) or its 
process characteristics (“negative, uncontrollable and perseverative”, as stated by 
Watkins, 2008), or both are influencing RMS. 
Finally, it should be questioned why discrepancy scores were only related to depression 
severity in our depressed participants, but not in general. Again, no clear-cut 
explanations can be offered, although we could again assume that depression in BPD 
differs in nature from depression in MDD. It is conceivable that traumatic experiences 
in vulnerable subjects install a range of post-traumatic symptoms, including an 
increased attention to self-coherence and depressed state with associated (ruminative) 
information processes. The focus on self-coherence and the depressed state may be 
maintained by worry-like thoughts, considering how one should be or act, given the 
(disturbed) circumstances (ought discrepancies). All these processes use available 
executive resources which in turn are unavailable for guided search processes. Future 
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research should therefore also focus on post-trauma symptoms and executive 
functioning. 
Our findings are not without limitations. As mentioned before, we did not collect 
information on the number of previous depressive episodes, (severity of) past 
traumatic experiences and post-traumatic stress. Furthermore, we failed to collect 
information about the medication use of our participants, as well as about their 
executive functioning. Future research should take these variables, of which is known 
that they could explain (additional) variance in memory specificity, into account in 
order to conduct more complete analyses. 
Furthermore, we used a relatively small sample (n=34) and participants were included 
in our study based on a diagnosis made by the treating psychiatrist. No more valid and 
reliable procedures (e.g., SCID-I, SCID-II) were used, nor did we assess participants’ 
precise borderline features or self-complexity. Therefore, we cannot exclude that our 
findings are the artefact of a selection bias in the pool of BPD phenotypes. Thus, 
replication with proper selection instruments in a larger sample is recommended. 
In addition, although the (written) AMT we used has been successfully used in previous 
research (e.g., Henderson et al., 2002; Raes et al., 2008; 2009), and analogous results 
were found in comparable samples, we have to admit that no direct comparison with 
the standard (oral) AMT has been done so far. The version we used differs procedurally 
from the standard AMT (no time constraints, taking into account the respondent’s own 
judgement regarding specificity or overgenerality, possible difficulties deriving the level 
of specificity from written answers that had no further comment), which may have 
influenced our measure of memory specificity, and therefore our results. 
Further comments concern time span of data collection. AMT administration 
immediately followed SDQ administration. We cannot exclude that filling out the SDQ 
might have activated important schemas that could have affected memory retrieval 
during AMT administration. In future studies, self-guides should ideally be assessed at 
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least one week before running the AMT (Williams, personal communication, Berlin, 
October 1, 2009). 
Finally, we need to be careful using the indices we created to test our hypotheses on 
the relations between self-relevance/self-discrepancy and memory specificity. Although 
a large sample of volunteers scored to what degree self-descriptions and AMT cues 
were synonymous, each volunteer only got a random selection of 67 matches, and each 
match was only scored by 4.11 volunteers on average. The raters were recruited using 
different ways (personal contacts of the first author, contacts of personal contacts, 
website advertisements on forums), which makes it harder to assess the homogeneity 
of this group. We did however include some descriptive variables, which show that the 
raters differ in many aspects from the participants. The raters had higher levels of 
education, were more often married and they usually were employed. 
However, and notwithstanding the above limitations, the present results suggest that 
depression (in interaction with cue relevance) as well as depression severity play an 
important role in RMS in BPD patients, extending earlier observations by, for example, 
Kremers et al. (2004, 2006a), but contradicting other findings by Arntz et al. (2002), 
Jones et al. (1999), Kremers et al. (2004, 2006a), Maurex et al. (2010), Reid and Startup 
(2010), and Renneberg et al. (2005). Also, the findings concerning the importance of 
cue content are consistent with prior work in the field (e.g., Barnhofer et al., 2007; 
Crane et al., 2007; Spinhoven et al., 2007) and add to the preliminary evidence 
suggesting an important association between RMS and the extent to which cues 
activate highly (discrepant) personal domains, which fits with the influential SMS model 
on autobiographical memory by Conway and colleagues (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). Nevertheless, we may have neglected to 
include potential important variables, such as history of trauma, data on the personal 
coping with or consequences of trauma, or measures of executive functioning that 
could account to a better understanding of RMS in BPD. 
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ABSTRACT 
Studies have shown that, compared to controls, patients suffering from Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) retrieve less 
specific memories (‘overgeneral memory’, OGM). Furthermore, these patients more 
often use an observer perspective (vs. field perspective) during autobiographical 
memory recall. Although patients with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) regularly 
report depressed mood and a traumatic history, OGM in BPD patients is only 
inconsistently found, and perspective during recall has not been studied in BPD before. 
We examined the relationship between MDD and PTSD status on the one hand, and 
specificity and vantage perspective of memory recall on the other hand, in BPD 
patients. Additionally, we explored whether prompting self-discrepancy would result in 
less specific, and more observer memories. Fifty-four BPD patients completed the Self-
Description Questionnaire, the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, the 
standard Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) and a personalised AMT that is believed 
to prompt self-discrepancy. Results showed that BPD patients with a co-morbid 
diagnosis of PTSD retrieve memories more from an observer perspective than those 
without PTSD. Our results suggest that traumatised (BPD) patients may benefit from 
therapeutic strategies that encourage the adoption of a field perspective during 
autobiographical memory retrieval. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Autobiographical memory is the aspect of memory that is concerned with the 
recollection of personally experienced past events” (Williams et al., 2007, p. 122). The 
study of autobiographical memory extends in different lines of research. The current 
chapter focuses on the association between specificity and vantage perspective during 
autobiographical memory retrieval on the one hand and co-morbid major depressive 
disorder (MDD; APA, 1994) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; APA, 1994) on the 
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other hand in patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD; APA, 1994). In 
addition, we explore the role of self-discrepancy in autobiographical memory retrieval. 
Memory specificity is traditionally measured using the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). In the AMT, participants are presented with word 
cues, such as ‘happy’ or ‘lazy’, and are instructed to retrieve specific memories, i.e. 
memories referring to events that happened on a particular day and place (e.g., “That 
one time, when my ex-husband threatened me in front of the children on my 48th 
birthday.”, in response to the cue ‘afraid’). Several studies (see Williams et al., 2007, for 
a review) have shown that (remitted) depressed and traumatised patients, compared to 
controls, more frequently retrieve categories of events (e.g., “Each time he threatened 
me”). This phenomenon is referred to as overgeneral memory (OGM). One assumption 
is that OGM may prevent one to get overwhelmed by painful recollections (CaR-FA-X 
model, Williams et al., 2007; Self-Memory System, SMS, Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 
2004). However, being overgeneral all the time is believed to be detrimental for a 
number of reasons. For instance, OGM has been shown to undermine successful 
problem solving (e.g., Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin, & Howells, 1992). Additionally, OGM 
has been found to be associated with higher levels of rumination (e.g., Raes, Watkins, 
Williams, & Hermans, 2008), a less favourable course of depression (see Sumner, 
Griffith, & Mineka, 2010, for a review), and a greater chance of PTSD in trauma 
survivors (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). Finally, Conway and colleagues (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004) argue that specific memories are essential in the 
construction and maintenance of our self-concept. 
Despite the fact that an unstable sense of self is a core feature of BPD (‘identity 
disturbance’; APA, 1994), and that BPD patients often suffer from co-morbid MDD and 
PTSD (Grant et al., 2008), OGM is only inconsistently found in BPD patients (see Van 
den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, Hermans, & Raes, in press, for a review, or Chapter 2 in this 
thesis). Some studies suggest that OGM in BPD is at least in part associated with MDD 
(Arntz et al., 2002; Kremers et al., 2004; but see e.g., Maurex et al., 2010, for 
Chapter 4 
 
- 87 - 
 
contradictory findings). Previous studies further found no association between OGM 
and PTSD in BPD patients (Kremers et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005). Therefore, the 
first aim of the present study was to further explore the associations between 
MDD/PTSD and OGM in BPD patients. Based on previous findings, we hypothesised that 
OGM in BPD patients would be associated with a co-morbid diagnosis of MDD 
(Hypothesis 1a), but not with co-morbid PTSD (Hypothesis 1b). 
Besides level of specificity, another dimension of autobiographical memories that has 
attracted the attention of researchers is vantage perspective during memory recall. 
Most recollections are typically remembered from one’s original viewpoint, as if one 
‘sees’ the situation through one’s own eyes (i.e., first person or field perspective; 
Bergouignan et al., 2008; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). However, some memories are 
remembered while ‘seeing’ the situation as an observer (i.e., third person, or observer 
perspective). Field memories are generally experienced as more emotional and 
detailed, whereas in observer mode one is more likely to focus on the objective 
circumstances than on the affective elements (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 
2002; 2004). It has been suggested that traumatic memories are more often retrieved 
from an observer perspective (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Kenny & Bryant, 2007), 
but higher proportions of observer memories – especially when retrieving positive 
memories – are also reported in samples of (remitted) depressed individuals 
(Bergouignan et al., 2008; Lemogne et al., 2006), independent of a trauma history or 
whether the memory referred to traumatic experiences or not (Kuyken & Howell, 
2006). Three theories try to explain the elevated levels of observer memories in 
depressed and traumatised patients. First, the adoption of an observer perspective may 
help to regulate one’s affect in response to distressing memories, because observer 
memories are likely to reduce memories’ emotional arousal (e.g., Robinson & Swanson, 
1993). However, the tendency to retrieve observer memories is an avoidant strategy 
(Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Lemogne et al., 2009) that is only functional in the short term. 
In the long term, trauma-related observer memories predict PTSD symptom severity 
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(Kenny et al., 2009).  Second, observer memories become more likely when one 
compares one’s actual self with a former or future self (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby, 
Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2011). Comparison is an important element of 
rumination, which has an essential role in the maintenance and onset of depression 
(e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and PTSD (e.g., Ehring, Frank, & Ehlers, 2008). Finally, 
according to Libby and Eibach (2011) the perspective one adopts during recall depends 
on how one conceptualises the retrieved life event in relation to one’s self-concept. 
Important life events that often precede MDD (e.g., Kessler, 1997) and/or PTSD, give 
rise to observer memories, because the individual needs them to be framed in a 
broader context, e.g., one’s self-beliefs, or in relation to other significant life events. 
Field memories, on the other hand, evoke concrete features of a situation, and are 
therefore assumed to address the experiential self. According to this theory then, and 
opposed to the concept of perspective taking as an avoidance strategy (cf. first 
account), observer memories may even intensify emotional responses (Libby, Valenti, 
Pfent, & Eibach, 2011). 
The second aim of this study was to further investigate vantage perspective in relation 
to MDD and PTSD in BPD patients. Most trauma-related studies on vantage perspective 
have focused on vantage for traumatic memories. However, in the light of the first two 
accounts (i.e., perspective as a function of avoidant affect-regulation or comparative 
processing), it is reasonable to expect that the adoption of an observer perspective may 
extend to non-traumatic memories as well, resulting in an observer retrieval style. More 
specifically, we hypothesised higher proportions of observer memories in (previously) 
depressed BPD patients compared to never depressed BPD patients (Hypothesis 2a), 
and in BPD patients with co-morbid PTSD compared to BPD patients without PTSD 
(Hypothesis 2b), irrespective of the content (trauma-related or not) of the memory. 
The third and final aim of this study was to explore the impact of self-discrepancy on 
OGM and vantage perspective during recall. Recent findings indicate that memory 
specificity in (remitted) depressed patients may be influenced by the meaning AMT 
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cues have for each respondent (e.g., Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). When a 
memory search process, for example in response to an AMT cue word, gives rise to the 
activation of information that is highly discrepant towards one’s current self-concept, 
this is thought to jeopardise the stability of the actual self. Cognitive resources are then 
shifted away from current search processes, in order to prevent a disorganised self 
(Conway et al., 2004). The search process is aborted before the memory layers with 
detailed information are reached, which will result in a generic (categoric) memory. 
Indeed, Van den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, and Raes (2012 – see also Chapter 3 in this 
thesis) found that the greater the extent to which AMT cues refer to discrepant 
domains about the self, the less specific memories are retrieved in a sample of 
currently depressed BPD patients (see also Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2012). To cover 
self-discrepancy in this study, we constructed a personalised AMT (pAMT) for each 
respondent, using his or her ten most self-discrepant self-guides. This pAMT was 
administered in addition to the standard AMT. With respect to OGM, we first 
hypothesised that, in line with previous findings, (remitted) depressed patients would 
show more OGM in response to the pAMT, compared to never depressed (BPD) 
patients (Hypothesis 3a). Second, although PTSD and OGM have been found to be 
unrelated in BPD patients (Kremers et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005), we 
hypothesised that prompting self-discrepant (traumatic?) information in PTSD patients 
using the pAMT would hinder guided search processes, resulting in higher levels of 
OGM than in patients without PTSD (Hypothesis 3b). Finally, we hypothesised that the 
pAMT in general would result in higher levels of OGM than the standard AMT 
(Hypothesis 3c). 
With respect to the relation between vantage perspective and self-discrepancy, we 
reasoned that prompting self-discrepancy would make idiosyncratic comparisons more 
likely. We therefore hypothesised that the pAMT would result in higher proportions of 
observer memories in patients with a history of depression (Hypothesis 3d) and in 
patients with PTSD (Hypothesis 3e), who are more prone to ruminative processes than 
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never depressed (e.g., Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998, study 1) and non-PTSD patients 
(e.g., Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002), respectively. Finally, we hypothesised that the 
use of the pAMT overall will result in higher proportions of observer memories than the 
standard AMT (Hypothesis 3f). To our knowledge, self-discrepancy has never been 
studied in relation to vantage perspective and trauma before. Therefore, most of these 
hypotheses (3b, 3d, 3e, and 3f) have an exploratory nature. 
 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 54 patients (8 males), all meeting DSM-IV BPD criteria (APA, 1994) 
according to the SCID-II interview (SCID-II; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 
1997; Dutch translation by Weertman, Arntz, & Kerkhofs, 2000). All participants were 
between 18 and 51 years of age (M = 29.48, SD = 8.37). They were recruited in two 
Belgian psychiatric hospitals: University Psychiatric Centre KU Leuven, Campus 
Kortenberg (77.78%) and Psychiatric Hospital Duffel (22.22%). Most patients were 
inpatients (79.63%) staying at a general psychiatric ward (46.51%), at a specialised unit 
treating BPD according to the principles of Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (34.88%) or 
at a unit specialised in the treatment of anxiety disorders (18.60%). Eleven patients 
followed day treatment and outpatient emotional skills trainings, organised by the 
aforementioned hospitals. No differences were found between patients of different 
settings with respect to memory specificity nor vantage perspective, except for the 
number of specific memories retrieved in response to the personalised AMT (Sp), 
MKortenberg = 7.33, MDuffel = 8.58, F = 7.56, p < .01. Although only 22.22% of all patients 
were recruited in Duffel, 40.00% of the never depressed participants came from Duffel. 
Furthermore, inpatients did not differ from outpatients with respect to the variables of 
interest. We therefore decided to study the sample as a whole. 
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INSTRUMENTS 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis II (SCID-II, First et al., 1997; 
Dutch translation by Weertman et al., 2000). The SCID-II is a semi-structured interview 
that assesses DSM-IV Axis II disorders (APA, 1994). All SCID-II interviews were 
performed by the first author, who is trained to use the SCID-II. The SCID-II items are 
scored as not applicable, applicable but not sufficiently present, or present. Scores 
reflect the presence or absence of 12 personality disorders (all DSM-IV personality 
disorders plus depressive and passive-aggressive personality disorder). Interrater 
reliability of the SCID-II ranges from .90 to .98 for dimensional judgements and internal 
consistency ranges from .71 to .94 (Maffei et al., 1997). 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis I (SCID-I, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
& Williams, 1997; Dutch translation by van Groenestijn, Akkerhuis, Kupka, Schneider, & 
Nolen, 1999). This semi-structured interview was used to assess DSM-IV Axis I disorders 
(APA, 1994). We only administered the MDD and PTSD modules. Again, interviews were 
performed by the first author. For the module on MDD, satisfactory test-retest 
reliability (κ = .61) and interrater reliability (κ = .80) are reported (Zanarini et al., 2000). 
For the module on PTSD, satisfactory test-retest reliability (κ = .78) and interrater 
reliability (κ = .88) are reported (Zanarini et al., 2000). 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT, Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Dutch version). In 
the AMT, respondents are presented with 18 cues that are read aloud by the 
experimenter (happy, sad, safe, angry, interested, clumsy, successful, emotionally hurt, 
surprised, lonely, relaxed, guilty, proud, afraid, pleasant, cowardly, carefree, and lazy). 
Participants are invited to retrieve specific memories. The definition of a specific 
memory is explained by means of an example. Three example cues are presented 
before the actual task to check whether the participants understood the instructions. 
Answers were immediately coded as ‘specific’, ‘general categoric’ (if the response 
refers to a category of events), ‘general extended’ (if the answer refers to an event that 
took longer than one day), ‘no memory’ (e.g., a semantic association), or ‘same event’ 
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(whenever the retrieved memory was identical to a memory retrieved in response to a 
previous cue). If respondents first retrieved a general memory or a memory that had 
been retrieved before, they were prompted to search for a (different) specific memory. 
If no memory was reported within 60 seconds, the next cue was presented and the 
answer was coded as ‘omission’. Originally, we were only interested in memory 
specificity. We thus computed the number of categoric (GC) and specific memories (S) 
retrieved and, to correct for the number of omissions, the proportions12 of specific [%S 
= S / (18 – number of omissions)] and general categoric memories [%GC = GC / (18 – 
number of omissions)]. Vantage perspective was included at a later stage. We therefore 
extended the protocol in the following way: At the end of the AMT, the experimenter 
explained the difference between field and observer perspective using a standardised 
instruction. Subsequently, participants were asked to classify each memory they 
retrieved as a field or an observer memory. Because Kuyken and Moulds (2009) argue 
that coding vantage perspective of semantic associations, categoric, and extended 
memories cannot be readily done, we only took the perspectives for the specific 
memories into account. Participants were unable to code three specific memories (out 
of a total of 496 specific memories retrieved since measuring vantage perspective) for 
vantage perspective. For each participant, the proportion of observer memories was 
calculated [%O = number of observer memories / (number of field memories + number 
of observer memories)]. AMT administrations were audiotaped. A random sample of 
ten percent of all answers to AMT cues were re-coded by a second rater, judging 
memory specificity. Interrater agreement was found to be high, κ = .82. 
                                                     
 
12  To preserve maximum readability, we do not report the results for our proportional indices 
of specific (%S and %Sp) and categoric (%GC and %GCp) memories, unless they are different 
from the results using the plain number of specific (S or Sp) and categoric (GC or GCp) 
memories. 
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Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ, Crane et al., 2007; non-published Dutch 
adaptation by Van den Broeck, Claes, & Raes, 2008). The SDQ, originally developed by 
Higgins, Klein, and Strauman (1985) to measure the actual, ideal and ought selves (see 
Appendix A, p. 235, for definition), has been adapted several times (Carver, Lawrence, 
& Scheier, 1999; Crane et al., 2007; Strauman, 1992; Van den Broeck et al., 2008). We 
used the same version as Van den Broeck et al. (2012 – Chapter 3 of this thesis). First, 
participants were asked to describe their actual self by means of seven characteristics. 
For each of the actual self-descriptions participants reported, they had to fill out a 100 
mm visual analogue scale (VAS), measuring the extent to which respondents believe 
they actually possess the cited characteristic at the present moment. These data were 
not used. Afterwards, participants were asked to describe their ought, ideal and feared 
selves, again by means of seven characteristics for each self. For each of the 21 
produced self-guides, two VASs were presented. On the first VAS, respondents were 
asked to indicate to what degree they ought to have, ideally would like to have or 
feared to have the self-guides they had written down, depending on whether the self-
guide belonged to their ought, ideal or feared self respectively. As for attributes 
formulated as characterising the actual self, participants were asked to indicate on the 
second VAS to what degree they actually possessed each of the cited self-guides at the 
present moment. This procedure allowed us to calculate discrepancy scores for each 
self-guide by subtracting the position on the second scale from the score on the first 
scale. 
Personalised Autobiographical Memory Test (pAMT). For each participant, the ten most 
discrepant self-guides as formulated in the SDQ were selected, and given back to the 
participant in a random order. Instructions and scoring is identical to that of the 
standard AMT, for both memory specificity and vantage perspective. We computed the 
number of specific (Sp) and categoric memories (GCp), and the proportion of observer 
memories (%Op). Participants were unable to code four specific memories (out of a 
total of 269 retrieved specific memories since the measurement of vantage 
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perspective) for vantage perspective. Also, as for the standard AMT, overall interrater 
agreement for memory specificity was satisfactorily high, κ = .7813, based on a random 
sample of ten percent of the answers given in response to pAMT cues. 
  
PROCEDURE 
This study was part of a larger study investigating autobiographical memory in BPD 
psychopathology. Following oral and written informed consent, participants were asked 
to fill out a battery of tests and questionnaires, of which the first was the SDQ. 
Afterwards, the SCID-I modules, the SCID-II and the standard AMT were administered, 
in this order. Due to practical issues, data collection often took more than one session, 
but in general a respondent’s protocol was completed within a three week timespan. 
To avoid memory effects, and to prevent that participants would associate the pAMT 
with the SDQ, the pAMT was administered at the end of the protocol. 
 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 7 presents the sample characteristics for the total group, as well as for the 
subsample (n = 34) of which data on vantage perspective during recall are also 
available. Most of the participants (70.37% in the total sample, 67.65% in the vantage 
perspective subsample) met more than five criteria needed for a BPD diagnosis (M = 
6.39; SD = 1.17 in the total sample; M = 6.32; SD = 1.19 in the subsample). Additionally, 
the majority of participants (66.67% of the total sample; 64.71% of the subsample) had 
one or more co-morbid Axis II disorders (M = 1.26 in the total sample; M = 1.15 in the 
                                                     
 
13  We would like to thank David Stuers for his contributions in calculating interrater reliability 
of the (p)AMT output (in this Chapter, buth also in Chapters 6 and 7). 
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subsample; both ranging from 0 to 4). The following Axis II disorders were most often 
diagnosed besides BPD in the total and subsample, respectively: Obsessive-Compulsive 
(25.93%; 23.53%), Paranoid (24.07%; 23.53%), Antisocial (24.07%; 20.59%), and 
Narcissistic (20.37%; 23.53%) personality disorder. 
Table 7 Sample characteristics for the total sample (n = 54) and for the subsample of which 
data on vantage perspective are available (n = 34) 
 Total sample 
(n = 54; 8 males) 
Subsample 
(n = 34; 6 males) 
Age (M, SD) 29.48 (8.37) 29.82 (8.75) 
Education level (%) 
 Primary school 
 High school 
 College 
 University 
 
9.3 
53.7 
25.9 
11.1 
 
14.7 
55.9 
14.7 
14.7 
Civil state (%) 
 Single 
 Living together 
 Married 
 Divorced 
 
63.0 
26.0 
3.7 
7.4 
 
64.7 
20.6 
2.9 
11.8 
Occupation (%) 
 Student 
 Unemployed 
 Working / on sick leave 
 Other 
 
9.3 
38.9 
48.1 
3.7 
 
8.8 
29.4 
55.9 
5.9 
N Kortenberg/N Duffel 42 / 12 22 / 12 
N Inpatient/N outpatient 43 / 11 23 / 11 
Inpatient (%) at 
 General psychiatric ward 
 Specialised DBT unit 
 Specialised anxiety unit 
 
46.5 
34.9 
18.6 
 
60.9 
26.1 
13.0 
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Presence or absence of MDD and PTSD in the total and subsample is presented in Table 
8. In sum, patients of the subsample in whom we investigated vantage perspective are 
similar to the total sample. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OGM AND MDD/PTSD (HYPOTHESES 1A-B) 
Table 9 presents the number of specific and categoric memories, retrieved in response 
to the standard AMT (S and GC) and the personalised AMT (Sp and GCp), in function of 
co-morbid diagnoses of MDD and PTSD. To test the hypothesis that a co-morbid 
diagnosis of MDD would be related with OGM (Hypothesis 1a), an ANOVA14 was 
conducted, comparing S and GC in currently depressed (n = 18), remitted depressed (n 
= 26) and never depressed (n = 10) participants. Levene’s test indicated unequal 
                                                     
 
14  Because we found age to be correlated with S, r = -.36, and GC, r = .34, both ps < .05, we 
initially conducted an ANCOVA with age as covariant. However, Levene’s test indicated 
unequal variances between groups for S, F = 5.06, and for GC, F = 5.22, both ps ≤ .01. We 
examined different transformations (x**.05/1/2, ln+1), but Levene’s test remained 
significant. We then performed an ANOVA to test whether age differed in current, remitted, 
and never depressed. No association was found, F = 1.50, p = .232. We therefore concluded 
to conduct plain ANOVAs, not taking into account age as a covariate, when investigating the 
association between MDD/PTSD on the one hand, and S and GC on the other hand. 
Table 8 Presence and absence of MDD and PTSD in our sample 
 Currently 
depressed 
Remitted 
depressed 
Never 
depressed 
Total 
Current PTSD 12 (7) 7 (3) 0 (0) 19 (10) 
No PTSD 6 (4) 19 (10) 10 (10) 35 (24) 
Total 18 (11) 26 (13) 10 (10) 54 (34) 
Numbers in parentheses refer to the subsample of which data on vantage perspective 
during recall are available (n = 34) 
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variances between groups for S, F = 3.41, and GC, F = 3.54, both ps < .05. Therefore, 
degrees of freedom were adjusted from 51 to 30 and 20 respectively. Contrary to our 
expectations, we found no support for an effect of depressed status on memory 
specificity, Welch’s F(2, 30.29) = 1.80, Welch’s F(2, 20.13) = 1.91, both ps ≥ .174 and 
both ωs ≤ .19, for S and GC, respectively. 
We further tested whether BPD patients with co-morbid PTSD (n = 19) showed more 
OGM compared to BPD patients without PTSD (n = 35) on the standard AMT 
(Hypothesis 1b). As expected, both groups did not differ significantly with respect to S 
and GC, F = .07, and F = .01, respectively, both ps ≥ .791 and both ds ≤ .08. 
  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VANTAGE PERSPECTIVE DURING RECALL AND MDD/PTSD (HYPOTHESES 
2A-B) 
Table 10 presents the proportion of observer memories, retrieved in response to the 
standard AMT (%O) and the personalised AMT (%Op), in function of co-morbid 
Table 9 Overgeneral memory in function of  a diagnosis of MDD/PTSD in the total sample 
of BPD patients (n = 54) 
 Current 
depressed 
(n = 18) 
Remitted 
depressed 
(n = 26) 
Never 
depressed 
(n = 10) 
Current PTSD 
(n = 19) 
No PTSD 
(n = 35) 
Standard AMT          
 S 13.78 (3.00) 14.88 (2.18) 15.30 (1.16) 14.47 (2.12) 14.66 (2.55) 
 GC 1.33 (1.64) .65 (.69) 1.10 (.99) .95 (.85) .97 (1.32) 
Personalised AMT         
 S 7.78a,b (1.31) 7.15a (1.59) 8.50b (.97) 7.47 (1.71) 7.69 (1.35) 
 GC .50a (.51) .12b (.33) .30a,b (.48) .32 (.48) .26 (.44) 
S = number of specific memories; GC = number of categoric memories. Different letters in a 
row mark significant differences following Tukey post-hoc comparisons, p < .05.  
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diagnoses of MDD and PTSD. First, we hypothesised that (previously) depressed 
patients would recall higher proportions of observer memories compared to never 
depressed participants (Hypothesis 2a). However, an ANOVA comparing %O in currently 
depressed (n = 11), remitted depressed (n = 13) and never depressed (n = 10) 
participants, did not support this hypothesis, F(2, 31) = .90, p = .417, ω = .07. 
Likewise, we hypothesised that patients with PTSD would retrieve higher %O compared 
to patients without PTSD, irrespective of memory content (Hypothesis 2b). Only 11 of 
the 493 memories scored for vantage perspective directly referred to the traumatic 
experiences listed during SCID-I administration. In line with our expectation, we found 
that participants with PTSD (n = 10) retrieved significantly higher %O than participants 
without PTSD (n = 24), F = 4.42, p < .05, and d = .82. 
 
THE IMPACT OF SELF-DISCREPANCY ON OGM/VANTAGE PERSPECTIVE, IN RELATION TO MDD/PTSD 
(HYPOTHESES 3A–F) 
With respect to the personalised AMT (pAMT), we hypothesised that current and 
remitted depressed BPD patients would show more OGM compared to never depressed 
Table 10 Vantage perspective during recall in function of a diagnosis of MDD/PTSD in BPD 
patients (n = 34) 
 
Current 
depressed 
(n = 11) 
Remitted 
depressed 
(n = 13) 
Never 
depressed 
(n = 10) 
Current PTSD 
(n = 10) 
No PTSD 
(n = 24) 
Standard AMT .47 (.23) .51 (.14) .41 (.19) .57a (.16) .43b (.18) 
Personalised 
AMT 
.53 (.18) .52 (.21) .38 (.26) .57 (.17) .44 (.23) 
Means in this table represent the proportion of observer memories retrieved, i.e., number 
of observer memories / (number of field memories + number of observer memories). 
Different letters in a row mark significant differences, p < .05. 
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participants (Hypothesis 3a; Table 9). We performed an ANOVA, comparing Sp and GCp 
in currently depressed, remitted depressed, and never depressed participants. Levene’s 
test indicated unequal variances between groups for GCp, F = 13.43, p < .001. We found 
support for an effect of depressed status on Sp and GCp, F(2, 51) = 3.49, ω = .29, and 
Welch’s F(2, 20.78) = 4.00, ω = .33, both ps < .05, respectively15. Post-hoc Tukey tests, 
however, revealed that remitted depressed patients retrieved fewer Sp than never 
depressed patients, but did not differ significantly from currently depressed patients16. 
Furthermore, post-hoc Games-Howell tests revealed that remitted depressed patients 
retrieved fewer GCp than currently depressed patients, but they did not differ from 
never depressed patients. 
We further hypothesised that pAMT administration would result in more OGM in 
traumatised patients compared to non-traumatised patients (Hypothesis 3b). However, 
these groups did not differ from each other with respect to Sp and GCp, F = .25, d = .14, 
and F = 20, d = .13, both ps  ≥ .618. 
We finally hypothesised that levels of OGM would be higher in response to the pAMT 
than to the standard AMT (Hypothesis 3c). To control for the different number of cues 
(n = 18 for the standard AMT, and n = 10 for the pAMT), we conducted pairwise 
comparisons, comparing %S and %Sp, as well as %GC and %GCp. Contrary to our 
predictions, we found that pAMT cues elicited less categoric memories than standard 
AMT cues, MAMT = .06, MpAMT = .03, t(53) = 2.66, p = .010, and d = .73. No differences 
were found between %S and %Sp, MAMT = .86, MpAMT = .89, t(53) = 1.83, p = .073, and d 
= .50. We further compared the proportion of omissions (%Omissions = number of 
omissions / the number of cues) for both AMTs. The pAMT resulted in nearly twice as 
                                                     
 
15  %Sp and %GCp were only marginally significantly associated with depressed state, F = 2.83, p 
= .068, ω = .25, and Welch’s F(2, 21.75) = 3.30, p = .056, ω = .29, respectively. 
16  These findings were not replicated with %Sp. 
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many omissions compared to the standard AMT, MAMT = .06, MpAMT = .11, t(53) = 3.58, p 
= .001, and d = .98. 
With respect to vantage perspective, we hypothesised that current or remitted 
depressed BPD patients would show higher proportions of observer memories 
compared to never depressed participants in response to the pAMT cues (Hypothesis 
3d; Table 10). We found no support for an effect of depressed status on vantage 
perspective during retrieval, F(2, 31) = 1.52, p = .235, ω = .17. 
Furthermore, we hypothesised that trauma would be related with higher %Op 
(Hypothesis 3e). Results did not support this hypothesis, F = 2.40, p = .131, although d = 
.62. 
Finally, we hypothesised that the use of the pAMT would result in higher %O than the 
standard AMT (Hypothesis 3f). However, %O and %Op did not differ from each other, 
MAMT = .47, MpAMT = .48, t(33) = -.34, p = .733, d = -.12. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We aimed to investigate the associations between diagnostic status (MDD/PTSD) on the 
one hand, and OGM and vantage perspective during recall on the other hand, in a 
sample of BPD patients. We further explored the impact of self-discrepancy on OGM 
and vantage perspective in relation to MDD and PTSD. The findings with respect to 
OGM, vantage perspective, and self-discrepancy will consecutively be discussed. 
With respect to OGM, we found no effect of depressive state of BPD patients on 
standard AMT performance (Hypothesis 1a). This matches some previous findings (e.g.,  
Renneberg et al., 2005), but contradicts others (e.g., Kremers et al., 2004), suggesting 
that MDD and OGM in BPD are not unrelated. It has been suggested that OGM is more 
strongly associated with suicidality (Maurex et al., 2010), hopelessness following 
intrusions (Renneberg et al., 2005), or differences in IQ and years of education (Reid & 
Startup, 2010), than with depression as such. Renneberg et al. (2005) further suggested 
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that (even depressed) BPD patients do not display ‘mnemonic interlock’17, or that they 
might be more motivated than patients with (only) MDD to meet the test instructions. 
We too have argued elsewhere that depression in BPD may differ in nature from 
depression in MDD (Van den Broeck et al., 2012 – Chapter 3 in this thesis). Depression 
in BPD should possibly be considered in terms of affective instability. 
Furthermore, and in line with our hypothesis, we found that PTSD and memory 
specificity were unrelated in BPD patients when the standard AMT was used 
(Hypothesis 1b). This matches the results of all previous studies that investigated the 
association between OGM and PTSD in BPD patients (Kremers et al., 2004; Maurex et 
al., 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005), but strongly contradicts the finding that non-BPD 
patients with PTSD are generally less specific than non-BPD patients without PTSD 
(Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that OGM does not 
serve affect-regulation in BPD patients as it does in patients with MDD and PTSD (see 
also Van den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, Berens, & Raes, submitted – Chapter 7 in this 
thesis). According to Conway and colleagues (Conway et al., 2004), highly self-
discrepant (traumatic) information may threaten the stability of the self. Resources are 
then re-allocated towards processes that stabilise the self, away from other processes 
that are in need of resources. Guided search processes are aborted prematurely, 
resulting in OGM. In BPD patients, who are characterised by a chronic instable sense of 
self (APA, 2013), the reallocation towards self-stabilising processes may be disregarded, 
leaving sufficient resources to fulfil the search processes until specific memories are 
                                                     
 
17  According to models on autobiographical memory organisation, autobiographical memories 
are hierarchically organised, with lower levels containing more event-specific knowledge. 
Guided search processes generally start off with a self-referent description of what has to be 
searched for at an intermediate level. With ‘mnemonic interlock’, Williams (1996) refers to 
processes that elaborate on the description, thereby continuously activating other self-
descriptions and inhibiting to proceed down to more specific levels. 
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retrieved. Alternatively, the null findings with respect to OGM in BPD patients may be 
due to cognitive inhibitory dysfunctions, shown by BPD patients (e.g., Domes et al., 
2006). 
With respect to vantage perspective during recall, it should be noted that the 
proportion of observer memories (%O; %Op) retrieved in our sample is relatively high. 
Irrespective of the content of the memories, 46.92% and 48.18% of the specific 
memories in response to the standard AMT and pAMT respectively, were coded as 
observer memories, whereas other studies in trauma survivors (Kenny & Bryant, 2007), 
recurrent depressed adults (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), and adolescents with and without 
MDD and/or PTSD (Kuyken & Howell, 2006) report 20% to 36% observer memories. 
Taking into account only traumatic memories of PTSD patients, McIsaac and Eich (2004) 
found that 36.73% of these memories were observer memories. In response to the 
standard AMT, our respondents retrieved only 11 memories (out of 496 coded for 
vantage perspective) that directly referred to one of the traumatic experiences 
mentioned during the administration of the SCID-I module on PTSD. Eight of these 
memories (72.72%) were retrieved while adopting an observer perspective. These 
findings may suggest that BPD patients in general more often adopt an observer 
perspective compared to other clinical (Kenny & Bryant, 2007; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009) 
and non-clinical groups (Kuyken & Howell, 2006). Yet, replication is necessary because, 
to our knowledge, we are the first to study vantage perspective during recall in BPD 
patients. 
This said, we found that a depressed state was unrelated to perspective taking during 
retrieval in BPD patients (Hypothesis 2b). Our results contradict earlier findings on the 
association between depressive state and vantage perspective during recall in non-BPD 
respondents (e.g., Bergouignan et al., 2008; Lemogne et al., 2006). These findings may 
also reflect the different nature of depression in BPD compared to depression in MDD. 
A co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD, on the other hand, resulted in higher proportions of 
observer memories in response to the standard AMT (Hypothesis 2b). This is in line with 
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clinical observations and earlier findings in students (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003; 
Porter & Birt, 2001) and trauma-survivors (Kenny et al., 2009), who show more 
observer memories when recalling traumatic events. In addition, Kenny et al. (2009) 
showed that trauma-related observer retrieval predict PTSD symptom severity at 1-year 
follow-up. As stated above, our BPD patients already report relatively high proportions 
of observer memories. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that a co-morbid diagnosis of 
PTSD may result in more observer memories, irrespective of the content of the 
memories. This may be supportive for the idea of an observer memory retrieval style in 
PTSD patients (with BPD). In addition to the fact that the majority of PTSD-related 
memories were retrieved while adopting an observer perspective, these findings may 
indicate that vantage perspective during recall in PTSD serves the regulation of 
emotional distress or comparative processes. Unfortunately, we did not ask participants 
to rate their memories on valence and emotionality, which would have allowed us to 
test whether the idiosyncratic meaning of the event is related to the adopted 
perspective during recall. Further studies could therefore incorporate measures on 
memory valence and emotionality in order to investigate the framework proposed by 
Libby and Eibach (2011). 
With respect to self-discrepancy, we found no support for any of the hypotheses. We 
first predicted that prompting self-discrepant information would result in higher levels 
of OGM, especially in (remitted) depressed participants (Hypothesis 3a). Our current 
depressed BPD participants, however, did not differ with respect to memory specificity 
(Sp and GCp) measured with the pAMT from the never depressed. To our knowledge, 
only Wessel et al. (2013) used idiosyncratic AMTs as well. They found similar results 
comparing previously and never depressed women that went through a complicated 
pregnancy. Yet, Van den Broeck et al. (2012 – Chapter 3) found that self-discrepancy 
was negatively associated with memory specificity in depressed BPD patients. They did 
not use pAMTs, but computed an index expressing the extent to which the (standard) 
Chapter 4 
 
- 104 - 
 
AMT cues were self-discrepant. Perhaps pAMTs are not sufficiently valid to measure 
self-discrepancy and/or its relations with depression. 
Also contradicting our expectations, the pAMT was found to elicit less categoric 
memories than the standard AMT (Hypothesis 3c). However, pAMT administration 
resulted in twice as many omissions than standard AMT administration. Perhaps the 
explicit instructions to recall specific memories lead respondents not to verbalise a 
general memory in case they fail to retrieve a specific one. Such a trial, however, is 
scored as an omission. Alternatively, omissions may reflect the nature of discrepant 
selves: It is probably more difficult to retrieve genuine specific memories referring to 
situations that one has only seldom experienced. 
All other hypotheses were exploratory. First, self-discrepant cues did not elicit more 
OGM in PTSD patients (with BPD) as compared to patients without PTSD (Hypothesis 
3b). We expected that prompting self-discrepancy would reactivate the discrepancy 
between one’s actual (damaged) self and one’s other (ideal, ought, feared) selves. 
Available resources would then serve self-coherence, leaving insufficient means to 
successfully retrieve specific memories. Future studies should more closely investigate 
the impact of trauma on one’s selves. Perhaps, the discrepant selves of a PTSD patient 
strongly resemble a former ‘current self’, making it easy to retrieve specific memories 
when prompted. Indeed, PTSD patients tend to incorporate the trauma in their current 
self (Sutherland & Bryant, 2005), making it a self-defining memory. 
Furthermore, when prompting self-discrepancy, no significant association between 
MDD/PTSD and vantage perspective during recall was found (Hypotheses 3d and 3e). 
Finally, standard AMT and pAMT resulted in equal proportions of observer memories in 
our BPD patients, irrespective of a co-morbid MDD or PTSD diagnosis (Hypothesis 3f). 
However, other studies on the association between vantage perspective and self-
discrepancy are lacking, and the validity of the pAMT may be questionable. Therefore, 
interpreting these findings is difficult. Perhaps, the association between vantage 
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perspective and self-discrepancy is non-existent. Alternatively, these null-findings may 
be specific for BPD patients, who are known to have an instable sense of self. 
We should be careful to generalise our findings with respect to OGM and vantage 
perspective in depressed and traumatised BPD patients to individuals with MDD and 
PTSD without BPD. As described above, OGM in depressed and traumatised patients 
with BPD differs from OGM in depressed and traumatised patients without BPD. In 
addition, we previously argued (Van den Broeck et al., 2012 – Chapter 3) that depressed 
state in BPD may differ from MDD. Nevertheless, these findings may have important 
theoretical implications for non-BPD patients as well. Current theoretical models 
suggest that both OGM and the adoption of an observer vantage point during recall 
would serve functional avoidance (FA in CaR-FA-X; SMS), or that they would increase 
when (abstract) rumination, comparison-based processing are stimulated (CaR in CaR-
FA-X). Our findings suggest that both strategies probably do not function 
interchangeably to regulate affect. More specifically, our results suggest that trauma (in 
BPD) gives rise to imagery adaptations (vantage perspective) during recall, and not to 
verbally based avoidance strategies (OGM), whereas depression in BPD is unrelated 
with OGM or the adoption of an observer perspective during autobiographical memory 
retrieval. Our results further suggest that the tendency to retrieve traumatic memories 
while adopting an observer perspective further generalises towards other kinds of 
memories in PTSD patients. It should be noted, however, that these conclusions are 
based on findings in a (limited) sample of BPD patients, who differ from non-BPD 
individuals on, e.g., hypervigilance. Therefore, emotional reactivity may also be 
important to take into account when attempting to explain these autobiographical 
memory disturbances in emotional disorders. 
These results may also add to better treatment of PTSD (in patients with BPD). Indeed, 
several studies indicate that it is important that patients relive their traumatic 
experiences, in a way that the related emotions are reactivated (e.g., Hackmann, 
Bennett-Levy, & Holmes, 2011). Thus, it is recommended to retrieve memories from a 
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field perspective, rather than from an observer perspective. Additionally, our findings 
suggest that traumatised BPD patients acquire an observer retrieval style, resulting in 
more experiential avoidance in general. Therefore, we believe that traumatised 
patients may benefit from a therapeutic approach that encourages them to adopt a 
field perspective when retrieving memories in general, irrespective of their contents. 
This study also has some limitations. First of all, given the heterogeneity of BPD, our 
sample size can be considered modest, especially because we divided it into several 
subsamples that we compared with each other. Furthermore, we did not present both 
AMT versions counterbalanced, and we used a dichotomous scale to measure vantage 
perspective. According to Rice and Rubin (2009), field and observer perspective are 
better measured with two distinct scales. Nevertheless, we are convinced that studying 
autobiographical memory in BPD patients could further elucidate the associations 
between autobiographical memory characteristics as OGM and vantage point during 
retrieval and associated psychiatric diagnosis or features. Further research may 
therefore not only address the above mentioned shortcomings, but should also include 
clinical and non-clinical non-BPD control groups. 
Another important limitation, especially in combination with the sample sizes of the 
subgroups used, is that we conducted a relatively large number of analyses. This 
obviously increases the risk of Type I errors (false positives). As such, and also in view of 
the fairly large amount of null-findings, the one positive finding on (observer) 
perspective in our (traumatised) BPD-patients – although in line with existing findings in 
non-BPD samples – needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study is the first to investigate vantage 
perspective in BPD patients. Our findings suggest that BPD patients adopt an observer 
perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval relatively often, and that 
traumatised BPD patients have an observer memory retrieval style, often adopting an 
observer perspective for non-traumatic memories as well. We found no support for 
associations between depressed/traumatic state and an overgeneral memory retrieval 
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style in these patients. Our results suggest that traumatised (BPD) patients may benefit 
from therapeutic strategies that encourage the adoption of a field perspective during 
autobiographical memory retrieval. 
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ABSTRACT 
Recent findings show that (previously) depressed and traumatised patients, compared 
to controls, more frequently use of an observer perspective (as set against a field 
perspective) when retrieving memories. Because patients with borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) often report mood disturbances and past traumatic experiences, it 
would be plausible to expect that these patients too would retrieve higher proportions 
of observer memories. Therefore, and given the phenotypical variance of BPD, we 
examined whether vantage perspective during recall is associated with one or more 
BPD symptom clusters. A community sample consisting of 148 volunteers (66 males) 
completed the Autobiographical Memory Test, the Borderline Syndrome Index, and the 
Depression Scale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. Interpersonal and anxious-
neurotic BPD features were found to be associated with higher proportions of observer 
memories. Contrary to our expectations, the proportion of observer memories was not 
associated with the total number of BPD symptoms. Nevertheless, our data suggest the 
existence of substantial connections between perspective taking during recall on the 
one hand and interpersonal difficulties and anxious-neurotic symptoms on the other 
hand, especially following cues that tap into domains that are highly discrepant towards 
one’s actual self-concept. 
 
BACKGROUND 
“Autobiographical memory (AM) is the aspect of memory that is concerned with the 
recollection of personally experienced past events” (Williams et al., 2007, p. 122). It is 
believed to function as a kind of database of previous experiences on which we rely to 
find problem solving strategies when we experience difficulties (Sutherland & Bryant, 
2008), and it is thought to play an important role in the construction of our self-concept 
and in goal oriented behaviour (Conway, 2005). It should not surprise, therefore, that 
problems with AM are found to be associated with emotional difficulties as major 
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depressive disorder (MDD; APA, 1994) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; APA, 
1994). Recent findings (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003; Kuyken & Howell, 2006) reveal 
that depressed and traumatised patients differ from healthy controls with respect to 
the perspective they adopt while retrieving memories. Patients diagnosed with 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) frequently complain about depressive episodes 
and they often report past traumatic experiences (Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, 
Reich, & Silk, 2004). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that people high on BPD 
complaints would show similar AM disturbances as depressed and traumatised 
patients. To our knowledge, vantage perspective has not been studied in relation to 
BPD symptoms hitherto. In this chapter, we study the relationship between vantage 
perspective during retrieval and borderline complaints as measured in a community 
sample. 
In general, most recollections are spontaneously remembered from one’s original point 
of view, as if one again ‘sees’ the situation through one’s own eyes (i.e., field 
perspective; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Nevertheless, some memories are remembered 
while ‘seeing’ the situation as an observer might have seen it, also seeing oneself act in 
the situation (i.e., observer perspective or ‘fly on the wall’ perspective). Field memories 
are generally experienced as more emotional and detailed, whereas in observer mode 
one is more likely to focus on the objective circumstances than on the affective 
elements (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002; 2004; Robinson & Swanson, 
1993) – but see also Libby and Eibach (2011) for less straightforward findings and 
interpretations. Traumatised and (formerly) depressed patients tend to retrieve larger 
proportions of observer memories compared to controls (in traumatised patients: e.g., 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; in currently depressed patients: e.g., Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; 
in previously depressed patients: e.g., Bergouignan et al., 2008). 
According to Kuyken and Moulds (2009), there are at least two possibly compatible 
accounts that give rise to higher proportions of observer memories in depressed and 
traumatised patients. First, Kuyken and Moulds (2009) suggest that observer memories 
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are used when one evaluates oneself, or when one needs to compare the actual self 
with a former or future self (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 
2007). Disappointments about goals that have not been attained and discrepancies 
between one’s actual self and one’s ideal self may lead to dejecting schemas about the 
self (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). Such schemas may threaten the stability 
of the self. In order to prevent a reactive crash of the self, the Working Self, which is 
responsible for maintaining an integrated sense of self (Conway, 2005; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004), specifically searches for 
information that is in line with the initial thoughts about the self. Hence, the organism 
is driven to evaluate oneself over and over, thereby using observer memories 
repeatedly. As expected, Kuyken and Moulds (2009) found positive correlations 
between the number of observer memories on the one hand and levels of self-
evaluation on the other (also see Nelis, Debeer, Holmes, & Raes, 2013). 
Second, following McIsaac and Eich (2004), Kuyken and Moulds (2009) suggest that the 
recollection of more observer memories may function as a cognitive functional 
avoidance strategy: The adoption of an observer perspective then, at least on the short 
term, prevents one from getting overwhelmed by intense and possibly painful emotions 
associated with intrusive memories that are common in depression and PTSD. Indeed, 
both clinical observations and research data (Berntsen et al., 2003; D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2004; McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Wilson & Ross, 2003) show that PTSD patients 
tend to report about their traumatic experiences while adopting an observer 
perspective, suggesting that the observer perspective may be adaptive in regulating, or 
at least dampening, one’s emotions. Furthermore, higher proportions of observer 
memories are found to be associated with outcomes on different avoidance measures 
(in depressed participants: e.g., Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Williams & Moulds, 2007; in 
traumatised participants: e.g., Kenny & Bryant, 2007; McIsaac & Eich, 2004), again 
suggesting that the observer perspective may be an avoidance strategy. 
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Following the established associations between the use of an observer perspective 
during recall and MDD/PTSD, and given the presence of trauma and associated (painful) 
emotions, affect instability, and difficulties regarding the stability of the self in BPD 
patients (e.g., Zeigler-Hill & Abraham, 2006, but see also the BPD criteria in DSM-IV, 
APA, 1994), we hypothesised that BPD features would be positively associated with the 
frequency of observer memories. Additionally, we explored the role of self-discrepancy 
in relation to vantage perspective during recall. 
 
METHODS 
PARTICIPANTS 
One hundred forty-eight participants (66 males), all between 17 and 30 years of age (M 
= 21.34; SD = 3.22) participated and were recruited by the second author, Jasmin Reza, 
using her personal social network and its extensions (convenience sampling). The 
majority (60.2%) held a high school diploma, 11.5% held college level degrees, and 
14.9% held master level degrees. 
 
INSTRUMENTS 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT, Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Dutch written 
minimal instructions version with adaptation towards the concept of discrepancy, 
Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2012). In a first phase participants were presented with 20 
cue words. Clinicians had judged half of these cues to be high discrepant (HD) for 
depressed patients, whereas the other half was not (i.e. low discrepant, LD; for details, 
see Schoofs et al., 2012), but all cues had a positive valence. HD and LD cues were 
alternated, starting with a LD cue: polite, happy, honest, enjoying, just, optimistic, 
respectful, energetic, sincere, satisfied, intelligent, pleasurable, neat, self-assured, 
sensitive, relaxed, grateful, successful, reliable, and active. Respondents were instructed 
to write down autobiographical memories in response to each of the cues that were 
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orally presented. Time limits were set at one minute per cue. In a second phase 
participants were asked to go over their responses again and to judge vantage point of 
the retrieved memories by scoring each memory as ‘P1’ (being a field memory or 
memory retrieved from a 1st person perspective), or ‘P3’ (being an observer memory or 
a memory retrieved from a 3rd person perspective). Occasionally, respondents did not 
succeed to respond with a valid memory to a cue. These answers were coded as ‘No 
Response’ by the experimenters afterwards. Respondents were also asked to rate their 
memories with respect to memory specificity, but these data go beyond the objective 
of this chapter. Variable of interest is the total proportion of memories retrieved while 
using an observer perspective (%O). To compute %O, we only included the valid 
memories, excluding the answers coded as ‘No Response’. Therefore, %O is the 
complement of the proportion of field memories. The written AMT has been used 
successfully previously to assess memory specificity (e.g., Henderson, Hargreaves, 
Gregory, & Williams, 2002; Raes et al., 2008). 
Borderline Syndrome Index (BSI, Conte, Plutchik, Karasu, & Jerrett, 1980; Dutch 
translation, Vertommen & Van de Wygaert, 1988). The BSI consists of 52 items 
describing features and characteristics of BPD. Items are judged on presence, and 
should therefore be answered with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Total scores range from 0 to 52, with 
higher scores reflecting greater levels of BPD pathology. Internal consistency in our 
sample was high, Cronbach’s alpha = .89, for the total score. A four factor model was 
revealed in the Dutch version (Vertommen & Van de Wygaert, 1988): Subscales 
measure Negative Self-Definition (NSD; 13 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .85), Difficult 
Interpersonal Relationships (DIR; 11 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .69), Failing Social Skills 
(FSS; 10 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .65), and Anxiety (ANX; 16 items, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.60). Convergent validity of the Dutch translation we used was found to be high, r =.75 
(tested with the Diagnostic Interview for Borderline, Vertommen & Van de Wygaert, 
1988). 
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Depression Anxiety Stress Scales - Depression Scale (DASS21-D, Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995; Dutch version, de Beurs, van Dyck, Marquenie, Lange, & Blonk, 2001). We were 
only interested in the Depression subscale (7 items, Cronbach’s alpha = .81 in the 
present study) of this 21-item self-report questionnaire. Respondents should score 
every item by indicating on a 4-point Likert scale to what extent the content of the item 
applied to them over the past week, ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 
(applied to me very much, or most of the time). Higher scores indicate higher symptom 
severity. Psychometric properties were found to be good (de Beurs et al., 2001). 
 
PROCEDURE 
This study was part of a larger study. Following written informed consent participants 
were invited to complete a battery of measures, including the ones described above, in 
the order presented above. Data administration was organised individually. Except for 
the AMT, no time limits were set. Most participants finished the test battery within one 
hour. This study was approved by the Ethical Committee of KU Leuven. 
 
RESULTS 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 11 includes the means, standard deviations, and ranges on all included variables. 
BPD complaints were limitedly reported (total BSI: M = 8.40, SD = 7.42, with a 
theoretical maximum score of 52), and depression severity (M = 3.32, SD = 3.56, with a 
theoretical maximum score of 21) scores were rather low. Thus, data are as expected in 
a community sample. 
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Table 11 Descriptive statistics of the measures used 
 M SD Range 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT)    
  % O 27.77 .21 0.00 – 75.00 
  % O-HD 27.54 .23 0.00 – 80.00 
  % O-LD 27.78 .22 0.00 – 80.00 
Borderline Syndrome Index (BSI)    
 Negative Self-Definition (NSD) 1.59 2.47 .00 – 13.00 
 Difficult Interpersonal Relationships (DIR) 1.44 1.73 .00 – 10.00 
 Failing Social Skills (FSS) 2.31 1.97 .00 – 9.00 
 Anxiety (ANX) 2.77 2.42 .00 – 11.00 
 Total score 8.40 7.42 .00 – 40.00 
Depression scale of the Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scales (DASS21-D), total score 
3.32 3.56 0 – 17 
%O = proportion memories retrieved during full AMT administration using an observer 
perspective; %O-HD = proportion memories retrieved using an observer perspective 
following high discrepant AMT cues; %O-LD = proportion memories retrieved using an 
observer perspective following low discrepant AMT cues. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VANTAGE PERSPECTIVE DURING RECALL AND BORDERLINE SYMPTOMS 
Table 12 shows the correlations between the proportions of observer memories (in 
total as well as following high and low discrepant cues), and BPD symptom clusters as 
measured by the BSI. We controlled for depression severity (DASS21-D), to exclude that 
observed associations were solely due to shared associations with depressive 
symptoms, and for age, given that the proportion of observer memories was found to 
be significantly associated with participant’s age (see Table 13). The proportion of 
memories retrieved while using an observer perspective (%O) was not, as hypothesised, 
systematically associated with the total BSI score. 
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Table 12 Correlations between the proportions of observer memories in total and following 
high and low discrepant cues, and borderline symptoms (BSI) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  
1. % O  - .90** .88** .04 .14 .17 .11 .14 
2. % O-HD  .90**  - .60** .06 .19* .20* .10 .16 
3. % O-LD  .88**  .57** - -.00 .06 .09 .09 .07 
4. BSI – NSI  .02  .05 -.02 - .64** .62** .67** .90** 
5. BSI – DIR  .14 .19* .04  .52** - .51** .49** .77** 
6. BSI – FSS  .16  .20* .08  .40** .36** - .53** .79** 
7. BSI – ANX  .11  .09 .10  .53** .34** .37** - .84** 
8. BSI – TOT  .15  .18 .07  .81** .70** .69** .79** - 
Depression and age are partialled out in the correlations beneath the diagonal. 
%O = proportion observer memories retrieved during full AMT administration; %O-HD = 
proportion observer memories following high discrepant cues; %O-LD = proportion observer 
memories following low discrepant cues; BSI-NSI = negative self-image; BSI-DIR = difficult 
interpersonal relationships; BSI-FSS = failing social skills; BSI-ANX = anxiety; BSI-TOT = total BSI-
score. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Table 13 Correlations between depression severity (DASS-D), age, and the proportions of 
observer memories in total and following high and low discrepant cues 
  2 3 4 5 
1. DASS-D -.11 .04 .04 .02 
2. Age  - -.26** -.22** -.25** 
3. % O  - .90** .88** 
4. % O-HD   - .60** 
5. % O-LD    - 
DASS-D = depression severity; %O = proportion observer memories retrieved during full AMT 
administration; %O-HD = proportion observer memories following high discrepant cues; %O-LD 
= proportion observer memories following low discrepant cues. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
Chapter 5 
 
- 123 - 
 
FURTHER EXPLORATORY ANALYSES 
Table 11 includes the proportion of observer memories following HD and LD cues 
respectively. These proportions do not significantly differ, t = -.142, p = .888, nor do 
they differ from the proportion of observer memories retrieved irrespective of 
discrepancy (%O), t = -.278, p = .782, and t = .012, p = .991, for %O-HD and %O-LD 
versus %O, respectively. 
We further explored the associations between the total proportion of observer 
memories and separate BPD symptom clusters, as well as the relationships between the 
proportions of observer memories retrieved following high (HD) and low (LD) 
discrepant cues and the BSI dimensions. Results are presented in Table 12. All reported 
p-values (except the ones discussed in the previous section) were corrected for multiple 
testing using the Benjamini-Hochberg’s method (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). We 
found that observer perspective in the case of high discrepant cues (%O-HD) was 
prominently associated with ‘Failing Social Skills’ (BSI-FSS), r = .20, p < .05, and with 
‘Difficult Interpersonal Relationships’ (BSI-DIR), r = .19, p < .05. These associations 
remained when controlling for age and depression severity, r = .20, and r = .19, 
respectively, both p < .05. No associations were found between BPD features and the 
proportion of observer memories following low discrepant cues (%O-LD). Given that 
these correlations are weak, we performed bootstrapping analyses in order to compute 
95% confidence intervals around these correlations. Zero was never included in these 
intervals. 95% CI’s range from .020 to .339, and from .027 to .357, for the associations 
between %O-HD on the one hand and BSI-DIR and BSI-FSS on the other hand, 
respectively, both uncontrolled for age and depressive symptoms. When controlling for 
age and depressive symptoms, 95 CI’s range from .026 to .343, from .030 to .365, and 
from .018 to .333, for the associations between %O-HD on the one hand, and BSI-DIR, 
BSI-FSS, and BSI-total score on the other hand, respectively. Although these 
associations are weak, bootstrapping analyses suggest they are not trivial. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this chapter we investigated the relationships between the vantage perspective of 
memories and BPD features. Contrary to our predictions, no association was found 
between the total proportion of observer memories retrieved and the total number of 
BPD symptoms reported. Moreover, additional exploratory analyses on the association 
between cue discrepancy and vantage perspective revealed that equal proportions of 
observer memories were retrieved in response to high and low discrepant cues. At first 
sight, these data suggest that respondents high on BPD complaints do not more often 
adopt an observer perspective during recall compared to healthy controls. 
However, broadening our view to the role of cue discrepancy in relation to vantage 
perspective and BPD symptoms, we found that especially greater proportions of 
observer memories following high discrepant cues were associated with ‘Difficult 
Interpersonal Relationships’ (DIR) and ‘Failing Social Skills’ (FSS), even when we 
controlled for depressive symptoms and age. These findings suggest that an observer 
perspective would be more common in those who are less socially skilled. However, 
taking a closer look to the FSS-subscale of the BSI, we discovered that these items 
rather refer to anxious-neurotic behaviours that are often thought to be typical for 
cluster C personality disorders (APA, 1994). Example items are, e.g., “I never accomplish 
as much as I could”, “I am afraid of anything new”, “It is hard for me to make 
decisions”, “I feel that I can not run my own life”, and “I feel uneasy in crowds, such as 
when I am shopping or at a movie”18. We therefore conclude that, besides difficult 
interpersonal relationships, cluster C type behaviours, rather than failing social skills, 
                                                     
 
18  Van den Wygaert (1990) acknowledges that this factor mainly consists of anxious-neurotic 
symptoms, but he reasoned that all these symptoms could be considered as examples or 
consequences of inadequate social skills. Therefore, he chose to name the scale ‘Failing 
Social Skills’. 
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are associated with higher proportions of observer memories. This is in line with 
previous findings in (recurrent) depressed patients (Bergouignan et al., 2008; Kuyken & 
Howell, 2006; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), who are known to hold higher dispositions on 
Neuroticism (Bienvenu et al., 2004). With respect to anxiety disorders, on the other 
hand, who also are considered to be more neurotic, the picture is less clear: Patients 
with different anxiety diagnoses differ in the perspective they adopt while retrieving 
memories (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999). In addition, since higher scores on FSS may 
also represent low self-esteem, our findings contradict the ones of Libby, Valenti, Pfent, 
and Eibach (2011, study 1), who found no association between self-esteem and vantage 
perspective during recall. 
Nevertheless, these findings potentially support the idea that high discrepant 
information may induce a tendency to compare, which is often associated with an 
observer mode (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). According to another line of research, high 
discrepant cues also complicate the retrieval of memories on the content level (Crane, 
Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Schoofs et al., 2012; Van den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, & 
Raes, 2012 – Chapter 3 in this thesis). Traumatised as well as (previously) depressed 
patients show a tendency to retrieve categories of events (e.g., “each time I went 
abroad for my job”) rather than memories referring to specific events that happened 
only once and did not take longer than one day (e.g., “that one time in that Steak house 
in Toronto”). This is referred to as overgeneral memory (OGM; for an overview, see: 
Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). It is assumed that resources that are 
used during an intentional search process are taken away in favour of processes that 
aim to maintain a stable self-concept whenever the risk exists that painful memories 
will be reactivated. Moreover, it is assumed that the recall of overgeneral memories 
would be facilitated when respondents are explicitly asked to retrieve memories that 
are consistent with self-discrepant domains (Van den Broeck et al., 2012). For instance, 
a depressed individual that is asked to retrieve a specific memory in response to the 
cue word ‘happy’, will be more likely to refer to a category of events. Together with this 
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line of reasoning, our results seem to suggest that a threatened self-concept thus might 
promote both the adoption of observer memories and the retrieval of overgeneral 
memories. 
Yet, it should be noted that the correlations reported above are weak, only explaining 
up to 4% of the other variable’s variance. Bootstrapping procedures, though, showed 
these associations are not trivial, but replications are recommended to heighten the 
validity of our findings. 
Alternatively, broadening the view on imagery perspective to non-clinical subjects, the 
framework of Libby and Eibach (2011) contradicts the above mentioned theories which 
both suggest that an observer perspective serves a dampening function. This model is 
built upon the widespread idea that the self is dual-faceted: One facet considers 
experiential awareness, the other conceptual knowledge. Whereas the first is fed by 
environmental features and concrete actions related to it, the latter consists of abstract 
meaning structures, defining the coherence of a self over time. According to Libby and 
Eibach (2011), the perspective one adopts while retrieving memories, depends mainly 
on how one conceptualises the life event in relation to the facets of their self, and not, 
as hypothesised by the functional avoidance hypothesis, on the negative valence of the 
event for the individual. The adoption of a field perspective is assumed to address the 
experiential self, because this perspective evokes concrete features of a situation. An 
observer memory, on the other hand, would lead people to frame that event in a 
broader context, e.g., one’s self-beliefs, or in relation to other significant events. 
Difficult, self-discrepant memories are generally considered as highly relevant for one’s 
long-term self, and are more likely to be retrieved using an observer perspective. 
However, memories that emphasise the continuity in one’s self-concept may also be 
important in terms of the broader context of one’s life, and may therefore also been 
retrieved from an observer’s point of view. Moreover, the authors suggest that the 
adoption of an observer perspective also has the potential to intensify emotional 
reactions: “Third-person imagery increases emotional response relative to first-person 
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imagery […] when the meaning of an event in the broader context of one’s life evokes a 
stronger emotional response than does the experience of the concrete details […]. 
However, when considering the meaning of an event in the broader context of one’s 
life evokes a weaker emotional response than does focusing on the concrete 
experience, third-person imagery should reduce emotional responses.” (Libby & Eibach, 
2011, p. 209-210). Unfortunately, our data do not allow to properly study these 
theoretical considerations, because we neglected to inventory the personal relevancy 
and/or the emotionality of the memories retrieved. We recommend that future studies 
would take these extra variables into account, in order to further distinguish between 
the possible functions of vantage perspective (dampening vs comparing vs meaning in 
life). 
Our findings further suggest that, besides cluster C type behaviours, especially 
interpersonal BPD symptoms are associated with more observer memories. No clear-
cut explanations are available for these specific associations, although we speculate 
that empathy may be a key concept in attempts to clarify this relationship. Empathy, 
once defined as “the capacity to understand and respond to the unique affective 
experiences of another person” (Decety & Jackson, 2006, p. 54) is generally assumed to 
be beneficial for interpersonal relationships. However, in relation to BPD, Krohn (1974) 
identified the so-called ‘borderline empathy paradox’. The paradox refers to the 
combination of seemingly enhanced empathic capabilities (see Dinsdale & Crespi, in 
press, for an overview) with impaired interpersonal functioning in BPD patients. Indeed, 
recent findings (Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010) suggest that BPD 
patients have increased levels of affective empathy (‘sensing another’s feelings’: 
emotion recognition, emotional contagion; Davis, 1983) and decreased levels of 
cognitive empathy (perspective taking, theory of mind). More specifically, it is argued 
that BPD patients more intensely feel the other person’s feelings (i.e., higher levels of 
emotional contagion), and that they miss the higher-order cognitive empathy skills to 
cope with these intense feelings. Additionally, the intense feelings are presumable 
Chapter 5 
 
- 128 - 
 
reflected in the observer by the same mechanisms of emotional contagion, resulting in 
mutual personal distress. We speculate that repetitive experiences of mutual personal 
distress would undermine the quality of the relationships. In addition, we further 
speculate that BPD patients, characterised by an unstable sense of self, probably 
eagerly tune in on all surrounded interpersonal stimuli they can find in order to create a 
sense of identity and safety. Their dysfunctional empathy system may be, at least in 
part, a maintaining element in their stable sense of self-instability. Of course, we are 
aware that a lot of speculations are formulated above that need further investigation. 
For instance, in relation to empathy, we talk about perspective taking in general, while 
in our and other studies vantage perspective during recall was questioned. Also, 
correlational research falls short in examining the causal relationships that are 
predicted above. Future research should try to reveal the true relations between these 
different kinds of imagery and all the hypothesised associations mentioned above. 
Also, we underline that data were administered in a community sample, and not in a 
group of BPD patients. We need to be careful generalising these (correlational) findings 
in our non-clinical sample to a clinical population, especially because the BSI-
distributions are positively skewed and given that the associations found are weak, only 
explaining up to 4% of each other’s variance. Furthermore, we did not collect 
information on other aspects that can influence the vantage perspective during 
autobiographical memory recall, such as traumatic experiences, post-traumatic 
symptoms, and medication use. Finally, cue discrepancy was not determined on a 
personal level, and with disregard of the clinical sample of interest (because the cues 
we used were judged to be discrepant for depressed patients, and not for BPD 
patients). Even so, we neglected to inventory other potentially interesting variables of 
the autobiographical memories (personal relevancy, emotionality, the extent to which a 
recalled memory is consistent with the presented cue), of which theorising would 
benefit. Future research should therefore not only investigate whether it is possible to 
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replicate the current findings in a clinical sample of BPD patients, but should also 
incorporate these extra variables to test the hypotheses formulated above. 
Interpersonal difficulties and problems with one’s self-concept are core features of 
BPD, causing a great deal of the burden of patients and their surroundings. Therefore, 
future studies should also explore the potential connections between (lack of aspects 
of) empathy, social impairments, vantage point, and dissociation. It has been suggested 
earlier (Van der Hart, Van der Kolk, & Boon, 1998) that dissociation is a highly defensive 
act in which all feelings are switched off. Rice and Rubin (2009) suggested that vantage 
perspective would be more ecologically validly measured using a continuous scale, 
ranging from field to observer perspective. It could be hypothesised that dissociation is 
at the end of the scale, near observer perspective, since it can be considered the 
ultimate avoidance strategy. It thus would be interesting to find out how dissociative 
experiences relate to the quality of interpersonal experiences, and autobiographical 
mental imagery. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude then, and notwithstanding the above mentioned limitations, our findings 
are the first to our knowledge to suggest that vantage perspective during retrieval may 
be associated with BPD symptoms when cues activate domains that are highly 
discrepant towards the actual self. 
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ABSTRACT 
Overgeneral memory (OGM), the tendency to retrieve categories of events from 
autobiographical memory instead of single events, is found to be a reliable predictor for 
future mood disturbances and post-traumatic symptom severity. Patients diagnosed 
with borderline personality disorder (BPD) often report co-morbid episodes of major 
depressive disorder (MDD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Therefore, we 
investigated whether OGM would predict depression severity and post-traumatic stress 
symptoms (i.e., trauma-related intrusions and avoidance of memories or reminders of 
the traumatic events) in BPD patients. At admission (N=54) and at six-month follow-up 
(N ≥ 31), BPD patients completed the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV 
Disorders, the Autobiographical Memory Test, the Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd 
edition (BDI-II), and the Impact of Event Scale (IES). Results showed that reduced 
memory specificity at baseline predicted (a) higher levels of depressive symptoms at 
follow-up and (b) more post-traumatic intrusions over and above baseline levels of 
depressive symptoms and intrusions, respectively. No association was found between 
memory specificity and post-traumatic avoidance at follow-up. It should be noted, 
though, that our sample was rather small, which is important, given the heterogeneity 
of the BPD diagnosis. Also, we neglected to include other measures that could help us 
to disentangle the mechanisms beyond OGM. Yet, despite previous findings suggesting 
that OGM in BPD is less robust than in MDD and PTSD, our results suggest that memory 
specificity in BPD patients may have some clinical relevance for the course of 
depressive and post-traumatic symptomatology in BPD. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Patients suffering from major depressive disorder (MDD; APA, 1994) have robustly 
shown to have difficulties retrieving specific, detailed information from their 
autobiographical memory (see, Williams et al., 2007, for a review). Instead of recalling 
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specific single events (e.g., “Last Friday, when I saw that Amy had forgotten her tennis 
shoes when she left for her dad”), they tend to retrieve categories of events (e.g., 
“Every Friday, when the children prepare themselves to stay the weekend at their 
father’s place”). Due to the fact that OGM is associated with less adaptive (avoidant) 
coping strategies (e.g., Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005) and impaired 
social problem solving abilities (e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996), OGM has 
been put forward as a potential vulnerability factor for depression (e.g., Gibbs & Rude, 
2004). A recent meta-analysis (Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010) indeed found that 
there is a reliable (albeit small) relation between OGM and an unfavourable course of 
depression. The authors investigated 15 datasets, all containing data on the AMT and 
depression severity at two time-points. Overall, their analyses revealed that higher 
levels of OGM at baseline predict higher levels of depressive symptoms at follow-up, 
over and above the level of depressive symptoms at baseline. Several recent studies 
corroborated the predictive value of OGM for future depression severity in an adult 
community sample (Van Daele, Griffith, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2014), students 
(Anderson, Goddard, & Powell, 2010; Boelen, Huntjens, & van den Hout, 2013; Sumner, 
Mineka, & McAdams, 2013), and younger adolescents (Hipwell, Sapotichne, 
Klostermann, Battista, & Keenan, 2011; Sumner et al., 2011). These findings suggest 
that future mood disturbances could be mitigated by improving memory specificity in 
patients at risk. Indeed, when depressed participants were trained to be more specific, 
depression severity (Neshat-Doost et al., 2013) and rumination levels were found to 
decrease (Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009). 
OGM is also found in patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; APA, 1994; see 
Moore & Zoellner, 2007, for a review), and several studies suggest that OGM may have 
an important impact on post-traumatic symptom severity as well. For instance, reduced 
memory specificity was found to predict post-traumatic symptom severity at six-month 
follow-up in survivors of motor vehicle accidents (Harvey, Bryant, & Dang, 1998) and 
assault victims (Kleim & Ehlers, 2008), even when initial symptom severity was taken 
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into account. Yet, Kangas, Henry, and Bryant (2005) found no evidence for OGM as a 
predictor of post-traumatic symptom severity in a sample of cancer patients. In women 
who were hospitalised following a complicated pregnancy, pregnancy-related memory 
specificity alone predicted post-traumatic stress and symptom severity at six weeks 
post-delivery (Hauer, Wessel, Engelhard, Peeters, & Dalgleish, 2009). When baseline 
measures were kept constant, however, the impact of memory specificity was only 
marginally significant. These studies, though, do not exclude the possibility that OGM 
may be initiated following the traumatic event. Therefore, three studies have 
investigated whether pre-trauma levels of OGM were able to predict post-traumatic 
symptoms at follow-up. Memory specificity measured during the training stage of 
newly hired firefighters (pre-trauma) added to the prediction of post-traumatic 
symptom severity at four-year follow-up, even when controlled for pre-trauma PTSD or 
depression severity (Bryant, Sutherland, & Guthrie, 2007). Second, in a non-clinical 
sample, Belcher and Kangas (2014) found that being more specific when retrieving past 
and future events may be protective for the development of intrusive images and 
thoughts during the week following exposure to a trauma film. A third study measured 
post-traumatic symptom severity with respect to an event that happened between 
baseline and follow-up (Boelen et al., 2013). In this study, higher levels of students’ 
memory specificity, measured with the Sentence Completion for Past Events Test 
(SCEPT; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007) predicted lower levels of post-
traumatic symptom severity at one-year follow-up. Overall, these findings thus suggest 
that OGM may be a vulnerability factor for post-traumatic stress as well. In line with 
what was found in depressed patients, memory specificity training in traumatised 
patients resulted in less intrusions and avoidance symptoms in Iranian war veterans 
(Moradi et al., 2014). 
Different, albeit not mutually exclusive accounts have been proposed to explain OGM in 
depressed and traumatised patients. According to the functional avoidance hypothesis 
(Williams et al., 2007), an overgeneral retrieval style preserves the stability of one’s 
Chapter 6 
 
- 140 - 
 
self-concept, because important details and associated emotions of unpleasant past 
events are not reactivated. Although such a strategy may prevent the development of a 
(new) depressive episode in the short term, it may lead to enduring post-traumatic 
symptoms or future mood disorders, perhaps because OGM undermines adequate 
social problem solving (Boelen et al., 2013; Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin, & Howells, 
1992; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008), or maintains a reciprocal relation with ruminative 
processes (Boelen et al., 2013; Bryant et al., 2007; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008). Cognitive 
models on PTSD suggest that OGM for traumatic memories may hinder the integration 
(‘processing’) of these events with other autobiographical memories and one’s self-
concept (e.g., Dalgleish, 2004; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Hearst-Ikeda, 1996). 
Additionally, long-lasting intrusions are hypothesised to absorb resources that could 
otherwise be used for effortful memory search (McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin, & 
Weathers, 1994; Wessel, Merckelbach, & Dekkers, 2002; Williams, 1996). Finally, it is 
hypothesised that especially reduced specificity in imagining future events, which is 
assumed to use the same pathways than memory retrieval (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2007), contributes to future levels of post-traumatic stress (Boelen et al., 2013; Belcher 
& Kangas, 2014). 
Patients suffering from borderline personality disorder (BPD) often report co-morbid 
MDD and PTSD (Grant et al., 2008). However, in cross-sectional studies, OGM in BPD is 
only inconsistently found (for a review, see Van den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, Hermans, & 
Raes, in press – Chapter 2 in this thesis). Whereas some studies suggest that OGM in 
BPD is mainly associated with a co-morbid diagnosis of MDD (e.g., Artnz, Meeren, & 
Wessel., 2002; Kremers, Spinhoven, & van der Does, 2004), others do not find an 
association between depression and OGM in BPD patients (Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & 
Startup, 2010; Renneberg, Theobald, Nobs, & Weisbrod, 2005). OGM in BPD has never 
been found to be related with a co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD (Kremers et al., 2004; 
Renneberg et al., 2005). To our knowledge, only one study (Kremers, Spinhoven, van 
der Does, & van Dyck, 2006) investigated whether memory specificity at baseline would 
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predict depression severity at 15-months in BPD patients. Measures of memory 
specificity did not make a significant contribution above depression severity at baseline. 
The aims of the current study were to investigate the predictive value of memory 
specificity for depression severity and post-traumatic symptoms at six-month follow-up 
in a sample of BPD patients. Based on the findings of Sumner et al. (2010), we 
hypothesised that OGM would predict future depressive symptoms at six-month follow-
up. Based on the findings in patients with PTSD, we further hypothesised that OGM 
would predict the frequency of intrusive thoughts, and the attempts to avoid trauma-
related elements – both central symptoms of PTSD (APA, 1994). 
 
METHOD 
PROCEDURE AND PARTICIPANTS 
This study was part of a larger study investigating autobiographical memory in BPD 
patients. Following oral and written informed consent, participants were asked to 
complete a battery of tests and questionnaires. Due to practical issues, data collection 
per participant often took more than one session, but in most cases a respondent’s 
protocol was completed within a three week timespan. Five months after initial testing, 
participants were contacted again by e-mail or by phone to make appointments for 
follow-up measurements. Reassessment took place in the hospital. We used a 
computerised version of the BDI-II and the IES, using the open source software 
Limesurvey. The study was approved by the ethical committees of the University of 
Leuven and the psychiatric hospitals where the study was conducted. 
Participants at T1 were 54 patients (8 males), all meeting DSM-IV BPD criteria (APA, 
1994) according to the SCID-II interview (SCID-II; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & 
Benjamin, 1997; Dutch translation by Weertman, Arntz, & Kerkhofs, 2000). All 
participants were between 18 and 51 years of age (M = 29.48, SD = 8.37). They were 
recruited in two Belgian psychiatric hospitals: University Psychiatric Centre KU Leuven, 
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Campus Kortenberg (77.78%) and Psychiatric Hospital Duffel (22.22%). Most patients 
were inpatients (79.63%) staying at a general psychiatric ward (46.51%), at a specialised 
unit treating BPD according to the principles of Dialectical Behavioural Therapy 
 
 
Table 14 Sample characteristics at T1 for the total sample (n = 54), and for the subsample 
(n = 33) with complete data at T2 
 Total sample                           
(n = 54; 8 males) 
Subsample                              
(n = 35; 5 males) 
Age (M, SD) 29.48 (8.37) 30.60 (8.45) 
Education level (%) 
 Primary school 
 High school 
 College 
 University 
 
9.3 
53.7 
25.9 
11.1 
 
8.6 
48.6 
28.6 
14.3 
Civil state (%) 
 Single 
 Living together 
 Married 
 Divorced 
 
63.0 
26.0 
3.7 
7.4 
 
71.4 
17.1 
2.9 
8.6 
Occupation (%) 
 Student 
 Unemployed 
 Working / on sick leave 
 Other 
 
9.3 
38.9 
48.1 
3.7 
 
5.7 
37.1 
54.3 
2.9 
N Kortenberg/N Duffel 42 / 12 26 / 9 
N Inpatient/N outpatient 43 / 11 24 / 11 
Inpatient (%) at 
 General psychiatric ward 
 Specialised DBT unit 
 Specialised anxiety unit 
 
46.5 
34.9 
18.6 
 
50.0 
37.5 
12.5 
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(34.88%) or at a unit specialised in the treatment of anxiety disorders (18.60%). Eleven 
patients followed day treatment and outpatient emotional skills trainings, organised by 
the above mentioned hospitals. 
At six-month follow-up, complete data were available for 31 of the original 54 
participants. Four patients could not be reached for follow-up, ten participants refused 
to take part in the study at T2, and nine participants had incomplete protocols. Tables 
 14 and 15 display the sample characteristics for the total sample at T1 and the reduced 
sample at T2. Patients with complete and incomplete follow-up data did not differ 
significantly at baseline with respect to the variables of interest (AMT, BDI-II, IES). BDI-II 
scores at T2 are significantly lower than those at T1, t(32) = 2.80, p < .01, ranging from 
Table 15 Descriptive statistics of the measures used at T1 (n = 54) and T2 (n = 34, except 
for BDI-II, n = 33) 
  T1  T2 
SCID-I   
 Current depressed 18 5 
 Remitted depressed 26 25 
 Never depressed 10 4 
BDI-II (M, SD) 30.93 (13.27) 25.30 (16.28) 
IES   
 Total score (M, SD) 41.75 (17.42) 39.85 (19.42) 
 Intrusions (M, SD) 21.36 (10.20) 19.56 (10.70) 
 Avoidance (M, SD) 20.40   (9.37) 20.29 (10.48) 
AMT   
 Number of specific memories (M, SD) 14.59   (2.39) 14.70   (2.33) 
 Number of categoric memories (M, SD) .96   (1.16) .74   (1.38) 
SCID-I = depression module of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis 
I; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IES = Impact of Event Scale; AMT = 
Autobiographical Memory Test. 
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the ‘severely depressed’ (T1) scoring range to ‘moderately depressed’ (T2), but AMT 
measures and IES scales at T1 do not differ from those at T2 (all ps > .277). 
 
INSTRUMENTS 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis II (SCID-II, First et al., 1997; 
Dutch translation by Weertman et al., 2000). The SCID-II is a semi-structured interview 
that systematically assesses DSM-IV Axis II disorders (APA, 1994). All SCID-II interviews 
were conducted by the first author, who is trained to use the SCID-II. The SCID-II items 
were scored on a 3-point scale ranging from not applicable, applicable but not 
sufficiently present, to present. Scores reflect the presence or absence of 12 personality 
disorders (all DSM-IV personality disorders plus depressive and passive-aggressive 
personality disorder). Interrater reliability of the SCID-II ranges from .90 to .98 for 
dimensional judgements and internal consistency ranges from .71 to .94 (Maffei et al., 
1997). 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis I (SCID-I, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
& Williams, 1997; Dutch translation by van Groenestijn, Akkerhuis, Kupka, Schneider, & 
Nolen, 1999). This semi-structured interview assesses DSM-IV Axis I disorders (APA, 
1994). We only administered the MDD and PTSD modules. Again, interviews were 
performed by the first author. For the module on MDD, satisfactory test-retest 
reliability (κ = .61) and interrater reliability (κ = .80) are reported (Zanarini et al., 2000). 
For the module on PTSD, satisfactory test-retest reliability (κ = .78) and interrater 
reliability (κ = .88) are reported (Zanarini et al., 2000). 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT, Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Dutch version). In 
the AMT, respondents are presented with 18 cues (happy, sad, safe, angry, interested, 
clumsy, successful, emotionally hurt, surprised, lonely, relaxed, guilty, proud, afraid, 
pleasant, cowardly, carefree, and lazy) that are read aloud by the experimenter. 
Participants are invited to retrieve specific memories that the cues remind them of. The 
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definition of a specific autobiographical memory is explained by using an example. 
Three example cues are presented before the actual task to check whether the 
participants understood the assignment. Answers were immediately coded as ‘specific’, 
‘general categoric’ (if the response refers to a category of events), ‘general extended’ (if 
the answer refers to an event that took longer than one day), ‘no memory’ (e.g., a 
semantic association in response of the cue), or ‘same event’ (whenever the retrieved 
memory was identical to a memory retrieved in response to a previous cue). If 
respondents first retrieved a general memory or a memory that had been retrieved 
earlier in response to another cue, they were prompted to search for specific memories 
again. If no memory had been found in 60 seconds, the next cue is presented and the 
answer is coded as ‘omission’. We were especially interested in the number of general 
categoric memories retrieved. We further computed the number of specific memories 
retrieved, and, to correct for the number of omissions, the proportions of specific and 
general categoric memories19. AMT administration was audiotaped. Ten percent of the 
answers to AMT cues were re-coded by a second rater. Interrater reliability was .89, 
over both AMT admissions. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown 1996; authorised Dutch translation 
(BDI-II-NL) by van der Does, 2002). This self-report questionnaire measures depression 
severity. It consists of 21 items, each representing a specific depressive symptom (e.g., 
pessimism, guilt, suicidal ideations). An item consists of four statements indicating 
different levels of severity. Participants are asked to mark the statements that best 
describe how they felt during the last two weeks, the current day included. Item scores 
differ from 0 to 3; total score ranges from 0 to 63 with higher scores indicating higher 
                                                     
 
19  To preserve maximum readability, we do not report the results for the proportional indices 
of specific (%S) and categoric (%GC) memories, unless they are different from the results 
using the plain number of specific (S) and categoric (GC) memories. 
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levels of depressive symptoms. The internal consistency of the total BDI-II in our sample 
(at T1) was high, Cronbach’s alpha = .91.  
Impact of Event Scale (IES, Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979; authorised Dutch 
translation (Schokverwerkingslijst) by Brom, Kleber, & Defares, 1986). The Dutch 
version of the IES counts 15 items, and aims to inventory to what extent one suffered 
from trauma-related intrusive thoughts, feelings, and images (7 items), and from 
avoidance of trauma-related stimuli, thoughts, and feelings (8 items) during the 
preceding seven days. Prior to these questions, respondents are invited to briefly 
describe a traumatic event that they will keep in mind while answering the items. Each 
item has to be scored on a 4-point scale, from not at all (0), over seldom (1) and 
sometimes (3) to often (5), expressing how often what is described in the item caused 
trouble during the week prior to testing. Total score ranges from 0 to 75; the Intrusions 
and Avoidance subscales range from 0 to 35, and from 0 to 40, respectively. The 
internal consistency of the IES scales in our sample (at T1) was high, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.88, Cronbach’s alpha = .90, and Cronbach’s alpha = .73, for IES total score, IES-
Intrusions, and IES-Avoidance, respectively. 
 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVES 
At six-month follow-up, complete data were available for 31 of the original 54 
participants. Nine participants had incomplete protocols20. Regression analyses 
 
                                                     
 
20  For five of them, both the BDI-II and the IES at T2 were missing. One participant completed 
the BDI-II at T2, but not the IES at T1. Another one completed both the IES and the BDI-II at 
T2, but had missing data on the SCID-I at T2. BDI-II scores at T2 were missing for two other 
participants (of which one also had missing data on the AMT at T2).  
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Table 16 Correlations between depression severity, IES scales, and number of specific and categoric memories at T1, and depression severity and 
IES scales at T2 
  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1. BDI-II (T1) .53** .50** .46** -.36* .21 .69** .38* .44** .25 
2. IES (T1)  - .90** .90** -.12 .03 .31 .43* .37* .42* 
3. IES-Intrusions (T1)  - .62** -.13 .12 .35* .37* .39* .29 
4. IES-Avoidance (T1)   - -.09 -.07 .20 .41* .29 .46** 
5. S    - -.74** -.50** -.40* -.43** -.29 
6. GC     - .17 .36* .47** .20 
7. BDI-II (T2)      - .31 .41* .17 
8. IES (T2)       - .92** .92** 
9. IES-Intrusions (T2)        - .69** 
10. IES-Avoidance (T2)         - 
BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; IES = total score of the Impact of Event Scale; S = number of specific memories retrieved during 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) administration; GC = number of general categoric memories retrieved during AMT administration. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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predicting BDI-II and IES scores at T2 could be conducted for 33 and 34 participants, 
respectively. 
The IES was completed on traumatic experiences related to personal assaults (n = 10 at 
T1; n = 12 at T2); interpersonal problems (n = 7; n = 5); the death or parting of a family 
member (n = 6; n = 7); personal illness (n = 4; n = 2); illness of a family member (n = 3; n 
= 1); personal injury or suicide attempt (n = 0; n = 1) or other experiences that could not 
be classified in one of the categories above (n = 4; n = 5). One trauma description was 
missing at T2. Although the life event reported at T1 could differ from that at T2, most 
respondents thought about a similar kind of traumatic event at both times, χ² = 77.20, p 
< .001. 
 
PREDICTION OF DEPRESSION SEVERITY AT SIX-MONTH FOLLOW-UP 
Table 16 presents the correlations between the baseline variables (AMT21, BDI-II) and 
BDI-II scores at follow-up. Given the high correlation between the number of specific (S) 
and categoric memories (GC), we decided to conduct separate regression analyses, 
both with BDI-II scores at T2 as the dependent variable. To control for depression 
severity and depressive state at T1, BDI-II score and depressive state (current/remitted 
depressed vs never depressed) at T1 were entered in Block 1. S and GC were entered in 
 
                                                     
 
21  Besides the standard AMT, we also administered a personalised AMT for each respondent, 
consisting of the ten most self-discrepant self-guides the respondent formulated. According 
to Conway et al. (2004), cues that tap into domains that are highly self-discrepant towards 
one’s actual self-concept evoke more overgeneral memories. However, as reported 
elsewhere, pAMT administration in BPD patients resulted in less categoric memories and 
more omissions than standard AMT administration (Van den Broeck, Pieters, Claes, Berens, 
& Raes, submitted – Chapter 4 of this thesis). Also, in this study, no association was found 
between memory specificity measured with the pAMT at T1 and depression severity and the 
IES scales at T2. 
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Block 2, respectively. Results are presented in Table 17. Block 1 accounted for 47.6% of 
the variance of the BDI-II scores at follow-up, with only BDI-II scores at T1 reaching 
Table 17 Summary of the hierarchical regression analyses results for the variables 
predicting depression severity (BDI-II) at 6 months (n = 33) 
 B SE B β p-value R² p-value 
DV: BDI-II – 6 months       
Step 1       
 Constant -1.65 5.84     
 BDI-II – T1 .86 .17 .69 < .001   
 Depressed state                      
(ever vs never depressed) 
1.19 5.58 .03 .832 .48 < .001 
Step 2       
 Constant 29.77 15.21     
 BDI-II – T1 .73 .17 .59 < .001   
 Depressed state                     
(ever vs never depressed) 
2.22 5.27 .05 .677   
 Number of specific memories -1.90 .86 -.30 .035 .55 < .001 
Step 2       
 Constant -1.82 5.96     
 BDI-II – T1 .85 .17 .69 < .001   
 Depressed state                     
(ever vs never depressed) 
1.08 5.68 .03 .850   
 Number of categoric memories .45 1.69 .04 .792 .48 < .001 
When DV (Dependent Variable) = BDI-II at 6 months: R2 = .08 for Step 2 (p = .035) when 
adding number of specific memories at T1 as a predictor. R2 = .00 for Step 2 (p = .792) 
when adding number of categoric memories at T1 as a predictor. 
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significance. Unlike GC, adding S22 in Block 2 to the equation significantly increases R² 
with 7.6%, Fchange = 4.91, p < .05. This means that higher levels of memory specificity 
at T1 predict lower levels of depressive symptoms at T2, when controlled for depressive 
symptoms and depressive state at T1. 
 
PREDICTION OF IES AT SIX-MONTH FOLLOW-UP 
Table 16 also presents the correlations between the IES scales, S, and GC at baseline, 
and the IES scales at follow-up. S and GC at T1 were significantly associated with IES 
total score and IES-Intrusions at T2, but not with IES-Avoidance. We therefore 
conducted regression analyses with IES total score (Table 18) and IES-Intrusions (Table 
19) at T2 as dependent variables, and AMT variables as independent variables, 
controlling for IES total score and IES-Intrusions at T1, respectively, besides PTSD status. 
Both S and GC added significantly to the prediction of both IES total score23 and IES-
Intrusions at T2. This means that higher levels of memory specificity at T1 predict lower 
frequencies of intrusions at T2, when controlled for IES total scores and IES-Intrusions 
at T1, respectively. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study investigated the predictive value of OGM for depression severity and post- 
 
                                                     
 
22  Adding the proportion of specific memories in Block 2 to the equation does not result in a 
significant ΔR², R²change = .05 with Fchange = 3.078, p = .09, with β = -.23, t = -1.75, p = .09, 
when predicting BDI-II scores at T2. 
23  Adding the proportion of specific memories in Block 2 to the equation results in a marginally 
significant ΔR², R²change = .096 with Fchange = 3.110, p = .052, with β = -.31, t = -2.03, p = 
.052, when predicting IES total score at T2. 
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traumatic symptoms at six-month follow-up in a sample of BPD patients. Depression 
severity at follow-up was predicted by the number of specific memories retrieved at 
baseline, over and above baseline depression severity levels. More specific memories at 
baseline thus correspond with lower levels of depression six months later. This finding 
was not replicated for the number of categoric memories, nor for the proportions of 
specific or categoric memories, however. Furthermore, in line with our expectations, 
   
Table 18 Summary of the hierarchical regression analyses results for the variables 
predicting IES total score at 6 months (n = 34) 
 B SE B β p-value R² p-value 
DV: IES – 6 months       
Step 1       
 Constant 22.89 7.75     
 IES – T1 .35 .20 .34 .087   
 PTSD at T1 (current vs no PTSD) 6.83 7.66 .17 .380 .21 .028 
Step 2       
 Constant 65.74 19.19     
 IES – T1 .30 .19 .28 .124   
 PTSD at T1 (current vs no PTSD) 7.64 7.14 .19 .293   
 Number of specific memories -2.80 1.16 -.36 .022 .34 .022 
Step 2       
 Constant 18.40 7.58     
 IES – T1 .34 .19 .33 .080   
 PTSD at T1 (current vs no PTSD) 6.85 7.22 .17 .351   
 Number of categoric memories 5.13 2.31 .33 .034 .32 .034 
When DV (Dependent Variable) = IES total score at 6 months: R2 = .13 for Step 2 (p = 
.025) when adding number of specific memories at T1 as a predictor. R2 = .11 for Step 2 
(p = .034) when adding number of categoric memories at T1 as a predictor. 
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memory specificity (both number and proportions of specific and categoric memories) 
predicted the frequency of traumatic intrusions, even when we controlled for the 
presence of intrusions at baseline. Contrary to our expectations, we found no 
association between avoidance levels at follow-up and memory specificity at baseline. 
Still, these findings suggest that, although cross-sectional associations between OGM 
and MDD and PTSD in BPD patients are inconsistently found, OGM in BPD patients may 
Table 19 Summary of the hierarchical regression analyses results for the variables 
predicting IES-Intrusions at 6 months (n = 33). 
 B SE B β p-value R² p-value 
DV: IES-Intrusions – 6 months       
Step 1       
 Constant 11.40 4.05     
 IES-Intrusions – T1 .39 .21 .38 .071   
 PTSD at T1 (current vs no PTSD) .07 4.53 .00 .988 .15 .083 
Step 2       
 Constant 37.34 10.69     
 IES-Intrusions – T1 .32 .19 .32 .107   
 PTSD at T1 (current vs no PTSD) .72 4.17 .03 .865   
 Number of specific memories -1.70 .66 -.40 .015 .30 .015 
Step 2       
 Constant 9.24 3.77     
 IES-Intrusions – T1 .32 .19 .31 .108   
 PTSD at T1 (current vs no PTSD) .84 4.13 .04 .840   
 Number of categoric memories 3.50 1.29 .41 .011 .32 .011 
When DV (Dependent Variable) = IES-Intrusions at 6 months: R2 = .16 for Step 2 (p = 
.013) when adding number of specific memories at T1 as a predictor. R2 = .17 for Step 2 
(p = .010) when adding number of categoric memories at T1 as a predictor. 
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still be of clinical relevance, in that is has some predictive value for the course of post-
traumatic and, to a lesser extent, depressive symptomatology. 
Although this study is line with previous findings on OGM predicting the course of 
depression (Sumner et al., 2010), it contradicts the only study conducted in BPD 
patients focusing on the predictive value of OGM for depression severity:  Kremers et 
al. (2006) found that memory specificity was not a significant predictor for depression 
severity at 15-months follow-up in a sample of BPD patients. Perhaps the longer time 
between T1 and T2 (15 months) in Kremers et al.’s study could explain this discrepancy. 
Indeed, Sumner et al. (2010) in their meta-analysis found that the impact of memory 
specificity on future mood declines when time-points are further apart. Alternatively, it 
should be noted that Kremers et al. used an adapted version of the standard 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), in which 
participants were explicitly instructed to retrieve “moments at which they exhibited the 
trait” that was used as a cue. We were less stringent during the AMT administration, 
and used the standard AMT instructions, asking participants to retrieve specific 
memories “that the cue reminded them of”. Nevertheless, given that only two studies 
are available today with inconsistent findings, replication is necessary to further explore 
the role of OGM (in co-morbid disorders and associated symptoms) in BPD patients. 
Our study also extends previous findings on OGM as a predictor of post-traumatic 
symptom severity, i.e., the frequency of intrusions and IES total score, which has never 
been studied in a sample of BPD patients. However, although both intrusions and 
avoidance are considered core features of PTSD and MDD, we found no association 
between OGM at T1 and (cognitive, behavioural, emotional) avoidance at T2. To our 
knowledge, except for Hauer et al. (2009), studies focusing on the predictive value of 
OGM for post-traumatic symptom severity have never used the IES to measure post-
traumatic stress. In addition, none of these prospective studies has reported on facets 
of traumatic stress. Yet, in cross-sectional studies, sometimes IES-Avoidance, but not 
IES-Intrusions was associated with memory specificity (e.g., Brewin, Watson, McCarthy, 
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Hyman, & Dayson, 1998; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995), whereas others found AMT 
performance to be related with IES-Intrusions, but not with IES-Avoidance (e.g., Brewin, 
Reynolds, & Tata, 1999). According to Wessel et al. (2002), these inconsistencies may 
reflect the unreliability of the IES. Alternatively, and with respect to our sample of BPD 
patients, the non-significant associations between measures of memory specificity at 
T1 and IES-Avoidance at T2 may be due to a lack of power. 
Based on these findings, we tentatively hypothesise that even BPD patients, in whom 
OGM in cross-sectional designs is inconsistently found (Van den Broeck et al., in press – 
see Chapter 2), may profit from memory specificity training (MeST; Raes, Williams, & 
Hermans, 2009) as demonstrated in depressed (Neshat-Doost et al., 2013) and 
traumatised patients (Moradi et al., 2014). Although the added variance for depression 
severity at follow-up explained by memory specificity at baseline is rather small (7.6%), 
given that βS = -.30, an increase with one SD at the AMT would result in a decrease of 
4.88 points at the BDI-II at follow-up. Likewise, the future score at the IES Intrusions 
scale would decline with  4.28 points. 
However, our study is not without limitations. We did not include measures on 
executive functioning, rumination, social problem solving, and future imagining; which 
prevents us from disentangling the mechanisms beyond OGM. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that we tested our hypotheses in a rather small sample of BPD patients, which 
is important, given the heterogeneity of the BPD diagnosis. Nevertheless, our results 
suggest that, although cross-sectional associations between OGM and MDD and PTSD 
in BPD patients are inconsistently found, OGM in BPD patients too may be clinically 
relevant in order to mitigate the course of depression and trauma symptoms. 
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ABSTRACT 
Depressed and traumatised patients tend to recall categories of events from memory, 
rather than specific memories. This is called overgeneral memory (OGM). OGM is 
considered to be a (cognitive) strategy to regulate negative affect. Contrary to the 
expectations, borderline personality disorder (BPD) patients only inconsistently show 
OGM. Instead, they seem to regulate difficult emotions more behaviourally, with non-
suicidal self-injury (NSSI). This study investigated how both these affect-regulation 
strategies relate to each other. Based on earlier findings (Startup et al., 2001), we 
hypothesised that NSSI and OGM would be inversely related. Fifty-three BPD patients 
completed the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, the Autobiographical 
Memory Test to assess OGM, and the Self-Injury Questionnaire – Treatment Related 
(SIQ-TR) to assess NSSI. We found no significant differences in OGM between patients 
with and without NSSI. However, we found that participants who use more NSSI 
methods showed less OGM, but this association disappeared when we controlled for 
age. We propose a balance-model of affect-regulation as one possible explanation for 
the negative relationship between these two affect-regulation strategies. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) is defined as any socially unaccepted behaviour involving 
deliberate and direct injury to one’s own body surface without suicidal intent (APA, 
1994; Claes & Vandereycken, 2007a; Nock, 2009). It involves behaviours such as severe 
scratching, bruising, cutting, burning, and biting oneself. NSSI differs from suicidal 
behaviour with respect to prevalence, functionality, and underlying cognitions 
(Muehlenkamp, 2005). NSSI usually starts at age 12 to 14 (Jacobson & Gould, 2007), 
and its frequency declines with age (Zanarini et al., 2008). 
Accumulating research now highlights the importance of studying the variety of 
methods of NSSI, besides and apart from the mere frequency of NSSI. NSSI diversity, 
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and not the frequency of the NSSI, is found to be associated with different measures of 
suicidality, such as number of suicide attempts (Nock, Joiner, Gordon, Lloyd-Richardson, 
& Prinstein, 2006; and see, Joiner, 2005, for an integrative framework), suicidal ideation 
(Lynam, Miller, Miller, Bornovalova, & Lejuez, 2011; Turner, Layden, Butler, & 
Chapman, 2013; Whitlock, Muehlenkamp, & Eckenrode, 2008), and suicide risk (Turner 
et al., 2013; Zlotnick, Donaldson, Spirito, & Pearlstein, 1997). Furthermore, NSSI 
diversity correlates positively with levels of impulsivity (Lynam et al., 2011; Turner et 
al., 2013), emotional dysregulation (Turner et al., 2013), severity of borderline 
personality disorder (BPD; Lynam et al., 2011), depression severity (Turner et al., 2013), 
disordered eating (Claes & Muehlenkamp, 2014; Whitlock et al., 2008), and anxiety 
symptoms (Klonsky & Olino, 2008). In sum, these findings suggest that NSSI diversity is 
a marker of severity of psychopathology (Jacobson & Gould, 2007). 
The functionality of NSSI has been extensively studied, and different frameworks have 
been put forward (for an overview, see Gordon, Kwan, Minnich, & Carter, 2014). Of all 
functions, affect-regulation is the most important function of NSSI. Indeed, it is 
consistently found that patients who engage in NSSI report a strong decrease of 
negative affect and an increase in positive feelings shortly after NSSI (‘experiential 
avoidance’: Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2006; Claes & Vandereycken, 2007b; Klonsky, 
2007; ‘automatic negative reinforcement’: Nock & Prinstein, 2004), suggesting that, in 
the short term, NSSI is an effective coping strategy. In the long term, feelings of guilt 
and shame are likely to arise. This has a negative impact on one’s self-concept 
(Jacobson & Gould, 2007; Kleindienst et al., 2008), which in turn increases the risk to re-
engage in NSSI (Chapman et al., 2006). 
Although NSSI is found in a variety of psychopathological conditions, it is traditionally 
considered as a symptom of  BPD (APA, 1994; Klonsky, 2007, 2011; Nock et al., 2006). 
Zanarini et al. (2008) reported that 89% of their BPD sample had engaged in repeated 
NSSI two years prior to testing. Additionally, 70% of them used multiple methods. 
Probably, the high prevalence of NSSI in BPD patients could, in part, be explained by 
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BPD patients’ hypervigilance (Linehan, 1993; Niedtfeldt et al., 2010; Putnam & Silk, 
2005; Stiglmayer et al., 2005). That is, BPD patients experience more frequently and 
more intense aversive feelings and, therefore, might more frequently turn to NSSI as an 
acute and effective affect-regulation strategy. Indeed, similar to non-BPD participants 
who engage in NSSI (e.g., Klonsky, 2011), BPD patients too, identify tension reduction as 
the most prominent motive of NSSI (Kleindienst et al., 2008). In addition, though, 
findings of Chapman and Dixon-Gordon (2007) also suggest that BPD patients might 
profit more from the affect-regulating function of NSSI than non-BPD participants. 
Another strategy that has been considered an affect-regulation strategy in BPD and 
other emotional disorders is overgeneral memory (OGM). OGM is a robust finding in 
depressed patients and patients suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (for an 
overview, see: Moore & Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). These patients are biased 
when they are asked to retrieve specific autobiographical memories in response to cue 
words, like happy or lonely. Instead of retrieving, as instructed, memories of events that 
happened only once and did not take longer than one day (‘specific memories’; e.g., 
“Last Easter, when the carrot cake was burnt”), they more often recall overgeneral 
categoric memories referring to a category of events (e.g., “Every Easter, when I bake a 
carrot cake”). According to the CaR-FA-X model (Williams et al., 2007) and the Self-
Memory System (SMS; Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 
Singer, & Tagini, 2004) overgeneral memory recall is assumed to be beneficial (and in 
some circumstances even adaptive) in the short term: By not passing through to the 
final, most detailed stages of a search process, the reactivation of painful memories and 
associated affective states is avoided (‘functional avoidance’). However, in the longer 
term, OGM potentially contributes to the maintenance and/or onset of a depressed 
state or post-traumatic stress symptoms. Disregarding event-specific knowledge may 
be detrimental, because event-specific knowledge is meant to inform one on a here-
and-now basis on the progress one makes in order to attain one’s personal goals, which 
could result in adjustments of one’s self-concept in the longer term (Conway et al., 
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2004). Furthermore, OGM in depressed and traumatised patients has been found to be 
associated with impaired social problem solving (e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 
1996; Sutherland & Bryant, 2008), higher levels of rumination (e.g., Raes et al., 2005; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), and reduced executive functioning (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 
2007). 
Grant et al. (2008) reported high co-morbidity rates of major depressive disorder (MDD; 
19.3% of BPD patients met MDD criteria during the last 12 months) and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD; 31.6% met criteria of PTSD during the last year) in BPD patients. 
Moreover, BPD patients suffer from an unstable sense of self (‘identity confusion’, 
DSM-IV, APA, 1994), disturbed executive resources (Maurex, 2009), and difficulties in 
social problem solving (e.g., Kremers, Spinhoven, van der Does, & van Dyck, 2006b; 
Maurex et al., 2010). Therefore, and given the assumed role of OGM as an affect-
regulation strategy in psychopathology, we would expect that BPD patients too, would 
show problems in retrieving specific memories. However, in contrast to NSSI, OGM in 
BPD is only inconsistently found (see Van den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, Hermans, & Raes, 
in press –Chapter 2 of this thesis). Whereas some studies suggest that OGM is 
associated with a diagnosis of BPD (Jones et al., 1999; Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & 
Startup, 2010), results of other studies do not support such an association (Arntz, 
Meeren, & Wessel, 2002; Kremers, Spinhoven, & van der Does, 2004; Renneberg, 
Theobald, Nobs, & Weisbrod, 2005). Additionally, a couple of studies suggest that OGM 
in BPD is mainly associated with a co-morbid diagnosis of MDD (Artnz et al., 2002; 
Kremers et al., 2004; Spinhoven, Bockting, Schene, & Williams, 2007; Van den Broeck, 
Claes, Pieters, & Raes, 2012 – Chapter 3 of this thesis), although others do not find an 
association between depression and OGM in BPD patients (Maurex et al., 2010; Reid & 
Startup, 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005 – see also Chapter 4 of this thesis). 
Previous studies thus suggest that both OGM and NSSI could serve an affect-regulation 
function in BPD. Studying how these strategies relate to each other could help to better 
understand affect-regulation in BPD patients, who are generally characterised by 
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affective dysregulation. To our knowledge, only three studies so far have investigated 
the relation between NSSI and OGM in BPD patients. Based on the widespread 
presence of ‘parasuicidal acts’ (referring to both suicidal and non-suicidal self-injury) in 
BPD patients, and the early findings on OGM in BPD patients (Jones et al., 1999), 
Startup et al. (2001) hypothesised that both concepts would be positively related. 
However, contrary to their predictions, their sample showed a strong and negative 
association between the frequency of parasuicidal acts and the number of overgeneral 
memories retrieved, r = -.47, p < .05. Startup et al. (2001) argued that OGM in BPD 
patients may be ineffective, therefore leading to the activation of distressing memories 
which, in turn, evoke affective dysregulation. This affective dysregulation is then 
controlled by parasuicidal acts. It should be noted that Startup et al. (2001) made no 
distinction between NSSI (without the intent to die) and suicidal behaviour. Similarly, 
the category of general memories they reported on was made up of categoric as well as 
extended memories (referring to an event that lasted longer than one day; e.g., “When 
I went abroad for a couple of days, last Easter”). In a later study, Renneberg et al. 
(2005) did not find any association between the frequency of self-mutilation (no 
definition given) and the number of specific memories retrieved in their sample of BPD 
patients. In a final study, Maurex et al. (2010) did not find an association either 
between the frequency of NSSI and the number of specific memories recalled in BPD 
patients. 
In order to get a clearer view on affect-regulation in BPD, the present study aimed to 
examine the association between NSSI and OGM in BPD patients. Based on the findings 
of Startup et al. (2001), we expected an inverse relationship between the frequency 
(presence) of NSSI and OGM. However, the opposite prediction could be made as well. 
Based on the fact that both OGM and NSSI are positively related to avoidance 
tendencies (NSSI: e.g., Claes et al., 2010; Najmi et al., 2007; OGM: e.g., Hermans, 
Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005; Muenks, 2010), one could also reasonably 
expect both central variables to be positively instead of negatively related. Additionally, 
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given that recent studies underline the importance of NSSI diversity apart from NSSI 
frequency, we also studied the association between OGM and the number of NSSI 
methods reported. 
 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Fifty-five patients (8 males), all meeting DSM-IV BPD criteria (APA, 1994) according to 
the SCID-II interview (SCID-II, First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1997; Dutch 
translation by Weertman, Arntz, & Kerkhofs, 2000) participated in the study. Two 
female participants had incomplete protocols, and were deleted from the analyses. The 
remaining participants were between 18 and 51 years of age (M = 29.47; SD = 8.45). 
Most participants were single (62.26%). The majority (54.72%) held a high school 
diploma, 26.42% held a college level degree, and 9.43% held a master level degree. 
Participants were recruited in two Belgian psychiatric hospitals: University Psychiatric 
Centre KU Leuven, Campus Kortenberg (77.36%) and Psychiatric Hospital Duffel 
(22.64%). Most patients (79.25%) were inpatients, staying at a general psychiatric ward 
(47.62%), at a specialised unit treating BPD according to the principles of Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993; 35.71%), or at a unit specialised in the 
treatment of anxiety disorders (16.67%). The other patients (20.75%) followed day care 
treatment and outpatient emotional skill trainings, organised by the above mentioned 
hospitals. 
 
INSTRUMENTS 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders, Axis II (SCID-II, First et al., 1997; 
Dutch translation by Weertman et al., 2000). The SCID-II is a semi-structured interview 
that systematically assesses DSM-IV Axis II disorders (APA, 1994). All SCID-II interviews 
were conducted by the first author, who is trained to use this instrument. The SCID-II 
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items were scored on a 3-point scale ranging from not applicable, applicable but not 
sufficiently present, to present. Scores reflect the presence or absence of 12 personality 
disorders (all DSM-IV personality disorders plus depressive and passive-aggressive 
personality disorder). Interrater reliability of the SCID-II ranges from .90 to .98 for 
dimensional judgements and internal consistency ranges from .71 to .94 (Maffei et al., 
1997). 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT, Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Dutch version). In 
the AMT, respondents are presented with 18 cues (happy, sad, safe, angry, interested, 
clumsy, successful, emotionally hurt, surprised, lonely, relaxed, guilty, proud, afraid, 
pleasant, cowardly, carefree, and lazy) that are read aloud by the experimenter. 
Participants are invited to retrieve specific memories. The definition of a specific 
autobiographical memory is explained by using an example. Three example cues are 
presented before the actual task to check whether the participants understood the 
assignment. Answers were immediately coded as ‘specific’, ‘general categoric’ (if the 
response refers to a category of events), ‘general extended’ (if the answer refers to an 
event that took longer than one day), ‘no memory’ (e.g., a semantic association in 
response of the cue), or ‘same event’ (whenever the retrieved memory was identical to 
a memory retrieved in response to a previous cue). If respondents first retrieved a 
general memory or a memory that had been retrieved earlier in response to another 
cue, they were prompted to search for specific memories again. If no memory had been 
found in 60 seconds, the next cue is presented and the answer is coded as ‘omission’. 
We were especially interested in the number of general categoric memories retrieved. 
We further computed the number of specific memories retrieved, and, to correct for 
the number of omissions, the proportions of specific and general categoric memories24. 
                                                     
 
24  To preserve maximum readability, we do not report the results for the proportional indices 
of specific (%S) and categoric (%GC) memories, unless they are different from the results 
using the plain number of specific (S) and categoric (GC) memories. 
Chapter 7 
 
- 168 - 
 
AMT administration was audiotaped. Ten percent of the answers to AMT cues were re-
coded by a second rater. Interrater reliability was .90. 
Self-Injury Questionnaire – Treatment Related (SIQ-TR; Claes, Vandereycken, & 
Vertommen, 2007b). The SIQ-TR is a paper-and-pencil questionnaire on non-suicidal 
self-injurious behaviour. Respondents are asked to indicate how long ago (ranging from 
a week ago to never) they performed each of five types of NSSI (severe scratching, 
bruising, cutting, burning, and biting oneself). Additional questions on taxonomy 
(frequency, location on the body, intensity of pain, planning) and functionality (affect 
scores before and after NSSI, motives of NSSI) were asked for each NSSI behaviour that 
was performed during the past month. The SIQ-TR thus allows to distinguish between 
participants who only recently (during the past month), ever (lifetime), or never have 
hurt themselves, as well as between patients who use one or more NSSI methods. 
 
PROCEDURE 
This study was part of a larger study investigating autobiographical memory in BPD 
patients. Following oral and written informed consent, participants were asked to 
complete a battery of tests and questionnaires. Due to practical issues, data collection 
often took more than one session, but in most cases a respondent’s protocol was 
completed within a three week timespan. We used a computerised version of the SIQ-
TR, using the open source software Limesurvey. The study was approved by the ethical 
committees of the University of Leuven and the psychiatric hospitals where the study 
was conducted. 
 
RESULTS 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Most of our participants (69.81%) met more than five criteria needed for a BPD 
diagnosis (M = 6.38; SD = 1.18), with eight participants (15.09%) fulfilling at least eight 
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criteria. Additionally, the majority of our participants (69.92%) had one or more co-
morbid Axis II disorders (M = 1.28; range: 0–4). The following Axis II disorders were 
most often diagnosed besides BPD: Obsessive-Compulsive PD (n = 14), Antisocial PD (n 
= 13), Paranoid PD (n = 13), and Narcissistic PD (n = 11). 
AMT scores did not significantly differ between in- and outpatients, but outpatients 
reported significantly fewer recent, but not lifetime, NSSI behaviours compared to 
inpatients, Mout = 0.18, Min = 1.05, F = 6.466, p = .014. Men and women did not differ 
from each other with respect to their scores on the variables of interest (AMT, SIQ-TR). 
Similarly, the setting from which participants were recruited was not associated with 
different scores on these variables either. 
Table 20 summarises the means, standard deviations and scoring ranges of all variables 
derived from the AMT. In general, 86.91% of the retrieved memories was a specific 
memory. Table 21 shows the variables of interest derived from the SIQ-TR. Eighty-three 
percent of our participants engaged in NSSI in the past, which matches previous data on 
the occurrence of NSSI in BPD patients (e.g., Zaki, Coifman, Rafaeli, Berenson, & 
Table 20 Descriptive statistics of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) 
 M SD Range 
 N / % specific memories  14.68 / .87  2.38 / .13 7 – 18 
 N / % general categorical memories  .92 / .05  1.14 / .07 0 – 6 
 N / % general extended memories  .42 / .02  .77 / .04 0 – 4 
 N / % no memory retrievals  .49 / .03  .93 / .06 0 – 3 
 N / % same event retrievals  .40 / .02  .63 / .04 0 – 2 
 N omissions 1.09 1.30 0 – 6 
N = number of [type of answers on the Autobiographical Memory Test]; % = proportion 
of [type of answers on the Autobiographical Memory Test]. 
In computing %, we do not take into account omissions, e.g., % specific memories is = N 
specific memories / (18 – N omissions), with 18 being the total number of cues of the 
Autobiographical Memory Test. 
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Downey, 2013; Zanarini et al., 2008). Cutting is by far the most frequently used method 
of NSSI in our sample: Almost three-quarters of our participants (73.60%) cut 
themselves in the past, and about one third of our sample (32.08%) cut themselves 
during the past month. Of those patients who engaged in NSSI, thirty-three 
respondents (75.00%) reported to have been engaged in more than one method of 
NSSI (M = 2.26; SD = 1.65), with seven patients (15.91%) reporting having used all five 
proposed methods of NSSI in the past (Table 21). 
 
 
 
 
Table 21 Frequencies and percentages of recent and lifetime NSSI, arranged by 
different NSSI methods, and by the number of different NSSI methods that 
were used during the period of interest 
 Recent                       
(during the last month) 
Lifetime 
Prevalence 
 N / % Scratching 13 / 24.5  30 / 56.6 
 N / % Bruising 9 / 17.0  23 / 43.4 
 N / % Cutting 17 / 32.1  39 / 73.6 
 N / % Burning 3 / 5.7  15 / 28.3 
 N / % Biting 4 / 7.5  13 / 24.5 
 N / % Total NSSI 28 / 52.8  44 / 83.0 
 0 25 / 47.2  9 / 17.0 
 1 16 / 30.2  11 / 20.8 
 2 8 / 15.1  11 / 20.8 
 3 2 / 3.8  8 / 15.1 
 4 2 / 3.8  7 / 13.2 
 5 -  7 / 13.2 
NSSI = non-suicidal self-injury; N = number of [reported NSSI method]; % = percentage 
of respondents that reported [NSSI method]. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMORY SPECIFICITY AND NSSI 
No differences in memory specificity were found between patients with a (recent or 
lifetime) history of NSSI and those without such a history (Table 22). Investigating the 
association between NSSI diversity and OGM, we found that recent NSSI diversity was 
not related to memory specificity in our sample (Table 23, above the diagonal). 
However, the more NSSI diversity during lifetime reported, the less general categoric 
memories were retrieved, r = -.34, p < .05. The positive association between the 
number of specific memories and lifetime NSSI diversity was marginally significant, r = 
.26, p = .06. Still, we found that more different methods of lifetime NSSI behaviours 
  
Table 22 The mean numbers and proportions of specific and categoric memories 
retrieved by participants who reported lifetime or recent NSSI compared to 
those who did not 
 Recent NSSI         
(n = 28) 
No recent NSSI     
(n = 25) 
F P 
N specific memories 15.07 14.24 1.626 .208 
N categoric memories .75 1.12 1.400 .242 
 % specific memories .89 .84 2.456 .123 
% categoric memories .04 .07 1.406 .242 
 Lifetime NSSI         
(n = 44) 
No lifetime NSSI     
(n = 9) 
F P 
N specific memories 14.73 14.44 .103 .749 
N categoric memories .84 1.33 1.402 .242 
 % specific memories .87 .84 .490 .487 
% categoric memories .05 .08 1.228 .273 
NSSI = non-suicidal self-injury; N = number of [specific/categoric] memories; % = 
proportion of [specific/categoric] memories. 
In computing %, we do not take into account omissions, e.g., % specific memories is = N 
specific memories / (18 – N omissions), with 18 being the total number of cues of the 
Autobiographical Memory Test. 
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related to higher proportions of specific memories, r = .31, p < .05. These associations 
thus suggest that NSSI diversity and OGM are inversely associated. 
It should be noted, however, that both specificity and lifetime NSSI diversity are 
significantly associated with age. The older patients are, the less specific they are with 
respect to  memory retrieval, and the fewer different NSSI methods they report having 
used during lifetime. We therefore re-analysed our data while controlling for age (Table 
23, below the diagonal). Interestingly, all associations between NSSI diversity and 
memory specificity then disappeared. 
 
 
Table 23 Correlations between age, the number and proportions of specific and categoric 
memories, and the number of different recent and lifetime NSSI methods 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Age -.37** .35* -.35* .37** -.25 -.42** 
2. S - -.73** .88** -.76** .17 .26$ 
3. GC -.55** - -.84** 1.00** -.18 -.34* 
4. %S .80** -.71** - -.84** .23 .31* 
5. %GC -.60** .99** -.70** - -.18 -.34* 
6. N# NSSIs-R .06 -.16 .16 -.14 - .48** 
7. N# NSSIs-LT .10 -.28 .09 -.27 .41* - 
Correlations below the diagonal are controlled for age. 
NSSI = non-suicidal self-injury; S = number of specific memories retrieved during 
Autobiographical Memory Test administration; GC = number of general categoric 
memories retrieved; %S = proportion of specific memories; %GC = proportion of general 
categoric memories; N# NSSIs-R = number of different non-suicidal self-injury methods 
used during the last month; N# NSSIs-LT = number of different non-suicidal self-injurious 
methods used in one’s lifetime. 
$ p = .06, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study examined the relationship between NSSI and OGM, two assumed affect-
regulation strategies, in BPD. A first main finding was that OGM and NSSI diversity, and 
not presence of NSSI, were inversely related in our BPD patients. A second finding, 
qualifying the first, was that both OGM and NSSI diversity were associated with age and 
that their relation disappeared once age was controlled for. Three topics need further 
discussion: The relation between the findings of the present study and findings of 
previous studies, the inverse nature of the relation between NSSI and OGM, and the 
associations found with age. 
Earlier studies on the association between OGM and NSSI in BPD patients exclusively 
focused on the frequency of NSSI behaviours (Maurex et al., 2010; Renneberg et al., 
2010; Startup et al., 2001). Whereas Renneberg et al. (2005) and Maurex et al. (2010) 
did not observe any relation, Startup et al. (2001) found a negative association between 
the frequency of parasuicidal acts and OGM. In our sample, patients with and without 
NSSI did not differ from each other with respect to memory specificity. Therefore, we 
conclude that we were not able to replicate the findings of Startup et al. (2001) on the 
association between frequency of NSSI and OGM in BPD patients. Comparison, 
however, is difficult. Startup et al. (2001) studied ‘generic memories’, combining both 
categoric and extended memories25, and they also included suicide attempts. 
In addition to frequency of NSSI, we also examined OGM’s relation with NSSI diversity. 
We found an inverse relation between these constructs, suggesting that NSSI diversity 
changes in function of OGM, and vice-versa. Thus, according to this balance-model, if 
one regulates one’s affect mainly behaviourally, one is restricted in the allocation of 
                                                     
 
25  In the present study, the patients with and without NSSI retrieved equal amounts of generic 
memories, Welch’s F(1, 34.27) = 1.24, p = .27, and F(1, 51) = 1.99, p = .16, for recent and 
lifetime NSSI, respectively. 
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resources towards cognitive means. This may in part explain why BPD patients, who 
often engage in a variety of NSSI behaviours (Zanarini et al., 2008), only inconsistently 
show OGM. However, this model has some open ends. For instance, this model does 
not explain why exactly OGM and NSSI diversity fill up the scales of the balance. We 
would hypothesise that the functionality of NSSI diversity, compared to NSSI frequency, 
more strongly resembles that of OGM, but future research is needed to clarify these 
relationships. Additionally, further studies should also investigate the relation between 
other affect-regulation strategies (e.g., active coping, seeking support, etc.) and OGM as 
well. Furthermore, it is remarkable that OGM was associated with lifetime, but not with 
recent (during the past month) NSSI diversity. However, as displayed in Table 21, only 
28 patients out of 53 (52.83%) engaged in NSSI during the past month, against 44 
patients (83.02%) during lifetime. Reported NSSI diversity is also smaller when only 
considering a one-month period. For instance, 2 out of 28 patients (7.14%) who 
engaged in NSSI during the past month were engaged in three different methods, 
compared to 8 out of 44 patients (18.18%) who engaged in NSSI during lifetime. The 
operationalization of NSSI may be incomplete when we only consider a short period of 
time. On the flipside, these findings suggest that NSSI diversity (and OGM) refers to a 
long-term coping style. Finally, the balance-model does not explain why exactly 
someone ‘chooses’ one strategy (NSSI/OGM) above the other at a particular moment. It 
has been previously hypothesised (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Startup et al., 2001) that 
cognitive affect-regulation strategies in (hypervigilant) BPD patients may often be 
ineffective in dealing with emotional turmoil. According to Mark Williams (personal 
communication, 25/2/2014), executive resources, and the way they are allocated, may 
add to a better understanding of our findings. Guided search processes are hindered 
and slowed down when executive resources are reduced (Dalgleish et al., 2007), which 
is common in depressed (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1990), traumatised (e.g., Moradi, 
Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000), and BPD patients (Maurex, 2009). 
Therefore, the chances for OGM are increased in these patients. In addition, it is 
assumed that resources are deployed to feverishly banish painful memories from 
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consciousness in order to reduce the impact of these memories on one’s affect. When 
this strategy fails, intrusions emerge. However, in general, OGM comes as a side-effect 
of this ‘affective gating’ mechanism. It is hypothesised that affective gating fails in BPD 
patients, maybe because of hypersensitivity, extreme traumas, or a combination of 
both. Therefore, they will not show OGM. Moreover, their affect will fluctuate with 
whatever comes to mind, in valence, as well as in intensity. In an attempt to control 
these fluctuations, BPD patients may turn to behavioural affect-regulation strategies 
(NSSI, but possibly also alcohol, drugs, etc.). 
Further analyses revealed that both memory specificity and lifetime NSSI diversity were 
negatively associated with age. Older respondents in our sample thus retrieve more 
categoric and less specific memories, and, remarkably, report to have engaged in less 
NSSI diversity. With respect to OGM’s relation with age, our study replicates earlier 
findings (in BPD patients, e.g., Arntz et al., 2002; Spinhoven et al., 2007, but also in 
other clinical and non-clinical samples, e.g., Ros, Latorre, & Serrano, 2009; Sumner, 
Griffith, & Mineka, 2010). However, despite these findings, the age effect is only rarely 
acknowledged, and researchers not always control for age when investigating OGM. 
With respect to NSSI, frequency is known to decline with age (e.g., Zanarini et al., 
2008). Our findings also suggest that older respondents would engage in fewer 
different NSSI methods than younger ones. A first possibility is that our findings reflect 
the general tendency to become more overgeneral when growing older. Being less 
specific, older respondents may differentiate less between different NSSI methods. 
Second, older patients may become less accurate in remembering the different 
methods they have been engaged in in the past. Indeed, as Startup et al. (2001) noted, 
measuring NSSI in retrospect may confound accuracy. Third, we may have 
coincidentally selected younger participants who on average used more methods than 
the older respondents we included (selection bias). Or, fourth, given the association 
between NSSI diversity and suicide (see our Introduction), and the high rates of suicide 
in BPD patients (up to 10%; APA, 2001), a natural selection bias may have occurred, 
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leaving only older participants with less variety in NSSI. Finally, it is possible that 
younger patients nowadays indeed use more NSSI methods compared to the older 
participants of our sample when they had the same age (cohort effect). Future 
longitudinal and prospective studies are recommended to clarify the negative 
association between age and NSSI diversity. 
Interestingly, the association found between NSSI diversity and OGM disappeared when 
controlling for age, suggesting that age accounts for the association between lifetime 
NSSI diversity and OGM. One possible and fairly straightforward explanation for the 
observed correlation between NSSI diversity and OGM is that we have to do with a 
spurious correlation, caused by or resulting from the effect of a third variable, in this 
case age. However, the relation of both NSSI diversity and OGM with age could also 
indicate that affect-regulation skills in BPD patients change as these patients grow 
older, perhaps under the influence of therapy, or that they experience less pain in later 
stages of their lifes (see also, Zanarini et al., 2008). Indeed, given that a disturbed 
affect-regulation is a central feature of BPD, long-term follow-up studies suggest that 
up to 75% of BPD patients lose the BPD diagnosis after 15 years (Paris, Brown, & 
Nowlis, 1987). Referring to the affective gating hypothesis again, these findings suggest 
that BPD patients in the longer run will succeed in installing an affective gateway. We 
hypothesise that, given that ageing is naturally associated with more OGM, OGM will 
help to fulfil this process. 
Our findings are not without limitations. First, by using the SIQ-TR, we only assessed a 
limited number of different NSSI methods, albeit the most common ones. Second, as 
mentioned already, NSSI was measured in retrospect, and therefore potentially not 
accurately. These shortcomings may be remediated in future studies by asking 
participants on a day-to-day basis during a consistent period of time to assess (and 
characterise) all NSSI methods they engage in. Given that we are the first to find an 
association between NSSI diversity and OGM in BPD patients, our findings need to be 
replicated, and future studies should challenge the proposed model, address the open 
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ends suggested above, and take age into account. However, these results, together 
with the previous findings on NSSI diversity, may be indicative of the potential 
importance of NSSI diversity in theorising and treatment. 
Notwithstanding the listed limitations, this study was the first to demonstrate an 
association between NSSI diversity and OGM in BPD patients, suggesting that, given the 
high prevalence of NSSI in BPD patients, BPD patients use NSSI (behaviour) over OGM 
(cognition) as an affect-regulation strategy. Important to note, however, is that the 
relation disappeared when we controlled for age. As mentioned, this could simply mean 
that the relation that we observed between NSSI diversity and OGM is a spurious 
finding, caused by the variable age. Alternatively, results may suggest that BPD patients 
achieve other, more adaptive affect-regulation strategies when they get older, or that 
the adoption of NSSI as an affect-regulation strategy has changed over cohorts. 
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DISCUSSION OUTLINE 
In this chapter, we will first give an overview of our findings with respect to each of the 
research aims we have outlined in the Introduction. While considering the strengths 
and limitations of our studies, we will interpret our findings against the background of 
previous studies. Subsequently, we will discuss the theoretical implications of our 
outcomes. Finally, we will discuss clinical implications and suggest directions for future 
research. 
 
RESEARCH AIM 1: ENLIGHTENING THE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN OGM 
AND (MDD/PTSD IN) BPD 
OGM in BPD is only inconsistently found (Chapter 2). Therefore, this thesis primarily 
aimed to get more insight into the associations between OGM and (co-morbid MDD 
and PTSD in) BPD. More specifically, we examined the following hypotheses 
(formulated in the Introduction, p. 13-14): 
 OGM in BPD is associated with a co-morbid depressed state and/or depression 
symptom severity (Hypothesis 226); 
 OGM in BPD is associated with PTSD and/or trauma symptom severity 
(Hypothesis 3); 
 OGM in BPD is associated with phenotypical BPD features (Hypothesis 4); 
 OGM in BPD is related to a less favourable outcome on BPD symptoms, 
depressive symptoms and/or trauma symptoms (Hypothesis 5); 
                                                     
 
26  Hypothesis 1 (‘Autobiographical memory disturbances depend on the AMT cues used’) fits 
our third research aim (‘to further investigate the association between self-discrepancy and 
memory specificity, and to explore the association between self-discrepancy and vantage 
point during recall’). See p. 209 for the discussion of this research aim. 
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 Previously found associations between OGM and other variables in depressed 
and traumatised patients (e.g., rumination, avoidance, …), and BPD patients 
(e.g., age, education, …) are replicated in our studies (Hypothesis 6). 
We will now address our findings with respect to each of these hypotheses. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
OGM in BPD is associated with a co-morbid depressed state and/or depression 
symptom severity (Hypothesis 2) 
In general, OGM has been found to be associated with depressed state, rather than 
with depression severity (Williams et al., 2007). In both our BPD samples, we found no 
effect of depressed state on memory specificity (Chapter 3 and 4). In general our 
findings are in line with what was found by Maurex et al. (2010), Reid and Startup 
(2010), and Renneberg, Theobald, Nobs and Weisbrod (2005). However, they contradict 
the results of Kremers, Spinhoven, and van der Does (2004), who found that only 
currently depressed (BPD) patients were less specific than controls. Correspondingly, 
the regression analysis conducted by Arntz, Meeren, and Wessel (2002) suggests that 
MDD is more important than BPD in predicting OGM. 
Depression severity was mostly found to be unrelated to OGM in BPD patients (Jones et 
al., 1999; Kremers et al., 2004; Kremers, Spinhoven, van der Does, & van Dyck, 2006; 
Maurex et al., 2010; Renneberg et al., 2005). Likewise, for our large clinical sample, no 
association was found between depression severity and the number of specific, r = -.14, 
nor categoric memories, r = .09, both ps > .3227. Our smaller clinical sample (Chapter 3), 
however, revealed a high and negative association between the scores on the Beck 
                                                     
 
27  The correlations reported in Chapter 6, Table 16 (p. 147) were only computed on the 
respondents included in the regression analyses. 
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Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; van der Does, 2002) and the proportion of specific, but 
not categoric memories. Furthermore, we found that the number (but not proportion) 
of specific memories predicted depression severity, but not depressed state at follow-
up (Chapter 6). Yet, this contradicts the findings of Kremers et al. (2006). These authors, 
however, used a different AMT, that may have resulted in smaller proportions of 
specific memories (Griffith et al., 2012). Furthermore, time between T1 and T2 was 
longer (15 months), perhaps decreasing the predictive power of OGM (Sumner, Griffith, 
& Mineka, 2010). 
Taken together, although depression severity is mostly found to be unrelated to OGM 
in BPD patients, our findings suggest that OGM is predictive for future depression 
severity. Furthermore, most findings now suggest that depressed state is not associated 
with higher levels of OGM in BPD patients. 
 
OGM in BPD is associated with PTSD and/or of trauma symptom severity (Hypothesis 3) 
In general, OGM has been found to be associated with the presence of trauma 
symptoms, rather than with trauma exposure per se (Moore & Zoellner, 2007). In BPD 
patients, no association between co-morbid PTSD and OGM has been found (Kremers 
et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005). We also found that OGM in BPD patients is not 
related to a co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD (Chapter 4). In addition, matching the findings 
of Kremers et al. (2004), both the frequency of trauma-related intrusions and avoidance 
of memories or reminders of the traumatic events (both measured with the Impact of 
Event Scale, IES; Brom, Kleber, & Defares, 1986 – see also Table 25, p. 192) were not 
related to memory specificity when measured cross-sectionally. Thus, in contrast to 
non-BPD patients, these findings robustly show that OGM in BPD patients is unrelated 
to cross-sectionally measured PTSD (symptoms). However, we found that OGM 
predicted higher frequencies of trauma-related intrusions at six-month follow-up 
(Chapter 6). 
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OGM in BPD is associated with phenotypical BPD features (Hypothesis 4) 
To our knowledge, none of the studies focusing on OGM in BPD reported on specific 
associations between BPD symptoms (or symptom clusters) and OGM. Yet, given the 
heterogeneity of the BPD diagnosis, these relations may be good candidates explaining 
the inconsistent findings with respect to OGM in BPD. We investigated this question in 
our large clinical BPD sample28. When age was co-varied, we found that the presence or 
absence of a criterion was never related to OGM. 
We then examined the association between OGM and BPD symptom severity, reflected 
in the BPD trait score that was derived from the ADP-IV (Assessment of DSM-IV 
Personality Disorders, ADP-IV; Schotte, De Doncker, & Courjaret, 2007). Each of the 94 
ADP-IV statements represents a personality disorder criterion, and respondents are 
asked to indicate to what extent they agree with each of the statements, ranging from 
1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Higher scores indicate higher levels of symptom 
severity. The total BPD trait score is the average of the 10 BPD-relevant items. This 
score was found to be unrelated to memory specificity when age was controlled for. 
Finally, based on the work of Sanislow et al. (2002), we used the ADP-IV items to create 
severity scores for each of the factors that underlie a BPD diagnosis (disturbed 
relatedness, affective and behavioural dysregulation). None of these dimensions was 
significantly associated with the measures of memory specificity. Thus, our findings 
suggest that neither the presence of specific BPD symptoms nor BPD symptom severity 
is associated with OGM. 
                                                     
 
28  Analyses on the association between BPD symptom (severity) and the autobiographical 
memory disturbances of interest (see also pp. 203-204) have not been reported in any of the 
previous chapters. 
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Solely based on our own work, it is impossible to conclude on the association between 
OGM and a diagnosis of BPD, because we never included control groups in our studies. 
Reviewing the literature, we compiled Table 24, which lists information about the 
proportions29 of specific and categoric memories retrieved by BPD patients, depressed 
and traumatised patients, and non-clinical controls. The proportion of specific and 
categoric memories largely vary across study, probably because of the use of different 
AMTs (Griffith et al., 2012) in samples differing with respect to many sample 
characteristics (in-/outpatients, gender, age, depressive episodes in the past, …). Yet, 
although this variation may compromise comparability, these data suggest that BPD 
                                                     
 
29  As reported in Chapter 2, memory specificity is not always reported in terms of the 
proportion of specific and/or categoric memories. Yet, the papers included in Table 24 all 
provide all information necessary to compute these figures. 
Table 24 Variance in memory specificity in different samples 
 %S %GC Based on 
Borderline 
patients 
.59 - .77 .13 - .22 Kremers et al. (2004); Maurex et al. (2010); Reid & 
Startup (2010); Renneberg et al. (2005); Van den 
Broeck, Claes, Pieters, & Raes (2012 – Chapter 3) 
Depressed / 
traumatised 
patients 
.54 - .76 .11 - .40 Andersson, Hesser, Cima, & Weise (2013); Belcher & 
Kangas (2014); Graham, Herlihy, & Brewin (2014)*; 
Hermans et al. (2008); Kleim & Ehlers (2008); 
McBride, Segal, Kennedy, & Gemar (2007); 
Sutherland & Bryant (2007)*; Watkins & Teasdale 
(2004); Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams (2000) 
Non-clinical 
controls 
.54 - .93 .06 - .12 Andersson et al. (2013); Belcher & Kangas (2014); 
Kremers et al. (2004); Maurex et al. (2010); Reid & 
Startup (2010); Renneberg et al. (2005) 
%S = proportion of specific memories retrieved at the AMT; %GC = proportion of categoric 
memories retrieved at the AMT.  
* refers to studies in patients with PTSD. 
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patients retrieve slightly more categoric memories than non-clinical controls. Compared 
to clinical controls, BPD patients’ retrieval of categoric memories is situated in the 
lower end of the range. With respect to the proportion of specific memories, no 
important differences are found between groups. Indeed, like Reid (2008), we conclude 
that BPD patients do not display overgeneral memory to the extent observed in 
depressed and traumatised patients. Further studies, however, are necessary, 
comparing BPD patients, other clinical and non-clinical controls in one and the same 
study. 
 
In our large BPD sample, we found that %S = .86, and %GC = .06. These proportions 
strongly differ from what is generally found in BPD patients (see Table 24). Rather, they 
match what is found in non-clinical controls. One possible explanation is that we 
allowed participants to search for memories for 60s, giving them more time to come up 
with specific memories than, for instance, Maurex et al. (2010; 30s) whose study is 
most comparable to ours with respect to sample size and AMT format (adjectives, only 
verbally presented). In addition, given that the experimenter was not blind for the 
purposes of the study, demand characteristics may have influenced the results. 
 
OGM in BPD is related to a less favourable outcome on BPD symptoms, depressive 
symptoms, and/or trauma symptoms (Hypothesis 5) 
As mentioned above and reported in Chapter 6, we found that memory specificity 
predicts the frequency of trauma-related intrusions at six-month follow-up, and to a 
lesser extent, future depression severity. OGM was not predictive for future depressed 
or traumatic state. With respect to BPD, we found no associations between measures 
of memory specificity at T1 and diagnostic state/symptom severity at T2. We already 
hypothesised that it is useful for BPD patients to learn how to get more specific while 
retrieving memories, given that our findings suggest that OGM in BPD may be clinically 
relevant in order to mitigate the course of depression and/or PTSD. 
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Previously found associations between OGM and other variables (socio-demographics 
and process variables) are replicated in our studies (Hypothesis 6) 
To better understand OGM, researchers have investigated its associations with both 
socio-demographic and process variables, both in BPD and in non-BPD participants. We 
investigated whether these associations could be replicated in our clinical BPD samples. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, OGM in BPD has not been found to be associated with gender 
(Arntz et al., 2002; Kremers et al., 2004) or marital status (Arntz et al., 2002). Age was 
sometimes found to be negatively correlated with memory specificity (Artnz et al., 
2002; Maurex et al., 2010; and Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, Schene, & Williams, 
2007, when cue discrepancy was taken into account), but not always (Kremers et al., 
2004; Renneberg et al., 2005). Education (in terms of years or level of education) was 
found to correlate positively with memory specificity (Arntz et al., 2002; Maurex et al., 
2010), or negatively with OGM (Spinhoven et al., 2007). In our large clinical BPD sample 
we found that memory specificity was not related with gender, marital status, or 
education (in terms of years and level of education). However, we found that both the 
number of specific and categoric memories were significantly associated with age (see 
also Chapters 4 and 7). The older the patients were, the less specific and the more 
categoric memories they retrieved. We already stressed the importance of this 
association in Chapter 7. Finally, as suggested in Chapter 2, we examined whether or 
not OGM was affected by the patient’s medication use. We found that the use 
antipsychotics, antidepressants, nor benzodiazepines was related to OGM. 
Furthermore, OGM in BPD has also been studied in relation to other (process) variables 
that have been found to be associated with OGM in depressed and traumatised 
samples (e.g., rumination, avoidance measures, executive functioning). As is shown in 
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Table 25 Correlations between measures of memory specificity and variables 
operationalising potentially underlying processes (CaR-FA-X), and dissociation 
in 54 BPD patients, partialled out for age 
 S GC 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS)   
 Total score -.09 .03 
 Brooding .03 -.19 
 Reflection -.22 .25 
Impact of Event Scale (IES)   
 Total score -.09 .06 
 Intrusions -.06 .06 
 Avoidance -.10 .04 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI)* .01 -.01 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II)* .06 -.03 
Letter-Number Sequencing subtest of 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III 
(WAIS III-LNS; estimation of executive capacity)* 
.13 .04 
Dissociation Questionnaire (DIS-Q)*   
 Total score -.14 .18 
 Identity confusion -.17 .14 
 Loss of control -.06 .11 
 Amnesia -.17 .26 
 Absorption .09 -.02 
S = number of specific memories; GC = number of categoric memories. 
AAQ-II (ACTIntervisie groep, 2006);  DIS-Q (Vanderlinden, van Dyck, Vertommen, 
Vandereycken, & Verkes, 1993); IES (Brom et al., 1986); RRS (Raes & Hermans, 2007); 
WAIS III (Wechsler, 2000); WBSI (Muris, Merckelbach, & Horselenberg, 1996). 
* See Appendix B, p. 236, for a description of these measures. 
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Table 2530, we found no associations between memory specificity and measures of 
rumination, experiential avoidance/acceptance, and an estimation of executive 
functioning, all partialled out for age and computed in our large clinical BPD sample. 
Also, we found no associations between memory specificity and avoidance of trauma-
related memories or reminders (IES; discussed above in this chapter and in Chapter 6). 
We did not replicate the findings of Maurex et al. (2010), who found a positive 
correlation between memory specificity and executive functioning in BPD patients. 
Also, in our smaller clinical sample (Chapter 3), we found that memory specificity 
correlated with rumination. However, this association disappeared when we controlled 
for depression severity. 
Finally, OGM in BPD has been studied in relation to several borderline-related 
symptoms that have been thought to have affect-regulating functions (e.g., 
dissociation, parasuicidal acts). We found no association between measures of memory 
specificity and dissociation (Table 25). However, as reported in Chapter 7, we found 
that NSSI diversity, but not presence, was negatively associated with reduced memory 
specificity – but this correlation disappeared when we controlled for age. 
In sum, because we found no associations between the CaR-FA-X process variables and 
measures of memory specificity, our data seem to question the applicability of the CaR-
FA-X model to BPD patients. This supports the conclusions we draw in Chapter 2 
following a review of the literature on OGM in BPD. Furthermore, age seems important. 
It has repeatedly been shown now that OGM is more likely in older (BPD) patients. 
Finally, we found an interesting association between NSSI diversity and OGM (that 
should be replicated in order to exclude it is a spurious association). 
 
                                                     
 
30  These correlations have not been reported yet in any of the previous chapters. 
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Taken together, we conclude that a co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD in BPD patients is 
robustly shown to be unrelated to OGM. Furthermore, the majority of findings now 
suggests that MDD in BPD is also unrelated to OGM. Yet, memory specificity was found 
to predict future depression severity and – more robustly – the frequency of trauma-
related intrusions. OGM has not been found to be associated with the presence of BPD 
criteria, nor with BPD symptom (cluster) severity. And finally, associations between the 
CaR-FA-X process variables and OGM in BPD patients are few and inconsistent. 
To explain the inconsistent associations between OGM and MDD in BPD patients, 
several accounts may be put forward. Perhaps OGM in these patients fluctuates with 
the affective state they are in. Future studies may therefore include measures of affect 
before (and perhaps also after) AMT administration. Or, as argued in Chapter 3, maybe 
depression in BPD patients differs in nature from depression in MDD. For instance, if 
depression in BPD results from affective instability, resources may be intact, making 
OGM less likely. The current instruments to assess depressed state may insufficiently 
distinguish between these types of depression. 
Furthermore, the predictive value of OGM for future complaints in BPD patients would 
fit the idea of OGM as a vulnerability factor in BPD as well. Yet, these findings need 
replication and further investigation. 
OGM has often been considered as an affect-regulation strategy (e.g., Chapter 7). All 
findings on OGM in BPD patients combined, seem to suggest that BPD patients 
generally do not use OGM as a steady affect-regulation (coping) strategy as described in 
the CaR-FA-X model. We have argued that BPD patients may disregard self-stabilising 
processes, leaving them with enough resources to come up with specific memories 
(Chapter 4), or that they opt for other strategies to regulate their affect (e.g., vantage 
perspective, Chapter 4, or NSSI diversity, Chapter 7). Moreover, findings rather suggest 
that the CaR-FA-X model seems generally less well applicable for explaining OGM in 
BPD. Yet, BPD patients ruminate (even more than depressed patients; Abela, Payne, & 
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Moussaly, 2003), but it seems that they do not get captured in ruminative processes to 
the same extent as depressed patients do. Also, with respect to functional avoidance 
(FA), it is unclear whether BPD patients, who are characterised by an unstable sense of 
self and get easily overwhelmed by intense emotions, use OGM at all as a strategy to 
preserve self-coherence. At least, findings suggest OGM does not generalise towards 
other memories in BPD patients as it does in depressed patients. Why do BPD patients, 
who are good candidates for showing (more) OGM given the history of depressive 
episodes and trauma they often have, show this pattern of results? Differences 
between depressed and BPD patients, particularly due to the nature of BPD, may 
influence information processing, and are therefore interesting variables to consider 
when attempting to explain these findings. We will now turn to some theoretical 
considerations on the potential role of executive functioning, and differences in affect-
regulation and identity in explaining this pattern of findings. 
 
The potential role of executive functioning 
According to Reid and Startup (2010), education could be considered as a rough 
estimate of executive functioning. Higher levels of education have repeatedly been 
shown to be associated with the retrieval of more specific (Arntz et al., 2002; Maurex et 
al., 2010; Reid & Startup, 2010), or less categoric memories (Spinhoven et al., 2007, 
study 2) in BPD patients – but we did not replicate these findings in our large clinical 
BPD sample. Yet, to our knowledge, only Maurex et al. (2010) properly investigated the 
association between executive functioning and OGM in BPD patients. They 
administered the Block Span Backward test. In this task, the examiner pointed to 
consecutively longer series of blocks, seemingly randomly organised at a white board. 
Respondents had to point to the blocks in the reversed order. Better outcome this task 
was associated with the retrieval of more specific memories in BPD patients. 
Unfortunately, we neglected to include a visual working memory task. We did, 
however, administered a verbal working memory task, the Letter-Number Sequencing 
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(LNS) Subtest of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 2000 – see Appendix B, p. 236, for more 
information on this task). Performances on this task were not associated with measures 
of memory specificity. This matches the findings of Maurex et al. (2010), who also 
administered the Digit Span Task of the WAIS-revised (Wechsler, 1981), another verbal 
working memory task that strongly resembles the LNS. 
Thus, given that the role of executive functioning is only limitedly studied in relation to 
OGM in BPD, and given that executive resources in BPD patients are depleted (e.g., 
Maurex, 2009), perhaps the limitedly increased proportion of categoric memories in 
BPD patients could be explained by the association between OGM and (visuospatial) 
executive functioning. This, however, does not explain why OGM in BPD patients is 
rather unrelated to rumination and avoidance measures. 
 
The potential role of differences in affect-regulation 
In Chapter 2, we already briefly discussed emotional dysregulation in this regard, one of 
the core factors underlying BPD. In line with Linehan (1993), we suggested that BPD 
patients may lack the cognitive mechanisms (as OGM) to alter the psychological 
distance towards emotional memories. Also, Williams (Chapter 7) argues that affective 
gating in BPD patients fails due to their hypersensitivity, but no further explanation is 
provided by which we could comprehend the absence of the CaR (Capture and 
Rumination) account in BPD patients. In their Emotional Cascade Model (ECM), Selby 
and Joiner (2009) expand on rumination as a potential factor underlying emotional 
dysregulation in BPD patients. They argue that, although rumination in general has 
been shown to magnify negative affect as well as to increase its duration, the intensity 
of the affect it evokes is larger in BPD patients than in MDD patients. In addition, it is 
assumed that emotional intensity will build up, as long as rumination proceeds. 
According to associative network models of information processing (e.g., Bower, 1981), 
the intensity of one’s emotions may add to successful retrieval of mood-congruent 
memories. Somewhat consistent with this idea, Talarico, LaBar, and Rubin (2004) found 
Chapter 8 
 
- 197 - 
 
that emotional intensity ratings of AMT cues significantly predicted memory specificity 
in undergraduate students. The ECM further states that normally effective strategies 
(cognitive reappraisal, distraction) may not be distractive enough for BPD patients to 
dampen their affect. Instead, they are likely to turn to physical sensations, such as NSSI 
of substance use. These strategies interfere with the ruminative processes, and halt 
“the build-up and intensity of negative emotions, allowing these emotions to subside 
because attention is no longer on emotions” (Selby & Joiner, 2009, p. 221). This line of 
reasoning would relate to inhibitory dysfunction (Domes et al., 2006), or heightened 
levels of impulsivity in BPD patients (e.g., Claes, Vertommen, Smits, & Bijttebier, 2009). 
 
The potential role identity disturbance 
Taking a closer look at the components of the CaR-FA-X model, we notice that both the 
CaR and the FA component are bound to one’s self-concept. With respect to CaR, 
rumination has been conceptualised as a strategy to cope with self-discrepant 
information (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1989, Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008). The FA component describes how processes aimed to maintain or stabilise one’s 
current self (self-coherence) become active when self-discrepant information threatens 
to become activated. Thus, in order for these processes to negatively influence memory 
specificity, the model assumes the presence of a rather stable, well-defined, and 
elaborated self-concept, when confronted with highly self-discrepant information. 
The self-concept of BPD patients has been described as unstable (e.g., Coolidge, Thede, 
& Jang, 2001; Jørgensen, 2009), disorganised (e.g., Bateman & Fonagy, 2006), 
discontinuous (e.g., Fuchs, 2007), fragmented (e.g., Fuchs, 2007; Livesely, 1998), not 
fully integrated (e.g., Fuchs, 2007), incoherent (e.g., Fuchs, 2007; Wilkinson-Ryan, & 
Westen, 2000), incongruous (Parker, Boldero, & Bell, 2006), and inconsistent (e.g., 
Livesely, 1998; Wilkinson-Ryan & Westen, 2000). It has been argued that BPD patients 
lack self-clarity (Bloch & Singh, 1994; Livesely, 1998), self-certainty (Livesely, 1998), self-
complexity (i.e., BPD patients have few and poorly elaborated higher-order self-
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schemas; Gardner, 1997; Parker et al., 2006), and concrete self-boundaries (Livesely, 
1998). Finally, these characteristics of the self may compromise the formation of one’s 
autonoetic awareness (i.e., experiencing one’s identity as constant over time and across 
situations; Fuchs, 2007), one’s goals (Bloch & Singh, 1994; Fuchs, 2007), one’s self-
directedness (e.g., Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993), and one’s sense of agency and 
autonomy (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Fuchs, 2007; Livesely, 1998). Despite the diverse 
terminology that has been used to describe the BPD self-concept, it is clear that there is 
a consensus in the literature that the self-concept of BPD patients fundamentally differs 
from that of, e.g., depressed and traumatised patients without BPD. We speculate that 
(some of) these differences might contribute to the observation regarding OGM in BPD 
patients. 
Although problems regarding the self-concept reported by BPD patients are situated at 
the content level (e.g., dysfunctional schemas, Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003), as 
well as at the functional level (e.g., NSSI as an affect-regulating strategy), the 
terminology used to distinguish the BPD self-concept from a non-BPD self-concept 
suggests that BPD patients primarily have problems regarding structural aspects of the 
self-concept (Livesley, 1998). The structural development of one’s self-concept, 
however, starts at the content level, with experiences, and in constant interaction with 
one’s environment and significant others (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007; Beck, 1967; 
Conway et al., 2004; Linehan, 1993; Young, 1990; Young et al., 2003). Very young 
children coincide with their environment, but they gradually learn to categorise their 
experiences, and to integrate (‘structure’) all self-knowledge into one’s self-concept 
(‘content’; Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976), at least when their experiences and 
interactions demonstrate consistencies in one’s behaviour, attitudes or thoughts 
(Conway et al., 2004). At an early age, these processes need to be supported by 
significant others. These significant others should mirror (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006) and 
validate (Kellogg & Young, 2006; Linehan, 1993) the infants’ internal states, in order to 
facilitate the development of experiential representations that will contribute to the 
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development of the infant’s self-concept, both in content and in form. Attachment 
figures who are unable to properly mirror the infant’s internal states (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2006), or unpredictable (violent) environmental circumstances during 
childhood (Linehan, 1993; Young et al., 2003), perhaps in combination with a biological 
vulnerability for emotional dysregulation (Linehan, 1993), hinder the processes 
necessary to develop steady self-schemas (e.g., clustering/categorising self-relevant 
information). More specifically, BPD patients are thought to essentially have problems 
“to create, maintain and use benign and integrated internal images of self and others” 
(Bender & Skodol, 2007, p. 501 – see also Judd & Ruff, 1993, for psychometric support 
for the idea that BPD patients have difficulties integrating information). 
In terms of Conway et al. (2004), we reason that BPD patients may be able to cluster 
their episodic information in the layers of the autobiographical knowledge base, but 
they fail – because they have not acquired the skills? – to crystallise (‘integrate’) these 
pieces of information into a distinct self-concept, unifying both positive and negative 
aspects, sometimes hiding one for another. As a result, we hypothesise that they have a 
fragmented self-concept, consisting of different, mostly poorly elaborated ‘current’ 
self-concepts, that are activated in turn, dependent on the context one is in, or the 
people one is with (see also, e.g., Materson & Klein, 1989; Kernberg et al., 1989). 
Therefore, the BPD self is experienced as unstable, incoherent, and discontinuous, and 
BPD patients are considered as impulsive and affective instable. Switching self-
concepts, though, may be considered a strategy to preserve the present fragile 
structure, because it potentially is an adaptive response to self-discrepant experiences. 
In the context of interpersonal relationships, Fuchs (2007, p. 379) puts it like this: “The 
temporal fragmentation of the self avoids the necessity of tolerating the threatening 
ambiguity and uncertainty of interpersonal relationships.” With poorly elaborated 
schemas and little self-coherence to preserve, we could expect the influence of the CaR 
and the FA component of the CaR-FA-X model to be limited. We further speculate that 
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dealing with diverse self-concepts may absorb important amounts of resources, having 
an impact on guided search processes. 
Although switching self-concepts can modulate emotional input into the system, 
Putnam and Silk (2005, p. 905) argue that “[cognitive change and attentional 
deployment] also occur simultaneously with or after the presentation of an affective 
[self-discrepant] stimulus”. When severely distressed, the violence of the evoked 
emotions may not be comprehended by the poorly elaborated activated self-concept. 
Behavioural strategies then, like, for example, non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), are used to 
‘reset’ one’s affective state (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Linehan, 1993). Indeed, NSSI 
diversity was found to be negatively associated with OGM. 
However, both NSSI diversity and OGM were associated with age, and when we 
controlled for age, their association disappeared. We therefore hypothesise that BPD 
patients make progress, and their self-concept may get more integrated and/or their 
emotional intensity decreases or they learn how to deal with it better, as they grow 
older. This would also match the findings that BPD patients may succeed in overcoming 
the diagnosis (Zanarini et al., 2008). Alternatively, older BPD patients may show higher 
levels of OGM because experiences are more rehearsed. 
Although these considerations are highly speculative, we believe that research on 
autobiographical memory, which is assumed to be strongly associated with one’s self-
concept, would benefit from the inclusion of measures of emotional dysregulation, self-
structure, and/or the ability to integrate information (see also: Directions for future 
research). 
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RESEARCH AIM 2: BROADENING THE KNOWLEDGE ON VANTAGE 
PERSPECTIVE DURING RECALL (IN BPD) 
With respect to the point of view one adopts (vantage perspective) during 
autobiographical recall, an overarching theoretical framework explaining its functions 
and mechanisms is not currently available. However, parallels with OGM seem obvious. 
Furthermore, to our knowledge, vantage perspective during recall has never been 
investigated in BPD patients. Therefore, the second aim of this thesis was to shed a light 
on the occurrence and relations of vantage perspective in BPD patients. In analogy with 
OGM, we now investigated the following hypotheses: 
 As in non-BPD participants, vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated 
with a co-morbid depressed state and/or depression severity (Hypothesis 2); 
 As in non-BPD participants, vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated 
with PTSD and/or trauma symptom severity (Hypothesis 3); 
We further explored the following statements: 
 Vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated with phenotypical BPD 
features (Hypothesis 4 - exploratory); 
 Vantage perspective during recall in BPD is related to a less favourable outcome 
on BPD symptoms, depressive symptoms and/or trauma symptoms (Hypothesis 
5 - exploratory); 
 Vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated with socio-demographic 
and process variables (Hypothesis 6 - exploratory). 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
As in non-BPD participants, vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated with a 
co-morbid depressed state and/or depression symptom severity (Hypothesis 2) 
Non-BPD depressed participants show higher proportions of observer memories 
(Bergouignan et al., 2008; Lemogne et al., 2006). We hypothesised more observer 
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memories in (remitted) depressed BPD patients as well. Our data, however, refuted this 
hypothesis (Chapter 4). Also, depression severity (BDI-II; van der Does, 2002) is found to 
be unrelated to the proportion of observer memories retrieved in our large clinical BPD 
sample, r = -.20, p = .247. This is in line with the findings of Kenny and Bryant (2007) in 
trauma-exposed individuals, but contradicts the results from Lemogne et al. (2009) and 
Kuyken and Moulds (2009) in healthy and remitted depressed respondents, 
respectively. Finally, also contradicting the findings of Kuyken and Moulds (2009), we 
found that the proportion of observer memories was not predictive for future 
depression symptom severity in our large clinical sample. 
 
As in non-BPD participants, vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated with 
PTSD and/or trauma symptom severity (Hypothesis 3) 
In our large clinical BPD sample, we found that (a) relatively few traumatic memories 
were retrieved in response to AMT cues; and (b) that most of these memories were 
retrieved while adopting an observer perspective (Chapter 4). The latter finding is in 
line with what has been found in non-BPD participants (e.g., Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 
2003). Moreover, we have shown that BPD patients with PTSD more often adopt an 
observer perspective during recall than BPD patients without PTSD, also for non-
traumatic memories. These findings, however, should be interpreted with caution (see 
p. 106 for critical remarks given the Type I errors that may occur due to multiple 
analyses). 
Whereas in non-BPD participants (levels of) observer memories were mostly found to 
correspond with more trauma-related avoidance behaviour (Berntsen et al., 2003; 
Kenny & Bryant, 2007; Porter & Birt, 2001), McIsaac and Eich (2004) failed to replicate 
these findings. Sometimes, avoidance measured with the IES (Brom et al., 1986) 
predicted only the number of negative field memories (Lemogne et al., 2009), or was 
only associated with more observer memories in the most depressed subsample 
(Williams & Moulds, 2007). In the total sample of BPD patients of our large clinical 
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study, we found that none of the IES scales was associated with vantage perspective 
(see also Table 26, p. 205). Yet, exploring these associations in the PTSD subsample (n = 
10) of our large clinical BPD trial, we found that higher proportions of observer 
memories were associated with less avoidance, r = -.66, p < .03531,32. This contradicts 
most of the findings in non-BPD participants. Finally, contradicting the findings of Kenny 
et al. (2009), we found that the proportion of observer memories retrieved at baseline 
was not associated with neither a diagnosis of PTSD (SCID-I; van Groenestijn, Akkerhuis, 
Kupka, Schneider, & Nolen, 1999) nor trauma symptom severity (IES) at follow-up.  
Thus, a co-morbid diagnosis of PTSD is associated with higher levels of observer 
memories in BPD patients, also when recalling non-traumatic memories. Furthermore, 
and although replication in larger samples is necessary, our findings suggest that the 
retrieval of observer memories in BPD patients with PTSD corresponds with less 
avoidance towards trauma-related thoughts and stimuli. 
 
Vantage perspective during recall in BPD is associated with phenotypical BPD features 
(Hypothesis 4 - exploratory) 
We explored whether vantage perspective during recall was associated with specific 
BPD criteria (SCID-I; van Groenestijn et al., 1999), and with the total BPD trait score, and 
the symptom severity scores on each BPD factor, derived from the ADP-IV (Schotte et 
al., 2007). These analyses revealed no significant associations. 
As outlined in Chapter 4 (p. 102), the proportion of observer memories in our large 
clinical BPD sample is relatively high compared to what has been found in trauma 
                                                     
 
31  These findings have not been reported in any of the previous chapters. 
32  Nonetheless, we found that patients with PTSD scored significantly higher on all IES 
dimensions than the non-PTSD patients. 
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survivors (Kenny & Bryant, 2007), recurrent depressed adults (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), 
and adolescents with and without MDD and/or PTSD (Kuyken & Howell, 2006). Despite 
the absence of a non-BPD control group, these findings may suggest that BPD patients 
in general more often adopt an observer perspective compared to other clinical (Kenny 
& Bryant, 2007; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009) and non-clinical control groups (Kuyken & 
Howell, 2006), independent of BPD symptom severity. Replication, however, in a design 
with both BPD and non-BPD participants, is necessary because, to our knowledge, we 
are the first to explore perspective taking during recall in BPD patients. 
 
Vantage perspective during recall in BPD is related to a less favourable outcome on BPD 
symptoms, depressive symptoms and/or trauma symptoms (Hypothesis 5 - exploratory) 
We already mentioned that the correlations between the proportion of observer 
memories at T1 and (the subscales of) the IES (Brom et al., 1986) and the BDI-II (van der 
Does, 2002) at T2 are all non-significant in our large clinical trial. Likewise, we found no 
association between the proportion of observer memories retrieved at baseline and 
BPD symptom severity (ADP-IV; Schotte et al., 2007) at follow-up. Finally, no 
associations were found between the initial proportion of observer memories and 
depressed, trauma, or BPD state at follow-up. However, because we did not measure 
vantage perspective during autobiographical memory retrieval from the beginning, 
these associations were computed over only 21 to 24 respondents. Perhaps our data 
have not enough power to observe the expected effects. 
 
Vantage perspective during recall is associated with socio-demographic and process 
variables (Hypothesis 6 - exploratory) 
Vantage perspective during recall has also been studied in relation to other variables, 
albeit to a lesser extent than OGM. Rice and Rubin (2009) found that women more 
often retrieved observer memories than men, but we were not able to replicate this.  
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Table 26 Correlations between vantage perspective during recall (%O) and 
variables operationalising potentially underlying processes and 
dissociation in 34 BPD patients 
 %O 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS)  
 Total score .11 
 Brooding -.02 
 Reflection .14 
Impact of Event Scale  
 Total score .19 
 Intrusions .21 
 Avoidance .12 
White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI)* .11 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II)* -.09 
Letter-Number Sequencing subtest of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III 
(WAIS III-LNS; estimation of executive capacity)* 
.04 
Dissociation Questionnaire (DIS-Q)*  
 Total score -.23 
 Identity confusion -.12 
 Loss of control -.23 
 Amnesia -.48 
 Absorption .45 
%O = proportion of observer memories 
AAQ-II (ACTIntervisie groep, 2006); DIS-Q (Vanderlinden et al., 1993); IES (Brom 
et al., 1986); RRS (Raes & Hermans, 2007); WAIS III (Wechsler, 2000); WBSI 
(Muris et al., 1996). 
* See Appendix B, p. 236, for a description of these measures. 
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When retrieving traumatic memories, (younger) high school students were found to 
more often adopt an observer perspective than psychology students (Berntsen et al., 
2003). In our non-clinical samples, we found negative associations between the 
proportion of observer memories on the one hand, and educational level, r = -.21 
(Koolen, 2012), and age, r = -.26 (Reza, 2011) on the other hand. Also, according to our 
data, vantage perspective was not affected by the use of psychopharmacological drugs 
(antipsychotics, antidepressants, benzodiazepines). 
Relations with other variables are only limitedly reported. Associations between the 
number of observer memories and performances on rumination questionnaires are 
inconsistent (Williams & Moulds, 2007 vs. Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). No association was 
found with the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Murris et al., 1996 – see 
Appendix B, p. 236, for more information on this questionnaire), a measure of 
experiential avoidance (Williams & Moulds, 2007). Although the vantage perspective of 
trauma-related memories was not associated with the levels of dissociation reported 
(Cooper, Yuille, & Kennedy, 2002), Williams and Moulds (2007) found that the 
proportion of observer memories retrieved by students corresponded with higher 
levels of numbness and detachment. Table 2633 displays the cross-sectional associations 
between the proportion of observer memories and the process variables of interest as 
computed in our large BPD sample. After Bonferroni corrections, no significant 
associations were maintained. 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In sum, depressed state was not found to affect vantage perspective during recall in 
BPD patients. As for OGM, this does not exclude the possibility that vantage perspective 
                                                     
 
33  These correlations have not been reported yet in any of the previous chapters. 
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is affected by the affective state of the participant at the time of testing. In contrast, as 
in non-BPD participants, we found that, although only few traumatic memories were 
retrieved in response to the AMT, most of these memories were retrieved while 
adopting an observer perspective. In addition, we found that BPD patients with PTSD 
more often adopt an observer perspective, also for non-traumatic memories. This may 
suggest that BPD patients with PTSD adopt a (generalised) observer memory retrieval 
style which serves an affect-regulating (coping; functional avoidance) function. 
Holmes and Mathews (2010) suggest that processing a reconstructed imagery memory 
will result in more emotionality than processing a verbal representation, because 
imagery largely overlaps the original event. Thus, in case of traumatic memories, 
avoidance of images is probably more useful than avoiding descriptions, that are 
already less emotional in nature. However, contrary to what could be expected, post-
hoc analyses in the small subsample of BPD patients with PTSD (n = 10) revealed a 
strong but negative association between the proportion of observer memories 
retrieved and IES-Avoidance. Although replication is necessary, one way to interpret 
these findings is to assume that observer memories in BPD patients with PTSD dampen 
the intensity of one’s emotions, making it easier in the short term to talk about the 
traumatic events, or to go to places associated with them. This matches the opinion of 
Kross and co-workers (Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005), who state 
that a distanced perspective that reduces emotional reactivity is beneficial for clinical 
populations to stay in contact with emotionally evocative material (see also Wisco & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). Alternatively, the adoption of an observer memory may be 
merely symptomatic for PTSD (with BPD). 
Yet, in the total sample of our large BPD trial, we found no associations between 
vantage perspective during recall on the one hand, and measures of (experiential) 
avoidance measures (IES, WBSI, AAQ) and dissociation (DIS-Q) on the other hand. 
Therefore, we do not think observer memories in BPD patients in general serve affect-
regulation. Given that the current findings seem to suggest that BPD patients in general 
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retrieve high proportions of observer memories in response to AMT cues compared to 
other samples, and keeping in mind our expansions on the fragmented self-concept of 
BPD patients in the theoretical section on OGM, we could speculate that BPD patients, 
stimulated by the distress caused by one’s affective instability, are motivated to 
develop a unified self-concept. Libby and Eibach (2002) supported the assumption that 
vantage perspective during recall results from an ‘on-line judgement’ of the discrepancy 
between the recalled event and one’s present self-concept (see also Kuyken & Moulds, 
2009). It could be argued that BPD patients use observer memories in order to search 
for similarities between different self-concepts, or in an attempt to enlarge their sense 
of autonoetic awareness. Similar strategies may be hypothesised in adolescents, who 
are in a critical phase to build their self-concept (Kuyken & Howell, 2006). We further 
speculate that BPD patients may lack the abilities to go beyond the first step of 
comparison (by means of an observer perspective) to the second step of successfully 
processing the similarities and differences (by means of a field perspective). Indeed, 
BPD patients have low levels of effortful control, and they are anxious to approach 
novel information (Claes et al., 2009).  
Alternatively, it was hypothesised that the association between memory perspective 
and its impact – whether an observer perspective is beneficial or detrimental – is 
mediated by one’s self-esteem (Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011). Indeed, Libby et 
al. (2011) found that student participants with a low self-esteem spontaneously more 
often adopted an observer perspective while retrieving memories referring to a failure 
experience. In addition, doing this enlarged their negative emotions and the experience 
of shame, which corroborated their current self-esteem. BPD patients are generally 
considered as having a low self-esteem (e.g., Rüsch et al., 2007). 
Future studies are recommended to replicate our findings, and to further disentangle 
the associations between vantage perspective during recall, emotional intensity, other 
process variables, and (the progress of) PTSD (in BPD). Future studies should also 
further investigate the (generalised) occurrence of observer memories in 
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traumatised/BPD patients. Finally, to check whether BPD patients indeed more often 
adopt an observer perspective during recall, future studies should include clinical non-
BPD and non-clinical control groups besides BPD patients. 
 
RESEARCH AIM 3: BROADENING THE KNOWLEDGE ON THE ROLE OF 
SELF-DISCREPANCY IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY RETRIEVAL 
The third and final aim of this thesis was to further investigate the association between 
self-discrepancy and memory specificity, and to explore the association between self-
discrepancy and vantage point during recall. More specifically, we hypothesised that 
the autobiographical memory disturbances of interest (in BPD, but not exclusively) 
would in part depend on the AMT cues used (Hypothesis 1). 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
OGM (in BPD, but not exclusively) depends on the AMT cues used (Hypothesis 1) 
With respect to OGM, it has recently been suggested that the idiosyncratic meaning a 
cue has for a respondent may influence memory specificity (Barnhofer, Crane, 
Spinhoven, & Williams, 2007; Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Spinhoven et al., 
2007). According to the Self-Memory System of Conway and colleagues (SMS; Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004), cues that are high discrepant 
from one’s actual self-concept evoke more overgeneral memories following a shift of 
resources from adaptive correspondence towards self-coherence (‘active attention 
shift’, Barnhofer et al., 2007). This closely relates to the functional avoidance (FA) 
component in the CaR-FA-X model of Williams et al. (2007). Another line of reasoning 
suggests that low self-discrepant cues may elicit higher levels of OGMs as well. More 
specifically, it was suggested that in people with highly endorsed dysfunctional 
schemas, especially cues that closely relate to these schemas would hinder specific 
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memory retrieval. Possibly, these highly self-relevant cues could reactivate the related 
schema, resulting in a drain of processing resources away from the memory search 
process (‘passive attention shift’, Barnhofer et al., 2007; Dalgleish et al., 2003; 
Spinhoven et al., 2007). Also, the reactivation of the schema may induce ruminative 
responses, further processing the events in memory that emphasise discrepancies 
between the current (dysfunctional) self-concept and one’s desired self-concepts (CaR 
in the CaR-FA-X model of Williams et al., 2007; Crane et al., 2007). Because these 
events have been rehearsed many times, an easily accessible generic category of events 
may have been installed, again increasing the likelihood of OGMs (Barnhofer et al., 
2007). Thus, whereas the FA account predicts that especially high self-discrepant 
information (which is, according to the theoretical models, also highly self-relevant) 
would result in OGMs, the CaR account rather suggests that highly self-relevant (and 
even low self-discrepant) cues would elicit more OGMs. 
We investigated the association between (the impact of) cue discrepancy and memory 
specificity by (a) determining the standard AMT’s level of self-discrepancy for each 
respondent (Chapter 3); (b) administering a personalised AMT to each respondent 
besides the standard AMT (Chapter 4); and (c) comparing memory specificity in 
response to low and high discrepant cues of a ‘group-specific’ AMT (e.g., Chapter 5 – 
but the findings we report here, have not been reported in any of the previous 
chapters). The first two methods were applied in clinical BPD samples, whereas the 
‘group-specific’ AMTs were administered in two convenience samples. 
In Chapter 3, we defined an index, expressing the extent to which the standard AMT is 
self-discrepant (and self-relevant, because these concepts are confounded due to the 
method used – see also below). A multiple hierarchical regression analysis showed that 
the interaction between depressed state and the AMT’s level of self-discrepancy was 
the only significant predictor of the proportion of specific memories retrieved in 
response to the AMT cues. More concretely, supporting the FA account, we found that 
this index (and not the one solely expressing self-relevancy) was highly and negatively 
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associated with memory specificity in the depressed BPD patients. A reversed 
(marginally significant) correlation was found in the non-depressed patients, which 
rather supports the CaR account. 
In our large clinical sample (Chapter 4), we operationalised self-discrepancy by means 
of personal AMTs (pAMT), using the ten most self-discrepant self-guides formulated by 
each participant. Unlike what we expected based on the FA account, pAMT 
administration did not result in lower proportions of specific memories. Moreover, 
pAMT administration resulted in significantly less categoric memories, and nearly twice 
as many omissions than standard AMT administration. The latter findings also 
somehow contradict the CaR account, since all cues are highly self-relevant. Holmes 
(personal communication, 19/10/2011) suggested that highly personally tailored 
(p)AMTs could trigger flashback-type involuntary memories, paradoxically resulting in 
higher levels of specific memories. 
In the Reza study (2011, convenience sample, n = 148, with 38 participants with a 
history of depression), we administered an AMT with cues that were rated as high (e.g., 
enjoying, optimistic, active) and low discrepant (e.g., honest, intelligent, neat) for 
depression by clinicians (for details, see Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2012). In line with 
our previous results (Chapter 3) and the findings of Crane et al. (2007) in remitted 
depressed patients, we hypothesised that the participants with a history of depression 
would recall less specific and more categoric memories in response to the cues that 
were rated as high discrepant for depression. However, no differences were found 
between the numbers of specific (categoric) memories evoked by high or low 
discrepant cues. Finally, in the Koolen study (2012, convenience sample, n = 120) the 
AMT we administered consisted of cues that were high (e.g., self-assured, successful, 
relaxed) and low discrepant (e.g., tired, stressed, creative) for BPD patients, rated by 
clinicians (for details, see Koolen, 2012). In line with the CaR account, our findings 
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suggest that especially low discrepant cues are associated with reduced memory 
specificity, irrespective of the number of BPD complaints34 reported. Yet, given that 
only few BPD complaints were reported in this sample (ranging from 0 to 29, while the 
theoretical maximum score of the BSI is 52), it could be questioned to what extent the 
low (BPD-) discrepant cues are really low discrepant for these non-clinical respondents. 
These findings would then be supportive for the FA account. 
Taken together, our attempts to investigate the association between self-discrepancy 
and memory specificity resulted in different findings, perhaps due to the method used 
to cover the concept of self-discrepancy. In Chapter 4, we already questioned the 
validity of the pAMT. The pAMT cues are probably highly personally self-relevant and 
self-discrepant, given that they were all literally formulated and scored on self-
discrepancy by the respondents. However, in contrast to the standard AMT, pAMT cues 
are not matched on other important variables that have been shown to have an impact 
on memory specificity (e.g., imageability, Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999; or familiarity). 
This may contribute to the relatively large proportion of omissions found with the 
pAMT. Alternatively, given that the pAMT was the final test included in the test battery, 
omissions may also have resulted from exhaustion. However, and more problematic, 
(part of the) omissions may also represent non-verbalised OGMs following the explicit 
instruction to retrieve specific memories. In the latter case, the pAMT is invalid for 
examining the association between self-discrepancy and memory specificity. In 
addition, in BPD patients, who are known to commonly suffer from an unstable sense 
of self, a pAMT constructed with self-guides of the Self-Description Questionnaire (SDQ; 
see Chapter 4 for a broader description of this instrument) that was administered three 
weeks before may not represent one’s current discrepant selves anymore. The ‘group-
                                                     
 
34  BPD complaints were measured with the Borderline Syndrome Index (BSI; Vertommen & Van 
de Wygaert, 1988). See Chapter 5, p. 119, for a broader description of this instrument. 
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specific’ AMTs used in the convenience samples then, are properly constructed, 
matching all cues for imageability, familiarity and valence (see Schoofs et al., 2012, and 
Koolen, 2012, respectively). However, they may fail to sufficiently address the 
respondent’s actual personally self-relevant or self-discrepant topics. Therefore, of all 
methods we developed to cover this topic of study, we believe the index method used 
in Chapter 3 is the most reliable. The AMT cues are properly selected, and the index 
expresses to what extent the cues are self-discrepant, thereby addressing the problems 
mentioned of the pAMT and the ‘group-specific’ AMT.  
Furthermore, in retrospect, we think all measures we used to operationalise self-
discrepancy/self-relevance confound both concepts, making it difficult to properly 
investigate the CaR account. Indeed, when respondents are asked to write down 
(discrepant) self-guides in the SDQ, it is very likely that they will mainly come up with 
highly self-relevant self-guides. Cues that are highly self-relevant but low self-discrepant 
will only seldom be derived with this method. One possible, though labour-intensive 
way, to compare the importance of self-discrepancy and self-relevance is to administer 
regular AMTs. In the next step, self-relevance and discrepancy are inventoried 
separately for each cue. In a non-clinical adolescent sample, Schoofs et al. (2012) 
administered a (minimal instructions, i.e., without the explicit instruction to retrieve 
specific memories) AMT consisting of both high and low discrepant cues. Afterwards, 
they inventoried the personal importance (relevance) of the cues. They found that the 
effect of self-discrepancy remained, even when they controlled for the personal 
importance of the cues. However, for now, findings are supportive for the CaR (in 
remitted depressed patients: Barnhofer et al., 2007; Spinhoven et al., 2007, study 1; in 
BPD patients: Spinhoven et al., 2007, study 2), as well as for the FA account (in non-
clinical adolescents: Schoofs et al., 2012; in remitted depressed patients: Crane et al., 
2007; in depressed BPD patients: Van den Broeck et al., 2012 – Chapter 3). Indeed, 
taking into account all the above associations, we believe we have found partial 
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support for the FA hypothesis in currently depressed BPD patients. Future studies may 
relate this association to avoidance measures, which were not included in this study. 
 
Vantage perspective (in BPD, but not exclusively) depends on the AMT cues used 
(Hypothesis 1 - exploratory) 
With respect to vantage perspective during recall, we explored, in analogy with OGM, 
whether higher levels of self-discrepancy were associated with higher proportions of 
observer memories, which are known to be less emotional. We found that BPD patients 
reported equal proportions of observer memories in response to both the standard 
AMT and the personalised AMT (Chapter 4). Likewise, using a ‘group-specific’ AMT for 
depression (Reza, 2011), we found that high and low discrepant cues did not evoke 
different proportions of observer memories in participants with a history of depression, 
nor in the never depressed participants. In the study of Koolen (2012), we administered 
a ‘group-specific’ AMT for BPD. We found that high discrepant cues and low discrepant 
cues did not evoke different levels of observer memories in those participants who 
reported the most complaints. In the group low on BPD complaints, however, the low 
(BPD) discrepant cues resulted in higher proportions of observer memories than the 
high (BPD) discrepant cues. These findings are contrary to what could be expected if the 
adoption of an observer perspective would serve functional avoidance (%O-HD > %O-
LD). Assuming that participants who report more BPD complaints have more widely 
endorsed BPD schemas, these findings also contradict what could be expected 
according to the CaR account (high BPD group > low BPD group). On the other hand, of 
course, cues that are low discrepant for BPD patients (e.g., tired, dissatisfied) may be 
high discrepant for respondents reporting only few BPD complaints. Perhaps these cues 
may induce comparison-based processing, which is found to be associated with more 
observer memories (e.g., Libby & Eibach, 2002). 
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To conclude then, taken into account our considerations about the validity of the 
methods used to cover self-discrepancy, findings suggest that self-discrepancy, in 
interaction with depressed state, adds to OGM, in BPD as well as in non-BPD 
participants. Findings, however, are limited in number, and future methodological 
improvements may help to further disentangle the potentially differential impact of 
self-discrepancy and self-relevance. 
Given our considerations formulated above on the impact of emotional dysregulation 
on autobiographical memory retrieval, one way to understand these findings would be 
to assume that sometimes, BPD patients may experience certain affective states, e.g., 
depression, in which the intensity of their emotions is reduced to more normal levels, 
or in which resources are further depleted, so that the intensity build-up is slowed 
down. In these circumstances, BPD patients may succeed to apply cognitive avoidance 
strategies, helping them to blunt unpleasant self-discrepant information. Likewise, 
given our considerations on identity disturbance, it could be argued that reduced 
resources due to depression in BPD patients may hinder the shifting between different 
self-concepts. Specific self-discrepant information should then be retrieved out of 
structures that are less accessible because they are linked to other self-concepts. 
Therefore, generic memories may be more likely in response to self-discrepant cues. 
With respect to the impact of self-discrepancy on vantage perspective during recall, 
findings are still inconclusive. As far as we know, we are the first to study the 
association between these concepts. Unfortunately, in retrospect, we believe we did 
not use the best method available to study this association. Also, in our non-clinical 
samples, results were inconsistent. Future studies should clarify this association, in 
different samples, and using sound methods. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Taken all findings together, we hypothesise that the CaR-FA-X model is not applicable 
to BPD patients. Yet, perhaps limited executive functioning adds to the explanation of 
the pattern of results with regard to OGM in BPD. In addition, we suggested that 
differences between depressed/traumatised and BPD patients with respect to OGM 
may relate to differences in affect-regulation in these samples. We further speculated 
that, in order for the CaR-FA-X model to negatively influence memory specificity, the 
presence of a rather stable, well-defined, and elaborated self-concept is necessary. This 
is not the case in BPD patients. 
Furthermore, with respect to vantage perspective during autobiographical memory 
retrieval, we hypothesised that BPD patients, stimulated by the distress caused by one’s 
affective instability, are motivated to develop a unified self-concept. However, they 
may lack the abilities to go beyond the first step of comparison (by means of an 
observer perspective) to the second step of successfully processing the similarities and 
differences (by means of a field perspective), and integrate them into their self-
concept. BPD patients with PTSD retrieve more observer memories. Given the inverse 
association with avoidance, we argued that observer memories in traumatised BPD 
patients might dampen the intensity of one’s emotions. 
Finally, regarding self-discrepancy, we found that depressed state interacted with self-
discrepancy to predict memory specificity. This may suggest that information 
processing in depressed BPD patients differs from that in BPD patients without MDD. 
 
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Given that reduced memory specificity predicts future depressive and post-traumatic 
symptom severity in BPD patients, we believe BPD patients, as depressed and 
traumatised patients, could potentially benefit from interventions that increase 
memory specificity, e.g., Memory Specificity Training (MeST; Moradi et al., 2014; Raes, 
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Williams, & Hermans, 2009), or Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Williams, 
Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). Elements of MBCT are included in Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), a therapeutic strategy that has shown to be 
effective in treating BPD (Trimbosinstituut, 2008). 
Furthermore, with respect to the treatment of PTSD, a core element of exposure is 
reliving the trauma, typically instructing patients to recall their trauma from a field 
perspective (Foa & Meadows, 1997). Although according to our findings the proportion 
of observer memories in BPD patients is not predictive of future symptom severity or 
traumatic state, levels of observer memories in BPD patients with PTSD are elevated 
compared to BPD patients without PTSD. Whereas some have argued that this hinders 
adequate processing of the traumatic experiences (e.g., Kenny et al., 2009), others 
suggested that an observer perspective in clinical groups prevents one to loose contact 
with emotional experiences (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2009). Linehan (1993) possibly 
combines both accounts, stating that the treatment of trauma in BPD patients should 
not be the first focus of treatment. BPD patients should first acquire behavioural (e.g., 
NSSI, suicidality), interpersonal (at least there should be a good relationship with the 
therapist), and societal stability (e.g., work, place to live). Likewise, schema-focused 
therapists do not directly introduce imagery rescripting exercises with respect to 
traumatic experiences in BPD patients. During the first stage of therapy, the therapist 
should primarily invest in bonding with the patient, and therapist and patients should 
agree on how to deal with feelings that generally induce self-destructive behaviours 
(Kellogg & Young, 2006). 
This would match the therapeutic inferences we would like to suggest based on the 
theoretical considerations outlined above. Indeed, against the background of the 
importance of one’s self-structure, we think treatment for BPD should primarily aim to 
strengthen the patients’ self-concept, and their abilities to integrate contradictory 
information. This way, BPD patients’ self-structure may reach levels at which they can 
use (reduced) memory specificity (and perhaps also vantage perspective during recall) 
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flexibly, as adaptive strategies (see, e.g., Debeer, Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2012, 
cited in Chapter 2, p. 45). As DBT, Mentalisation Based Therapy (MBT), and Schema-
Focused Therapy (SFT) have been shown to be effective in treating BPD 
(Trimbosinstituut, 2008). We believe these therapeutic frameworks all stimulate 
integration and self-growth, albeit in different ways. In MBT, social understanding is 
explicitly strengthened. DBT has an interpersonal skills training, elements of 
mindfulness, and social metaphors, besides skill trainings aimed at dealing with 
emotional dysregulation. Finally, SFT encourages the discussion between different parts 
of oneself, and uses limited reparenting to re-model the early relationships with 
important others. In addition, all frameworks have a consistent theory on the origin and 
development of BPD patients’ identity and behaviour. Such a model may contribute to 
the development of self-acceptance and self-confidence in BPD patients (Katsakou et 
al., 2012), which in turn is necessary to further develop one’s self-concept (e.g., Rice & 
Dellwo, 2002). 
 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the sections above, we already directly and indirectly suggested some ideas for 
future research. For instance, from a methodological point of view, we suggested how 
future studies could more validly address the question about the role of self-
discrepancy and/or self-relevancy. More specifically, we proposed that future studies 
could administer a standard AMT, after which respondents are asked to rate for each 
cue (a) how personally relevant it is; and (b) to what extent it currently deviates from 
one’s actual self-concept. This method would overcome the confounded scores mixing 
both self-relevance and self-discrepancy that we (Chapter 3) and Crane et al. (2007) 
used previously. In addition, especially with respect to BPD patients, this method would 
control for the potential impact of unstable self-concepts. 
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On the content level, we argued that BPD patients’ performances on the AMT (for both 
memory specificity and vantage perspective during recall) might depend on the current 
affective state they are in, and that depression in BPD patients not necessarily 
corresponds to depression in MDD. Future studies, thus, may investigate the nature of 
depression in BPD patients, and how it distinguishes from depression in MDD. In 
addition, we think it could be useful to include a measure that maps a respondent’s 
affective state prior to (and perhaps also after) AMT administration (or perhaps even 
before and after each cue) to investigate the impact of one’s affective state on 
autobiographical memory performance. 
Also, given that we are the first to study vantage perspective in BPD patients, future 
studies are recommended to further investigate vantage perspective in BPD patients. 
For instance, to see whether BPD patients indeed retrieve higher proportions of 
observer memories than non-BPD participants, we suggest to set up a study comparing 
the proportion of observer memories in different groups (normal controls, traumatised 
patients, BPD patients). Furthermore, it would be interesting to replicate our findings 
regarding the observer memory retrieval style we observed in traumatised BPD 
patients. As far as we know, only Kuyken and Howell (2006) studied the vantage 
perspective adopted while retrieving non-traumatic memories using the AMT as well. 
They did not found an observer memory retrieval style in their traumatised (depressed) 
adolescent participants. Future studies should disentangle whether these different 
findings are due to diagnosis, age or developmental stage of the participants, or other 
factors. Additionally, upcoming studies may try to replicate the (negative) association 
we found between the proportion of observer memories and IES-Avoidance in our BPD 
patients with PTSD. 
Other suggestions for future research closely relate to the theoretical considerations 
we formulated. First, we think it is important that future studies further study the 
association between executive functioning and OGM in BPD patients. Correlational 
studies should include measures of both visual and verbal working memory. In addition, 
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experimental studies could be set up, in which half of the participants is involved in 
tasks that use working memory, and the other half is not. If reduced executive 
functioning affects OGM, the participants who had a complementary working memory 
task should demonstrate more OGM. 
Furthermore, given the theoretical considerations we formulated above regarding the 
role of emotional dysregulation on memory specificity, future studies may attempt to 
replicate the findings of Selby, Anestis, Bender, and Joiner (2009), who found that (a) 
rumination in BPD patients resulted in greater reactivity and intensity of negative 
affect, and (b) that rumination partially mediated the relation between BPD symptoms 
and behavioural dysregulation. Extending these findings to memory specificity, it could 
then be tested whether or not the emotional intensity evoked by rumination in BPD 
patients correlates with memory specificity. 
We finally suggested that the deviant self-structure of BPD patients directly impacts on 
the autobiographical memory characteristics of interest. A first challenge in testing 
these hypothesis lies in operationalising the quality of one’s self-structure. A creditable 
attempt was made by Linville (1985), using the term self-complexity. Self-complexity 
was defined as “a joint function of the number of aspects [of one’s self, e.g., one’s roles 
or personality traits] and their degree of independence” (Linville, 1985, p. 99). Linville 
(1985) provided her participants with a pile of cards with traits. She asked them to 
categorise them in groups, putting those traits together they felt belonged together. 
More groups represented higher levels of self-complexity, and higher self-complexity 
was found to be associated with less extreme affective variability. Indeed, BPD patients 
are found to have lower grades of self-complexity (Gardner, 1997). Especially the lack of 
interrelatedness of one’s roles (‘self-concept differentiation’) was associated with BPD 
related symptoms (e.g., low self-esteem, dissociation) and worse parental bonding. 
(Lutz & Ross, 2003). We hypothesised that the CaR-FA-X model was only applicable in 
those with relatively high levels of self-complexity, c.q. self-concept differentiation. To 
test this hypothesis, one could examine these concepts in depressed, traumatised and 
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BPD patients, and see how they relate to OGM and/or vantage perspective during 
recall. More specifically, we would predict that low self-concept differentiation would 
result in less OGM and more observer memories. From a therapeutic point of view, we 
could argue that, if these hypotheses were corroborated in future studies, BPD patients 
would benefit from trainings helping them to integrate, c.q. differentiate complex data. 
Another aspect of our line of reasoning on the impact of identity disturbance on 
autobiographical memory specificity concerned switching between different self-
concepts. Zeigler-Hill and Abraham (2006) used experience sampling to investigate the 
association between the stability of one’s self-esteem and borderline features. They 
found that those who reported more borderline features displayed an unstable low 
self-esteem. Similar methods could be used to examine how often important self-
definitions are active, and whether instability on this behalf is associated with memory 
specificity and self-discrepancy. 
Finally, in general, we would like to stress the importance of studying large samples, 
given the complexity and heterogeneity of the BPD diagnosis. And, as suggested in 
Chapter 2, future studies may benefit from including clinical and non-clinical control 
groups to unravel differences in autobiographical memory functioning. 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
The importance of autobiographical memory for daily functioning justifies the study of 
its characteristics in both healthy and clinical participants. In this thesis, we essentially 
studied the presence and associations of the specificity and vantage perspective of 
autobiographical memories, two characteristics of voluntary memory retrieval, in BPD 
patients. We are aware that our work only highlights some small pieces of the puzzle of 
autobiographical memory. Indeed, previous studies have shown that autobiographical 
memory retrieval cannot be considered separately from encoding (e.g., Raes et al., 
2009) or processing (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000), the centrality (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 
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2006) and valence (e.g., traumatic vs non-traumatic; e.g., Porter & Birt, 2001) of the 
retrieved event for one’s personal life, and other memory characteristics, such as 
imagery aspects (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2010), the vividness of the memory 
(d’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006), or the extent to which the memory is 
experienced as intrusive (e.g., Bywaters, Andrade, & Turpin, 2004). Also, besides 
voluntary memory retrieval, some memories are experienced as involuntarily popping 
into our mind (e.g., Krans, 2013). It is only recently that researchers have begun to 
study these aspects of memory in relation to each other and the frameworks of 
autobiographical memory organisation (e.g., Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 
2013). 
Nevertheless, with respect to our research topics, we hope we have made a modest 
contribution by this thesis. In short, although the current studies are still inconclusive 
about the association between OGM and BPD, they suggest that OGM in BPD is not 
associated with a co-morbid diagnosis of neither MDD nor PTSD. Yet, given that OGM is 
predictive for future depressive and post-traumatic symptom severity, we think that 
OGM may have some clinical relevance in BPD patients as well. Also, OGM has been 
found to be associated with NSSI diversity. Furthermore, with respect to vantage 
perspective, we found that PTSD is associated with higher proportions of observer 
memories. Finally, our findings suggest that self-discrepancy adds to memory specificity 
in depressed BPD patients. We have argued that these findings could be interpreted 
against the background of reduced executive functioning, emotional dysregulation 
and/or identity disturbance, and we proposed directions for future studies to further 
investigate our ideas. 
BPD is a heterogeneous, though common diagnosis, and all sufferers (and their 
surroundings) report high clinical burden. Patients and society would therefore benefit 
from a clear understanding of information processes in these patients, being both a 
target for therapy as well as the medium by which therapy works. We hope this work, 
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despite its shortcomings, may contribute to a better understanding of this disorder and, 
eventually, to its treatment. 
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF OUGHT, IDEAL, AND FEARED SELVES  
(From Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007, p. 323) 
 
The ‘‘OUGHT SELF’’ was described as ‘‘the kind of person you believe you have a duty or 
obligation to be, or that you believe people think you should be. It’s defined by the 
personality characteristics you think you ought to possess, or feel obligated to possess. 
It’s not necessary that you have these characteristics now, only that you believe you 
ought to have them.’’ 
 
The ‘‘IDEAL SELF’’ was described as ‘‘the kind of person you’d really like to be. It’s defined 
by the personality characteristics you would ideally like to have. It’s not necessary that 
you have these characteristics now, only that you believe you want to have them.’’ 
 
The ‘‘FEARED SELF’’ was described as ‘‘the kind of person that you fear being, worry about 
being, or dislike being. It’s defined by the personality characteristics that you think you 
might have now or in the future, but that you would rather not have. It’s not necessary 
that you have these characteristics now, only that you do not want to have them, or 
want to avoid having them. 
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APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIONS OF ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
ACCEPTANCE AND ACTION QUESTIONNAIRE-II (AAQ-II; BOND ET AL., 2011; DUTCH TRANSLATION BY THE 
ACTINTERVISIE GROEP, 2006). 
The AAQ-II is a self-report measure of psychological inflexibility, acceptance, or experiential 
avoidance. It counts 10 Items that question the extent to which respondents try to escape 
from negative internal or private sensations, emotions, or cognitions. Participants should 
indicate how often they feel what is expressed in the items on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 
(never true) to 7 (always true), e.g. “My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling 
life”. Total scores thus vary from 10 to 70, with higher scores reflecting more experiential 
avoidance, while lower scores indicate acceptance and commitment for action. High internal 
consistency is reported, alpha = .84 (Bond et al., 2011), as well as excellent retest-reliability. 
Concurrent, predictive, and discriminant validity are very good too. 
 
DISSOCIATION QUESTIONNAIRE (DIS-Q; VANDERLINDEN, VAN DYCK, VERTOMMEN, VANDEREYCKEN, & VERKES, 
1993) 
This 63 item self-report questionnaire measures dissociation. It was constructed using items 
from the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), the Perceptual 
Alteration Scale (PAS; Sanders, 1986), and the Questionnaire of Experiences of Dissociation 
(QES; Riley, 1988), and some new items. Items should be scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 
indicating to what extent that statement is applicable to the respondent, ranging from not at 
all applicable to extremely applicable. Four subscales were defined (Vanderlinden et al., 1993, 
p. 23): (1) Identity confusion (25 items, ‘one is aware of influences of dissociated alter 
personalities’; (2) Loss of control over behaviour, thoughts, and emotions (18 items, 
‘experiences of losing control over behaviour, thoughts and feelings, and in that sense this 
subscale refers also to impulsiveness’); (3) Amnesia (14 items); and (4) Absorption (6 items, 
‘enhanced concentration’). Good internal consistency and test-retest reliability were reported, 
together with good construct and congruent validity (Vanderlinden et al., 1993). 
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WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE, 3RD ED., LETTER-NUMBER-SEQUENCING TASK (WAIS-CLN; WECHSLER, 
2000). 
The WAIS is an often used intelligence measure, consisting of 14 subtests. We only used one of 
them, the Letter-Number-Sequencing task. In this task, participants are presented with a 
growing sequence of letters and numbers. They are instructed to repeat all digits, but in 
another order. They should first list up all the numbers in ascending order, followed by the 
letters in alphabetical order. Five practice items are presented before actual testing begins. 
Then, three items consisting of two digits are presented. Furthermore, three items consisting 
of three items, and so on. The test stops when a respondent fails to repeat three items of the 
same length. This subtest was originally developed by Gold, Carpenter, Randolph, Goldberg, 
and Weinberger (1997), and it is part of the Working Memory Index that can be computed 
after administration of the full WAIS (Wechsler, 2000). We therefore used it as a compact 
estimation of working memory. 
 
WHITE BEAR SUPPRESSION INVENTORY (WBSI, WEGNER & ZANAKOS, 1994; DUTCH TRANSLATION BY MURIS, 
MERCKELBACH, & HORSELENBERG, 1996) 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) counts 15 items 
assessing the tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts, e.g. “I always put problems out of my 
mind”, or “I have often thoughts I try to avoid”. Respondents are asked to rate each item on a 
5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Total score thus ranges 
from 15 to 75, with higher scores indicating a stronger tendency to suppress unwanted 
thoughts. The Dutch translation we used has good internal consistency, alpha ranges from .86 
to .89, and satisfactory test-retest reliability, r = .80 after 12 weeks (Muris, Merckelbach, & 
Horselenberg, 1996; Rassin, Muris, Schmidt, & Merckelbach, 2000). Some have found a one-
factor solution ('thought suppression'; e.g., Muris et al., 1996; Rafnsson & Smari, 2001; Wegner 
& Zanakos, 1994), while others have found a second factor, which they called ‘failure of 
suppression’, or ‘intrusions’ (Höping & de Jong-Meyer, 2003; Rassin, 2003). 
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